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Abstract	  
Volkswagen’s	  Dieselgate	  scandal	  represents	  one	  of	   the	   largest	  automotive	  crises	   in	  history.	   In	  the	  
United	  States,	  approximately	  500,000	  cars	  were	  found	  to	  emit	  as	  much	  as	  40	  times	  the	  legal	  limits	  
in	  pollutants	  after	  the	  company	  installed	  software	  to	  defeat	  emissions	  testing.	  This	  mixed	  methods	  
case	   study	  examines	  owner	  and	  consumer	  opinions	   to	  determine	   the	   impact	   and	  effectiveness	  of	  
VW’s	   choice	   of	   compensation	   strategy	   for	   its	   crisis	   response.	   The	   study’s	   conclusions	   are	   that	  
consumer	  brand	  sentiment	  didn’t	  recover	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  two	  separate	  compensation	  offers.	  
In	  fact,	  factors	  including	  the	  company’s	  prior	  heavy	  advertising	  of	  the	  cars	  as	  “clean	  diesel”	  before	  
the	  discovery,	  intensified	  the	  feelings	  of	  shock	  and	  betrayal.	  Strong	  prior	  reputation,	  long	  seen	  as	  a	  
buffer	  against	  negative	  crisis	  reputational	  impact,	  is	  also	  examined.	  The	  study	  observes	  a	  corollary	  
to	   reputation	   as	   a	   buffer	   –	   finding	   instead	   that	   Volkswagen’s	   strong	   prior	   reputation	   and	   heavy	  
brand	  loyalty,	  coupled	  with	  its	  aggressive	  promotion	  of	  a	  false	  buying	  proposition,	  actually	  created	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As	  a	  public	  relations	  practitioner	  with	  25	  years	  of	  experience	  working	  with	  Fortune	  
500	  companies	  across	  industries	  and	  continents,	  and	  as	  someone	  who	  has	  counseled	  senior	  
executives	  through	  reputation	  management	  issues	  and	  worked	  crises	  ranging	  from	  
national	  product	  recalls	  to	  employee	  fatalities,	  I	  have	  long	  been	  interested	  in	  crisis	  
communications.	  In	  my	  academic	  scholarly	  research,	  I	  have	  gravitated	  toward	  theories	  and	  
concepts	  related	  to	  crisis	  communications,	  organizational	  relationships	  and	  organizational	  
stakeholder	  empowerment.	  I	  believe	  that	  intense	  examination	  of	  how	  organizations	  behave	  
in	  times	  of	  reputational	  challenges	  can	  be	  instructive	  to	  the	  practice	  and	  can	  contribute	  to	  
the	  body	  of	  academic	  knowledge	  that	  has	  been	  explored	  for	  decades	  in	  PR	  and	  marketing	  
communications.	  
In	  terms	  of	  media	  coverage,	  public	  interest	  and	  government	  involvement,	  the	  
current	  Volkswagen	  (VW)	  “Dieselgate”	  scandal	  has	  approached	  some	  of	  the	  largest	  
historical	  corporate	  crises.	  Fines	  levied	  against	  the	  company	  are	  easily	  the	  biggest	  in	  the	  
auto	  industry’s	  history	  (Bomey	  &	  Woodyard,	  2016)	  and	  total	  more	  than	  $17	  billion.	  These	  
events	  captured	  massive	  attention	  and	  even	  sparked	  major	  motion	  pictures.	  Hollywood	  has	  
already	  announced	  production	  of	  a	  movie	  about	  VW	  and	  Dieselgate	  (Petroff,	  2015).	  In	  VW’s	  
crisis	  approximately	  500,000	  automobiles	  in	  the	  United	  States	  alone	  were	  sold	  with	  
software	  that	  allowed	  them	  to	  pass	  initial	  environmental	  inspection,	  only	  later	  to	  switch	  off	  
and	  allow	  harmful	  gasses	  at	  a	  multiple	  of	  up	  to	  40	  times	  what	  is	  permitted	  by	  
environmental	  standards	  (Gates	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  Millions	  have	  been	  impacted	  by	  the	  VW	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Dieselgate	  scandal	  starting	  with	  the	  company’s	  own	  customers,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  loyal,	  
multiple	  VW	  car	  owners,	  who	  now	  face	  owning	  cars	  that	  have	  lost	  lost	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  
in	  value	  and	  were	  essentially	  illegal.	  	  	  
The	  facts	  behind	  the	  VW	  scandal	  are	  well-­‐documented.	  	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  2015,	  VW	  
admitted	  that,	  over	  a	  period	  of	  years,	  it	  had	  altered	  approximately	  11	  million	  diesel-­‐
powered	  vehicles	  worldwide	  so	  that	  they	  could	  cheat	  government	  emissions	  tests	  (Gates	  et	  
al.,	  2017).	  The	  article	  speculated	  that	  VW’s	  motive	  was	  to	  improve	  fuel	  economy	  and	  
increase	  performance.	  Prior	  to	  the	  scandal,	  VW	  had	  been	  aggressively	  advertising	  and	  
promoting	  its	  “TDI”	  diesel	  vehicles	  as	  clean-­‐running	  and	  environmentally	  friendly.	  But,	  as	  
described	  in	  the	  article	  and	  numerous	  other	  media	  reports,	  by	  cheating	  emissions	  
standards,	  VW	  and	  Audi-­‐branded	  diesels	  (VW	  manufacturers	  Audi	  cars)	  were	  actually	  
emitting	  excessive	  amounts	  of	  nitrogen	  oxides,	  a	  pollutant	  that	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  
respiratory	  diseases	  and	  other	  health	  issues.	  
Immediate	  Reaction	  
One	  of	  the	  early	  questions	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  VW’s	  admission	  was	  just	  how	  widespread	  
the	  crisis	  was.	  By	  late	  September,	  Germany’s	  transportation	  minister	  gave	  the	  first	  
indication	  that	  affected	  cars	  also	  existed	  in	  Europe	  (“Volkswagen	  trickery,”	  2015)	  and	  that	  
11	  million	  cars	  worldwide	  were	  fitted	  with	  the	  cheat	  software.	  
Much	  attention	  was	  also	  focused	  on	  who	  within	  VW’s	  corporate	  governance	  
structure	  had	  knowledge	  about	  the	  cheat	  device	  and	  when	  they	  knew	  it.	  CEO	  Martin	  
Winterkorn	  resigned	  in	  the	  days	  following	  the	  announcement	  and	  was	  under	  heavy	  
scrutiny.	  VW	  soon	  acknowledged	  that	  Winterkorn	  had	  received	  an	  internal	  memo	  in	  May	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2014	  “that	  contained	  information	  about	  irregularities	  in	  the	  emissions	  of	  its	  diesel	  cars”	  
(Ewing,	  2016)	  well	  over	  a	  year	  before	  the	  company	  admitted	  to	  planting	  the	  cheat	  
software.	  The	  question	  of	  when	  the	  company	  had	  knowledge	  was	  important	  from	  a	  legal	  
perspective	  since	  shareholders	  had	  claimed	  the	  company	  had	  broken	  German	  law	  by	  not	  
informing	  them	  sooner.	  	  
Media	  coverage	  also	  focused	  on	  customer	  impact.	  VW	  was	  a	  widely	  popular	  brand	  
and	  had	  aggressively	  marketed	  its	  TDI	  models	  as	  being	  environmentally	  friendly.	  CNN	  
interviewed	  VW	  owners	  and	  reported	  that	  the	  company’s	  “costly	  lie”	  had	  “left	  its	  customers	  
feeling	  confused,	  cheated	  and	  steaming	  mad”	  (Garcia,	  2015).	  The	  CNN	  article	  shared	  TDI	  
customer	  stories	  including	  a	  college	  freshman	  who	  had	  saved	  $19,000	  working	  summer	  
jobs	  to	  get	  her	  first	  car,	  only	  to	  see	  the	  car	  lose	  more	  than	  $10,000	  in	  resale	  value	  in	  a	  
matter	  of	  days.	  A	  California	  physician	  bought	  his	  TDI	  because	  he	  wanted	  to	  lower	  his	  
carbon	  footprint:	  “There	  was	  a	  sense	  we	  were	  doing	  the	  world	  some	  good.	  To	  have	  it	  
flipped	  180	  degrees	  is	  just	  shocking.	  I	  haven’t	  computed	  the	  cost	  to	  society	  now	  that	  I’m	  
spewing	  out	  nitrous	  oxide	  but	  it’s	  definitely	  an	  ironic	  twist.”	  An	  Arizona	  TDI	  owner	  called	  
the	  scandal	  a	  shame	  for	  corporate	  America:	  “People	  already	  had	  such	  skepticism	  about	  the	  
labeling	  of	  products,	  and	  now	  this	  just	  adds	  to	  the	  sense	  that	  corporations	  don’t	  have	  
consumers’	  best	  interests	  at	  heart”	  (Garcia,	  2015).	  
Another	  hot	  media	  topic	  was	  the	  possible	  impact	  on	  VW	  as	  a	  company	  and	  impact	  to	  
its	  brand	  value.	  Just	  a	  month	  after	  the	  news	  broke,	  and	  well	  before	  any	  talk	  of	  the	  
company’s	  ultimate	  response,	  Fortune	  magazine	  reported	  that,	  despite	  the	  massive	  impact	  
of	  VW’s	  action,	  ultimate	  effect	  on	  the	  brand	  had	  been	  less	  than	  expected.	  	  It	  quoted	  a	  flash	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survey	  conducted	  after	  the	  news	  broke	  from	  Northwestern	  University	  showing	  nearly	  50	  
percent	  of	  consumers	  still	  had	  a	  positive	  or	  very	  positive	  impression	  of	  VW	  and	  less	  than	  
five	  percent	  used	  negative	  terms	  to	  describe	  the	  company.	  It	  cited	  possible	  reasons	  
including	  numerous	  prior	  automaker	  crises	  that	  had	  numbed	  consumers	  to	  bad	  news	  about	  
automakers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  other	  previous	  auto	  crises	  were	  safety-­‐related,	  
resulting	  in	  loss	  of	  life.	  
Consequences	  for	  VW	  	  
At	  the	  executive	  level,	  fallout	  was	  swift.	  After	  CEO	  Winterkorn	  resigned	  almost	  
immediately,	  the	  company’s	  United	  States	  head	  also	  resigned.	  Its	  U.S.	  regulatory	  director	  
was	  arrested	  in	  January	  2017.	  
Remaining	  company	  leaders	  have	  been	  left	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  far-­‐ranging	  fallout	  from	  
Dieselgate,	  which	  has	  included	  multiple	  lawsuits,	  actions	  by	  various	  governments	  and	  even	  
a	  suit	  filed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  alleging	  deceptive	  advertising	  
relating	  to	  the	  “clean	  diesel”	  claim	  in	  which	  the	  FTC	  seeks	  more	  than	  $15	  billion	  in	  total	  
damages	  (Bomey,	  2016).	  
The	  stark	  contrast	  between	  vehicles	  that	  were	  promoted	  as	  clean	  running	  and	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  they	  were	  actually	  highly	  polluting	  was	  “an	  FTC	  case	  waiting	  to	  happen	  
because	  they	  based	  their	  entire	  advertising	  campaign	  on	  this	  benefit”	  according	  to	  one	  
advertising	  and	  media	  attorney	  quoted	  in	  USA	  TODAY	  (Bomey,	  2016).	  The	  FTC	  pointed	  to	  
VW’s	  use	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  “environmentally-­‐conscious,”	  “eco-­‐conscious”	  and	  “green”	  to	  
illustrate	  the	  deception.	  	  VW’s	  “clean	  diesel”	  messages	  had	  appeared	  in	  multiple	  media	  
channels.	  One	  VW	  online	  video	  in	  which	  a	  woman	  held	  a	  white	  scarf	  against	  the	  exhaust	  of	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a	  VW	  TDI	  and	  proclaimed	  it	  to	  be	  pristine	  was	  viewed	  more	  than	  nine	  million	  times	  
(Bomey,	  2016).	  
In	  June	  of	  2016,	  German	  prosecutors	  said	  they	  were	  formally	  expanding	  
investigations	  to	  the	  VW	  executive	  ranks	  although	  the	  company	  had	  maintained	  that	  the	  
scandal	  originated	  and	  was	  confined	  to	  lower	  ranking	  managers	  (Ewing,	  2016).	  
Prosecutors	  were	  investigating	  whether	  senior	  executives	  were	  in	  violation	  of	  securities	  
laws	  regarding	  information	  disclosure.	  
VW’s	  History	  and	  Reputation	  	  
VW	  is	  a	  German	  company	  with	  an	  interesting	  history	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  1930s.	  Its	  
name	  translates	  to	  “people’s	  automobile,”	  and	  its	  original	  mission	  was	  to	  provide	  
affordable	  auto	  transportation	  for	  the	  masses.	  This	  mission	  was	  actively	  supported	  by	  
Adolf	  Hitler	  and	  Nazi	  Germany;	  they	  wanted	  German	  citizens	  to	  have	  the	  same	  access	  to	  
automobiles	  as	  did	  citizens	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  VW	  grew	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  
automakers,	  with	  recorded	  revenues	  of	  nearly	  $240	  billion	  (U.S.)	  in	  2014.	  
It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  in	  the	  modern	  era	  and	  prior	  to	  Dieselgate,	  VW	  was	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  well-­‐respected	  and	  coveted	  brands	  in	  the	  world,	  ranking	  ahead	  of	  
household	  names	  such	  as	  Ford,	  Audi,	  Sony,	  Facebook	  and	  Adidas	  in	  the	  annual	  brand	  value	  
report	  from	  Interbrand	  (Ranking	  The	  Brands,	  2013).	  	  Just	  as	  importantly,	  its	  brand	  value	  
was	  growing	  -­‐-­‐	  with	  a	  20	  percent	  increase	  in	  value	  from	  the	  prior	  year.	  Only	  Apple,	  Google	  
and	  Amazon	  had	  larger	  brand	  value	  growth	  over	  the	  same	  time.	  Among	  automakers,	  VW	  
had	  the	  third	  highest	  brand	  ranking	  globally,	  behind	  only	  BMW	  and	  Toyota.	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Another	  brand	  ranking	  instrument,	  the	  Reputation	  Institute’s	  Global	  RepTrak	  100,	  
followed	  VW’s	  brand	  rankings	  with	  attention	  given	  to	  post-­‐crisis	  impact.	  That	  RepTrak	  100	  
measures	  a	  company’s	  ability	  to	  deliver	  on	  stakeholder	  expectations	  across	  seven	  
dimensions	  including	  governance,	  leadership,	  performance	  and	  citizenship.	  (Reputation	  
Institute,	  2015)	  The	  Reputation	  Institute	  found	  that	  consumers	  support	  companies	  that	  
perform	  well	  across	  those	  seven	  dimensions	  through	  supportive	  behaviors	  such	  as	  
purchasing,	  recommending	  and	  investing.	  In	  2015,	  VW	  had	  the	  third	  highest	  RepTrak	  auto	  
industry	  reputation	  score	  trailing	  only	  BMW	  and	  Daimler.	  In	  2016,	  it	  was	  in	  last	  place.	  
After	  Dieselgate,	  the	  RepTrak	  2016	  report	  found	  that	  the	  company’s	  reputation	  
dropped	  nearly	  14	  points	  from	  2015	  to	  2016	  from	  an	  overall	  score	  of	  75.0	  in	  2015	  to	  61.3	  
in	  2016	  (Reputation	  Institute,	  2016).	  The	  average	  loss	  for	  automakers	  in	  the	  2016	  RepTrak	  
report	  was	  two	  points.	  The	  three	  dimensions	  of	  reputation	  where	  VW	  saw	  double-­‐digit	  
drops	  were	  governance,	  citizenship	  (a	  dimension	  where	  the	  year	  prior	  it	  was	  ranked	  in	  the	  
top	  ten	  worldwide),	  and	  leadership.	  
In	  terms	  of	  financial	  performance,	  the	  company	  suffered	  almost	  immediately,	  as	  
sales	  of	  all	  VW	  models	  fell	  20	  percent	  by	  December,	  2015.	  Its	  stock	  price	  plummeted,	  with	  
shares	  falling	  from	  a	  high	  of	  $50	  in	  March,	  2015,	  to	  $20	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  the	  news.	  	  It	  
went	  from	  recording	  positive	  net	  income	  of	  more	  than	  $2	  billion	  in	  2014	  to	  taking	  a	  net	  
loss	  of	  $6.2	  billion	  in	  2015	  (Gates	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  
Environmental	  Impact	  
Unlike	  safety	  crises	  faced	  by	  other	  automakers,	  VW’s	  crisis	  didn’t	  result	  in	  
immediate	  human	  health	  impact	  that	  could	  be	  directly	  tied	  to	  the	  emissions	  scandal.	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However,	  environmental	  experts	  weighed	  in	  on	  the	  dangers	  of	  adding	  additional	  air	  
pollutants	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  costs	  to	  human	  health.	  Selin	  (2015)	  in	  her	  article	  for	  grist.com	  
explained	  the	  impact:	  
The	  pollutants	  that	  VW	  failed	  to	  effectively	  control	  are	  nitric	  oxide	  (NO)	  and	  
nitrogen	   dioxide	   (NO2),	   which	   are	   collectively	   known	   as	   NOx.	   Combined	  
with	   other	   atmospheric	   pollutants,	   NOx	   can	   form	   even	   more	   dangerous	  
pollutants:	   ozone	   and	   particulate	   matter.	   The	   EPA	   regulations	   for	   diesel	  
engines	  limit	  the	  amount	  of	  NOx	  that	  can	  be	  emitted	  per	  mile	  traveled.	  VW	  
classified	   its	   vehicles	   as	   meeting	   the	   so-­‐called	   TierII/Bin	   5	   emission	  
standards,	  which	  means	  it	  was	  allowed	  to	  emit	  0.07	  grams	  of	  NOx	  for	  every	  
mile	  traveled	  over	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  vehicle.	  Actual	  emissions	  from	  affected	  
cars	  were	  reported	  to	  be	  10	  to	  40	  times	  higher.	  With	  more	  that	  480,000	  cars	  
affected,	   estimates	   have	   ranged	   from	   10,000	   to	   40,000	   tons	   of	   extra	   NOx	  
released	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  (Selin,	  2015)	  
	  
Selin	  also	  explained	  the	  health	  effects	  of	  breathing	  small	  particles	  into	  the	  lungs	  
including	  asthma,	  decreased	  overall	  lung	  function,	  bronchitis	  and	  heart	  attack.	  VWs	  are	  
popular	  cars	  amongst	  urban	  drivers,	  so	  the	  prospect	  of	  high-­‐polluting	  automobiles	  in	  areas	  
already	  saturated	  with	  carbon	  emissions	  painted	  an	  especially	  dark	  picture	  according	  to	  
environmental	  experts.	  	  A	  satellite	  heat	  map	  published	  by	  grist.com	  shows	  a	  dramatic	  
image	  of	  thousands	  of	  VW	  TDI	  auto	  owner	  home	  addresses	  overlayed	  onto	  already	  heavily-­‐
populated	  areas	  in	  high	  pollution	  index	  counties	  in	  California.	  
	  
	   	   	  
8	  
VW’s	  Crisis	  Response	  and	  Communications	  
VW’s	  communications	  to	  customers	  throughout	  the	  crisis	  followed	  an	  arc	  that	  began	  
with	  its	  public	  pledge	  to	  first	  cooperate	  with	  the	  investigation	  and	  “to	  fixing	  the	  issue	  as	  
soon	  as	  possible”	  (Volkswagen:	  News	  &	  Updates,	  2015,	  September	  18)	  and	  several	  
statements	  about	  its	  “shock”	  related	  to	  the	  findings.	  The	  company	  established	  a	  website	  as	  
a	  means	  to	  keep	  customers	  informed,	  www.vwdieselinfo.com,	  and	  regularly	  posted	  news	  
about	  its	  activities	  related	  to	  Dieselgate.	  In	  its	  very	  first	  posting	  to	  the	  site	  on	  Sept.	  23,	  
2015,	  VW	  signaled	  that	  it	  understood	  the	  road	  ahead	  to	  rebuild	  its	  reputation,	  saying	  “the	  
executive	  committee	  is	  aware	  that	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  crisis	  of	  trust	  will	  be	  a	  long	  
term	  task	  the	  requires	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  consistency	  and	  thoroughness”	  (Volkswagen:	  News	  
&	  Updates,	  2015,	  September	  23).	  	  	  
Finally,	  in	  January	  of	  2016,	  the	  company	  announced	  what	  it	  called	  its	  attempt	  to	  
“restore	  the	  invaluable	  trust”	  of	  its	  customers	  by	  offering	  them	  a	  “goodwill	  package”	  of	  two	  
$500	  gift	  cards	  (one	  which	  could	  be	  redeemed	  anywhere,	  another	  that	  could	  be	  used	  for	  
products	  and	  services	  at	  VW	  dealerships	  and	  free	  access	  to	  roadside	  assistance)	  
(Volkswagen:	  News	  &	  Updates,	  2016,	  January	  11).	  The	  package	  was	  estimated	  to	  cost	  VW	  
nearly	  $250	  million.	  	  The	  company	  conducted	  several	  outreach	  initiatives	  to	  customers	  to	  
promote	  the	  compensation	  package,	  and	  approximately	  125,000	  customers	  signed	  on	  to	  
receive	  the	  gift	  cards	  in	  the	  first	  ten	  days	  after	  it	  was	  offered	  (“Volkswagen	  CEO	  admits”,	  
2015).	  Accepting	  the	  gift	  cards	  did	  not	  affect	  customers’	  right	  to	  pursue	  other	  legal	  action	  
in	  the	  future	  (Ewing	  &	  Mouawad,	  2015).	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Media	  coverage	  of	  the	  goodwill	  package	  focused	  on	  customer	  reaction	  and	  recorded	  
comments	  from	  customers	  who	  said	  they	  felt	  insulted.	  These	  customers	  expressed	  anger	  
and	  characterized	  the	  action	  as	  an	  empty	  gesture.	  	  A	  Kansas	  City	  Star	  editorial	  called	  the	  
package	  a	  “half-­‐hearted	  attempt	  to	  compensate	  the	  people	  they	  had	  lied	  to,	  offering	  them	  a	  
paltry	  $1,000”	  (“VW	  scandal	  a	  case	  study,”	  2016).	  
Prominent	  voices	  weighed	  in	  on	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  goodwill	  package.	  Two	  United	  
States	  senators,	  Richard	  Blumethal	  and	  Edward	  Markey,	  called	  the	  offer	  “grossly	  
inadequate”	  and	  “a	  fig	  leaf	  attempting	  to	  hide	  the	  true	  depths	  of	  Volkswagen’s	  deception”	  
(Leinert	  &	  Cremer,	  2015).	  They	  called	  for	  further	  investigation	  and	  urged	  VW	  to	  offer	  all	  
owners	  a	  buy-­‐back	  option	  for	  their	  TDI	  models.	  
The	  goodwill	  package	  was	  the	  company’s	  only	  compensation	  outreach	  to	  consumers	  
until	  June	  of	  2016,	  when	  it	  finally	  reached	  an	  ultimate	  settlement	  of	  more	  than	  $10	  billion	  
with	  the	  United	  States	  government.	  The	  settlement	  offered	  owners	  either	  a	  buy	  back	  or	  fix	  
for	  all	  affected	  vehicles,	  as	  well	  as	  restitution	  payments	  of	  several	  thousand	  dollars	  to	  each	  
owner.	  In	  total,	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  said	  that	  consumers	  could	  expect	  to	  get	  between	  
$12,500	  to	  $44,000	  depending	  on	  the	  age	  of	  the	  vehicle	  (Gates,	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  Owners	  
received	  individual	  notices	  about	  their	  buyback	  or	  fix	  	  offer	  with	  terms	  dependent	  on	  the	  
age	  of	  vehicle	  and	  other	  benchmarks.	  The	  final	  settlement	  was	  easily	  the	  largest	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  auto	  industry	  and	  surpassed	  recent	  settlements	  from	  other	  crises	  faced	  by	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The	  Value	  of	  this	  Research	  Project	  
In	  this	  project,	  I	  plan	  to	  undertake	  an	  extensive	  case	  study	  and	  analysis	  of	  one	  
aspect	  of	  VW’s	  strategic	  communications	  efforts	  after	  the	  crisis	  broke	  -­‐-­‐	  specifically,	  the	  
crisis	  response	  strategies	  the	  company	  used	  as	  it	  sought	  to	  repair	  its	  reputation	  with	  its	  
own	  customers	  and	  the	  car-­‐buying	  public.	  By	  closely	  examining	  Dieselgate	  and	  VW’s	  crisis	  
response	  strategy,	  I	  hope	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  an	  organization	  to	  repair,	  
maintain	  or	  enhance	  trust	  after	  a	  major	  reputational	  crisis.	  	  	  
PR	  and	  marketing	  researchers	  frequently	  study	  trust	  (as	  an	  element	  of	  reputation)	  
and	  the	  ability	  for	  organizations	  to	  form	  mutually	  beneficial	  relationships.	  In	  times	  of	  crisis,	  
trust,	  reputation	  and	  relationships	  are	  tested.	  Further,	  modern	  consumers	  are	  more	  
empowered	  than	  ever	  through	  digital	  engagement	  tools	  such	  as	  social	  media,	  which	  makes	  
crisis	  response	  even	  more	  important.	  
Through	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  methodologies,	  I	  will	  examine	  customer	  
reaction	  to	  VW’s	  response	  strategies	  and	  how	  customer	  perceptions	  were	  impacted.	  As	  a	  
theoretical	  basis	  for	  my	  research,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  theories	  including	  Benoit’s	  image	  repair	  
theory	  (IRT)	  [1]	  and	  Coombs’	  situational	  crisis	  communications	  theory	  (SCCT).	  Other	  
concepts	  discussed	  and	  applied	  will	  include	  values-­‐based	  management,	  the	  reflective	  
paradigm	  of	  public	  relations	  and	  other	  discussions	  of	  PR	  and	  relationship-­‐building	  between	  
an	  organization	  and	  its	  publics.	  
Research	  Project	  Timeframe	  and	  the	  Ongoing	  Nature	  of	  Dieselgate	  	  
My	  research	  focuses	  on	  a	  relatively	  short,	  but	  important,	  time	  in	  the	  Dieselgate	  
scandal.	  The	  crisis	  is	  not	  over.	  	  It	  continues	  as	  of	  the	  date	  of	  this	  research	  project,	  and	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therefore	  the	  complete	  case	  study	  is	  unable	  to	  be	  written.	  In	  this	  project,	  my	  interest	  is	  in	  
VW’s	  crisis	  response	  strategy	  immediately	  afterwards	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2015	  (specifically,	  the	  
goodwill	  package	  offer	  timeframe)	  and	  later	  in	  2016	  when	  VW	  reached	  the	  final	  $10	  billion	  
settlement	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  These	  moments	  are	  particularly	  important	  because	  they	  
speak	  to	  VW’s	  crisis	  response	  efforts.	  By	  examining	  how	  companies	  respond	  during	  crisis,	  
we	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  body	  of	  knowledge	  about	  what	  constitutes	  an	  effective	  response	  
strategy	  and	  can	  help	  organizations	  understand	  how	  best	  to	  rebuild	  and	  preserve	  
reputation.	  
Lawsuits,	  government	  actions	  and	  various	  stakeholder	  actions	  continue	  to	  surface	  
and	  evolve	  as	  of	  the	  date	  of	  this	  project.	  	  News	  continues	  to	  break	  on	  an	  almost	  daily	  basis	  
about	  Dieselgate	  as	  the	  U.S.	  and	  other	  countries	  assess	  impact,	  levy	  fines	  and	  work	  with	  VW	  
to	  arrive	  at	  what	  they	  feel	  is	  adequate	  response.	  For	  example,	  a	  U.S.	  judge	  ordered	  VW	  to	  
pay	  an	  additional	  $2.8	  billion	  penalty	  on	  April	  21,	  2017	  (Burden,	  2017).	  While	  I	  chose	  to	  
focus	  only	  on	  VW’s	  U.S.	  crisis	  response	  in	  fall	  of	  2015	  and	  2016,	  these	  later	  developments	  
are	  certainly	  interesting	  and	  perhaps	  worthy	  of	  further	  study.	  	  
One	  example	  of	  another	  area	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  culture	  that	  existed	  at	  VW.	  The	  
company’s	  management	  style	  and	  culture	  has	  drawn	  a	  high	  level	  of	  scrutiny.	  Shortly	  after	  
Dieselgate	  broke,	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  described	  how,	  historically,	  VW	  had	  been	  highly	  
autocratic	  and	  “governed	  through	  an	  unusual	  hybrid	  of	  family	  control,	  government	  
ownership	  and	  labor	  influence”	  (Gates	  et	  al.,	  2017).	  The	  article	  quotes	  an	  expert	  who	  
studied	  VW	  as	  saying	  that	  “the	  company’s	  isolation,	  its	  clannish	  board	  and	  a	  deep-­‐rooted	  
hostility	  to	  environmental	  regulations	  among	  its	  engineers”	  made	  a	  major	  scandal	  all	  but	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inevitable.	  Other	  published	  articles	  described	  VW’s	  relentless	  push	  to	  be	  number	  one	  and	  
how	  that	  singular	  focus	  led	  engineers	  and	  others	  involved	  with	  Dieselgate	  to	  cut	  corners	  in	  
order	  to	  make	  the	  cars’	  performance	  even	  more	  appealing	  to	  the	  car-­‐buying	  public.	  
Also	  of	  interest	  and	  perhaps	  an	  avenue	  for	  future	  research	  into	  automotive	  crises	  is	  
the	  January,	  2017,	  announcement	  that	  United	  States	  government	  was	  launching	  an	  
investigation	  into	  Fiat	  Chrysler	  that	  involved	  that	  company’s	  failure	  to	  disclose	  software	  
that	  impacted	  environmental	  emissions.	  While	  that	  investigation	  is	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  and,	  
as	  yet,	  does	  not	  allege	  the	  same	  level	  of	  knowledge	  and	  cover-­‐up	  at	  the	  executive	  level,	  the	  
parallels	  are	  interesting	  and	  definitely	  worthy	  of	  similar	  scrutiny	  in	  future	  research.	  
Because	  this	  project	  confines	  its	  scope	  to	  crisis	  response,	  I	  believe	  it	  can	  make	  an	  
important	  academic	  research	  contribution.	  	  As	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  
crisis	  response	  strategies	  have	  usually	  been	  reviewed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  qualitative	  case	  studies	  
looking	  at	  historically	  relevant	  organizational	  crises.	  Scholars	  have	  pointed	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  
case	  studies	  that	  have	  combined	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  analysis.	  Only	  in	  the	  
recent	  past	  have	  studies	  been	  promoted	  that	  have	  included	  more	  quantitative	  analysis	  (the	  
best	  example,	  as	  will	  be	  mentioned	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  is	  the	  2016	  book	  edited	  by	  
Blaney	  that	  includes	  a	  collection	  of	  case	  studies	  with	  quantitative	  analysis,	  all	  of	  which	  look	  
at	  Benoit’s	  image	  repair	  theory).	  
It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  view	  Dieselgate	  in	  context	  with	  the	  overall	  health	  and	  future	  
of	  VW.	  	  By	  closely	  analyzing	  VW’s	  crisis	  response	  strategy,	  we	  can	  try	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  
what	  the	  ultimate	  impact	  of	  a	  major	  crisis	  is	  on	  the	  affected	  brand.	  In	  recent	  weeks,	  VW	  
overtook	  Toyota	  as	  the	  world’s	  largest	  automaker	  in	  terms	  of	  volume	  of	  cars	  sold.	  Also,	  as	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reported	  by	  the	  marketing	  analysis	  website	  thedrum.com,	  VW	  has	  continued	  to	  
aggressively	  market	  its	  non-­‐TDI	  models	  throughout	  the	  Dieselgate	  time	  period,	  launching	  
new	  ad	  campaigns	  at	  the	  Super	  Bowl	  and	  in	  prime	  time	  media.	  	  
The	  analysis	  by	  thedrum.com	  points	  out	  that	  while	  VW’s	  reputation	  scores	  have	  not	  
returned	  to	  pre-­‐crisis	  levels,	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  as	  the	  company’s	  new	  advertising	  
emphasizes	  the	  high	  quality	  and	  great	  owner	  loyalty	  that	  characterized	  it	  pre-­‐Dieselgate.	  
Niall	  Quinn,	  head	  of	  corporate	  public	  relations	  at	  The	  Reputations	  Agency,	  explains	  his	  
feeling	  that	  the	  work	  that	  VW	  had	  already	  put	  into	  building	  its	  reputation	  over	  many	  years	  
could	  also	  have	  helped	  its	  return	  to	  recovery	  and	  secure	  its	  top	  position	  globally	  
(“Volkswagen’s	  crowning,”	  2017).	  
To	  Quinn’s	  point,	  this	  research	  will	  also	  look	  specifically	  at	  VW’s	  prior	  levels	  of	  
reputational	  goodwill,	  especially	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  how	  customers	  reacted	  to	  both	  of	  its	  
compensation	  packages	  and	  whether	  its	  past	  reputational	  goodwill	  paid	  dividends	  later.	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Literature	  Review	  
In	  undertaking	  my	  case	  study	  of	  Volkswagen	  and	  Dieselgate,	  I	  seek	  to	  understand	  
prior	  research	  of	  corporate	  crises	  as	  well	  as	  theories	  that	  can	  be	  instructive	  in	  helping	  
analyze	  organizational	  behavior	  broadly	  and	  crisis	  communications	  response	  specifically.	  I	  
want	  to	  understand	  how	  thinking	  about	  organizational	  behavior	  has	  evolved.	  Also,	  I	  want	  
to	  review	  foundational	  thinking	  around	  crisis	  communications	  so	  that	  I	  have	  a	  
comprehensive	  frame	  of	  reference	  when	  examining	  Volkswagen’s	  activities.	  
In	  this	  section,	  I’ll	  review	  recent	  trends	  toward	  ethical	  behavioral	  norms	  as	  
manifested	  in	  values-­‐based	  management	  (as	  well	  as	  broad	  notions	  about	  organizational-­‐
stakeholder	  relationships	  and	  organizational	  communications	  theories);	  how	  crises	  are	  
defined	  and	  classified;	  the	  role	  of	  trust	  in	  relationships;	  crisis	  communications	  response	  
theories;	  and	  scholarly	  observations	  about	  what	  constitutes	  effective	  crisis	  
communications	  response.	  
Organizations	  and	  their	  relationships	  with	  stakeholders	  
Just	  a	  few	  decades	  ago,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  an	  organization’s	  management	  to	  its	  
stakeholders	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  secondary	  obligation.	  	  Wenstop	  and	  Myrmel	  (2006)	  explain	  
that	  management	  guru	  Milton	  Friedman	  said	  in	  1970	  that	  management’s	  duty	  was	  to	  focus	  
on	  maximizing	  profits	  and	  that	  the	  free	  market	  and	  societal	  values	  will	  take	  care	  of	  
everyone	  else.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  today	  most	  modern	  definitions	  of	  organizational	  public	  relations	  center	  
on	  a	  concern	  with	  fostering	  mutually	  beneficial	  relationships	  between	  organizations	  and	  
stakeholders.	  	  While	  each	  party	  has	  differing	  interests,	  goals	  and	  objectives,	  the	  goal	  is	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often	  characterized	  as	  striving	  for	  “win-­‐win”	  scenarios.	  Grunig	  (2001)	  describes	  a	  two-­‐way	  
communications	  model	  with	  a	  symmetrical	  orientation	  striving	  for	  a	  balance	  between	  
advocacy	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  accommodation	  on	  the	  other	  so	  that	  the	  parties	  perceive	  
outcomes	  in	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  win-­‐win	  zone	  
Two-­‐way	  symmetrical	  communications	  has	  become	  a	  normative	  theory	  in	  public	  
relations	  and	  organizational	  communications.	  Early	  on,	  some	  scholars	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  
theory	  and	  equated	  it	  with	  accommodation.	  Grunig	  defended	  the	  criticism	  by	  saying	  that	  it	  
balances	  advocacy	  and	  accommodation	  and	  that	  “the	  concept	  of	  symmetry	  directly	  implies	  
a	  balance	  of	  the	  organization’s	  and	  the	  public’s	  interest”	  (p.	  15).	  
The	  concept	  of	  how	  the	  organization	  views	  its	  agenda	  relative	  to	  all	  of	  its	  
stakeholders	  is	  important	  when	  we	  examine	  corporate	  behavior	  (normally	  or	  in	  times	  of	  
crisis).	  	  Grunig	  explains	  that	  is	  why	  he	  chose	  the	  term	  symmetry	  to	  describe	  his	  theory.	  
The	  basic	  idea	  was	  that	  public	  relations	  should	  go	  beyond	  the	  advocacy	  of	  
self-­‐interest	  without	  concern	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  an	  organization’s	  behavior	  
on	  others	  to	  a	  balance	  between	  self-­‐interest	  and	  concern	  for	  the	  interests	  
of	  others.	  (p.	  28)	  
Other	  scholars	  have	  studied	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  organizations	  orient	  themselves	  to	  
stakeholders.	  Holmström	  (2008)	  describes	  the	  reflective	  paradigm	  of	  public	  relations	  as	  an	  
orientation	  by	  which	  the	  organization	  sees	  itself	  in	  a	  polycontextual	  world	  where	  it	  exists	  
within	  a	  societal	  framework	  with	  others	  (in	  contrast	  to	  a	  monocontextual	  view).	  The	  
organization	  uses	  reflection,	  rather	  than	  reflex,	  to	  relate	  to	  stakeholders	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  
manage	  them	  from	  a	  purely	  self-­‐motivated	  standpoint.	  Therefore	  the	  organization	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recognizes	  multiple	  views	  and	  multiple	  players.	  This	  is	  relevant	  for	  excellence	  in	  PR	  
practice	  because,	  as	  explained	  by	  Marsh	  (2010),	  under	  reflective	  paradigm,	  relationships	  
are	  something	  to	  be	  built	  through	  engagement	  rather	  than	  to	  be	  managed.	  Holmström	  talks	  
about	  the	  paradigm	  as	  including	  a	  move	  towards	  trust	  and	  a	  move	  for	  organizations	  to	  
justify	  their	  decisions	  to	  stakeholders.	  
Holmström	  suggests	  that	  the	  reflective	  paradigm	  can	  become	  normative	  practice	  for	  
organizations	  since	  it	  helps	  them	  frame	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  world.	  For	  example,	  to	  
further	  illustrate	  the	  difference	  between	  organizations	  that	  operate	  under	  the	  reflective	  
paradigm	  and	  those	  that	  don’t,	  Holmström	  (2008)	  provides	  examples	  of	  reflective	  versus	  
reflexive	  operational	  mindsets.	  For	  example,	  she	  describes	  companies	  in	  a	  monocontextual,	  
reflexive	  framework	  as	  viewing	  the	  environment	  as	  something	  to	  be	  managed	  versus	  a	  
polycontextual,	  reflective	  organization	  that	  would	  view	  the	  environment	  as	  something	  to	  
be	  respected.	  In	  this	  way,	  reflective	  paradigm	  brings	  “new	  expectations	  to	  legitimize	  
practice”	  (Holmström,	  2008,	  p.	  240).	  
Importantly	  for	  organizations,	  those	  that	  take	  a	  reflective	  approach	  earn	  a	  figurative	  
social	  license	  to	  do	  business.	  Van	  Ruler	  and	  Vercic	  (2005)	  conceptualize	  that	  Holmström	  
“foresaw	  a	  new	  paradigm	  for	  legitimate	  business	  conduct	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  associated	  by	  
the	  conventional	  economic	  growth	  and	  profit	  paradigm,	  but	  (also)	  by	  a	  public	  legitimate	  
paradigm	  by	  societal	  legitimization”	  (p.	  255).	  These	  authors	  advocate	  for	  a	  reflective	  
communications	  management	  approach	  viewing	  people	  as	  “reflective	  human	  beings	  
engaged	  in	  a	  continuous	  social	  process	  of	  constructing	  society”	  (p.	  266).	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As	  we	  think	  about	  trust	  as	  a	  cornerstone	  element	  in	  organizational-­‐stakeholder	  
relationships,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  reflective	  approach.	  Reflective	  organizations	  
are	  oriented	  toward	  shareholder	  concerns	  and	  have	  a	  desire	  for	  a	  more	  symmetrical	  
interaction.	  The	  reciprocity	  that	  is	  needed	  for	  a	  trusting	  relationship	  would	  come	  more	  
naturally	  to	  them.	  Reciprocity	  isn’t	  emphasized	  in	  monocontextual-­‐framework	  
organizations	  as	  Holmström	  (2004)	  describes	  them	  as	  being	  asymmetrical	  in	  nature.	  
	   It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Holmström	  characterizes	  organizations	  as	  often	  
being	  on	  a	  path	  to	  legitimacy	  that	  changes	  from	  being	  in	  a	  place	  of	  monocontextual	  
reflexivity	  where	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  profit	  to	  polycontextual	  reflection	  where	  the	  focus	  shifts	  to	  
people,	  plant	  and	  profit	  (Holmström,	  2008).	  
Holmström	  sounds	  a	  warning	  for	  organizations	  that	  don’t	  seek	  legitimacy	  in	  a	  
reflective	  context.	  	  She	  posits	  that	  it’s	  important	  for	  organizations	  to	  move	  to	  reflective	  
paradigm	  because	  reflexivity	  is	  “blind,	  autonomous	  reproduction,	  which	  conflicts	  blindly	  
with	  other	  world	  views	  and…is	  negligent	  to	  broader	  context	  and,	  consequently	  to	  its	  own	  
unintended,	  however	  often	  far	  reaching	  side	  effects,	  and	  the	  risks	  involved	  in	  its	  decisions”	  
(p.	  241).	  	  
To	  conclude	  discussion	  on	  reflective	  paradigm,	  we	  can	  see	  similarities	  between	  
reflective	  paradigm	  and	  symmetrical	  communications.	  By	  being	  reflective,	  organizations	  
are	  oriented	  toward	  stakeholder	  concerns	  and	  are	  naturally	  inclined	  to	  the	  reciprocity	  that	  
is	  needed	  for	  a	  trusting	  relationship.	  In	  contrast,	  Holmström	  (2004)	  describes	  
monocontextual	  organizations	  as	  being	  asymmetrical.	  She	  notes	  that,	  while	  it	  is	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challenging,	  reflective	  organizations	  strive	  to	  “take	  an	  open	  and	  understanding	  position	  
towards	  other	  perspectives	  than	  their	  own”	  (p.	  130).	  
	   It’s	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  professional	  realm	  of	  business	  
management	  over	  the	  last	  100	  years,	  this	  focus	  on	  normative	  practices	  that	  take	  
stakeholders	  into	  consideration	  such	  as	  two-­‐way	  symmetrical	  communication	  and	  
reflective	  paradigm	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  relatively	  new	  mindset.	  For	  instance,	  Wenstop	  and	  
Myrmel	  (2006)	  explained	  that	  management	  guru	  Friedman’s	  position	  in	  1970	  was	  that	  
management’s	  duty	  was	  to	  focus	  solely	  on	  maximizing	  profits	  and	  that	  the	  free	  market	  and	  
societal	  values	  would	  take	  care	  of	  everything	  else.	  A	  best-­‐selling	  business	  author	  in	  the	  
1960’s	  and	  70’s,	  the	  authors	  described	  Friedman’s	  belief	  that,	  while	  there	  are	  many	  
stakeholders	  in	  an	  organization,	  the	  leader	  only	  needs	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  owners	  and	  
“run	  the	  enterprise	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  wishes”	  (p.	  674)	  
	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  an	  asymmetrical	  definition	  of	  public	  relations	  does	  survive	  in	  
some	  definitions	  of	  PR	  including	  Cameron’s	  explanation	  that	  PR	  is	  the	  “strategic	  
management	  of	  competition	  and	  conflict	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  one’s	  own	  organization—and	  
when	  possible—also	  for	  the	  mutual	  benefit	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  its	  various	  stakeholders	  
or	  publics”	  (Wilcox	  &	  Cameron,	  2009,	  p.	  7).	   	  
Core	  values	  and	  values-­‐based	  management	  
	   We	  can	  look	  to	  modern	  management	  research	  to	  learn	  about	  ethical	  behavior.	  The	  
move	  toward	  the	  adoption	  of	  corporate	  “core	  values”	  as	  guideposts	  for	  behavior	  is	  often	  
referred	  to	  as	  values-­‐based	  management.	  In	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  decades	  as	  greed	  and	  
leadership	  misdeeds	  led	  to	  massive	  corporate	  scandals	  such	  as	  Enron,	  MCI	  Worldcomm	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and	  many	  others	  (and	  with	  the	  resulting	  heavy	  hand	  of	  regulation	  that	  followed	  those	  
scandals),	  companies	  are	  now	  turning	  toward	  core	  values	  as	  a	  way	  to	  define	  culture	  and	  
guide	  management	  decisions.	  VanLee	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  said	  that,	  post-­‐Enron,	  companies	  have	  
begun	  to	  look	  inward	  instead	  of	  outward	  when	  things	  go	  wrong	  and	  have	  begun	  to	  
implement	  beneficial	  values.	  
	   Many	  scholars	  have	  examined	  this	  trend	  and	  have	  attempted	  to	  define	  corporate	  
core	  values.	  Urde	  (2009)	  calls	  core	  values	  “beacons	  in	  the	  management	  of	  a	  corporate	  
brand”	  and	  posits	  that	  they	  also	  need	  to	  “resonate	  with	  customers”	  to	  be	  effective	  (p.	  617).	  
In	  his	  definitions,	  Urde	  tends	  to	  link	  values	  closely	  with	  the	  customer	  relationship	  and	  the	  
brand.	  In	  his	  study	  of	  values,	  he	  says	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  fall	  into	  four	  categories:	  true	  
(internally-­‐rooted);	  aspirational	  (not	  yet	  perceived	  by	  stakeholders);	  potential	  (widely	  
recognized	  but	  not	  yet	  linked	  with	  the	  brand)	  and	  hollow	  (with	  no	  real	  substance	  behind	  
them).	  Lencioni	  (2002)	  looks	  at	  values	  a	  bit	  more	  globally	  and	  calls	  them	  “deeply	  ingrained	  
cultural	  cornerstones”	  (p.	  114).	  He	  also	  categorizes	  values	  statements	  that	  he	  reviewed	  
and,	  for	  instance,	  identifies	  aspirational	  values	  (the	  organization	  knows	  it	  needs	  the	  value	  
but	  currently	  lacks	  it)	  and	  permission-­‐to-­‐play	  values	  (meeting	  minimum	  behavioral	  and	  
social	  standards).	  
	   Finally,	  Wenstop	  and	  Myrmel	  (2006)	  reviewed	  values	  statements	  from	  300	  
companies.	  Their	  categorical	  definitions	  included	  core	  values	  (attitude	  and	  character	  traits	  
such	  as	  integrity	  or	  honesty);	  created	  values	  (values	  that	  are	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  for	  the	  
organization	  and	  include	  what	  stakeholders	  expect	  of	  it	  such	  as	  quality	  and	  ROI);	  and	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protected	  values	  (values	  that	  can’t	  suffer	  infringement	  and	  that	  are	  protected	  by	  duty	  ethic,	  
rules	  and	  regulations	  e.g.	  ISO	  compliance).	  	  
	   Wenstop	  and	  Myrmel’s	  discussion	  of	  protected	  values	  is	  interesting	  because	  they	  
explain	  that	  protected	  values	  include	  concepts	  such	  as	  regulatory	  compliance	  and	  
providing	  for	  basic	  environmental,	  health	  and	  safety	  standards.	  Other	  scholars	  discuss	  
management	  standards	  and	  duties	  as	  being	  separate	  concepts	  from	  core	  values.	  
	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  factors	  that	  can	  either	  help	  or	  
hinder	  a	  company’s	  values	  program.	  Commitment	  over	  time	  seems	  also	  to	  be	  an	  important	  
enabler.	  Urde	  (2009)	  found	  that	  values	  programs	  are	  “rooted”	  in	  the	  organization	  and	  are	  
“built	  over	  time”	  (p.	  617).	  An	  already-­‐engaged	  employee	  base	  is	  also	  helpful.	  Finally,	  
VanLee	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  found	  that	  senior-­‐level	  commitment	  was	  absolutely	  critical	  and	  that	  
CEO	  support	  for	  the	  values	  was	  the	  most	  effective	  factor.	  
	   Importantly,	  the	  implications	  of	  poorly	  conceived	  and	  poorly	  reinforced	  values	  
programs	  can	  be	  dire.	  Lencioni	  (2002)	  describes	  hollow	  values	  as	  destabilizing.	  Others	  are	  
more	  forceful.	  Gruys	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  posit	  that	  if	  behaviors	  and	  values	  aren’t	  aligned	  it	  can	  
lead	  to	  internal	  cynicism	  and	  mistrust.	  They	  say	  this	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  ethical	  disconnects	  
and	  cite	  the	  Enron	  case	  as	  an	  example,	  since	  Enron	  had	  clearly	  published	  core	  values	  before	  
its	  scandal	  occurred.	  	  In	  his	  qualitative	  study	  of	  organizations	  and	  how	  they	  enact	  values	  
programs,	  Tidwell	  (2016)	  found	  broad	  acquiescence	  among	  communications	  leaders	  
interviewed	  at	  large	  corporations	  that	  values	  must	  be	  “constantly	  reinforced,”	  but	  found	  
“little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  innovative	  ways	  to	  provide	  reinforcement”	  (p.	  148).	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VW’s	  published	  core	  values	  
	   VW	  embraced	  the	  concept	  of	  establishing	  and	  promoting	  corporate	  core	  values	  
prior	  to	  dieselgate.	  In	  its	  2014	  annual	  report,	  the	  company	  described	  its	  values	  orientation:	  
Our	   Code	   of	   Conduct,	   which	   is	   applicable	   throughout	   the	   Group,	  
provides	   guidance	   for	   our	   employees	   in	   the	   event	   of	   legal	   and	   ethical	  
challenges	   in	   their	   daily	   work.	   It	   embodies	   the	   Group	  values	  of	  
customer	  focus,	  top	  performance,	  creating	  value,	  renewability,	  respect,	  
responsibility	  and	  sustainability.	  All	  employees	  are	  equally	  responsible	  
for	  adhering	  to	  these	  principles	  (Volkswagen,	  2014).	  
	   Further,	  in	  its	  2014	  annual	  report,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  supposed	  commitment	  to	  the	  
environment	  that	  played	  such	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  VW’s	  advertising	  for	  TDI	  models	  as	  it	  
spells	  out	  in	  very	  specific	  terms	  how	  it	  plans	  to	  be	  a	  model	  of	  environmental	  sustainability	  
among	  global	  automakers,	  even	  boldly	  claiming	  that	  its	  goal	  was	  to	  be	  “the	  leading	  
automotive	  company	  in	  ecological	  terms	  by	  2018”	  (Volkswagen,	  2014)	  The	  degree	  to	  
which	  VW	  spells	  out	  its	  environmental	  commitment	  is	  surprisingly	  specific	  and	  
transparent.	  It	  lists	  specific	  CO2	  emissions	  targets	  by	  the	  numbers	  and	  and	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  
“pursuing	  them	  systematically.”	  
	   The	  irony	  of	  the	  lengths	  VW	  takes	  to	  explain	  its	  environmental	  commitment	  in	  the	  
2014	  annual	  report	  (only	  a	  year	  before	  Dieselgate	  was	  discovered)	  is	  shocking.	  The	  
company	  describes	  a	  holistic	  commitment	  involving	  all	  employees	  and	  all	  levels.	  
Anchoring	   environmental	   aspects	   firmly	   within	   our	   organizational	   and	  
decision-­‐making	  processes	  is	  essential	  to	  achieving	  our	  ambitious	  targets.	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The	   Group’s	   environmental	   management	   system	   has	   been	   in	   place	   for	  
many	   years	   and	   provides	   the	   basis	   for	   ensuring	   that	   these	   aspects	   are	  
taken	   into	   account…The	   fact	   that	   environmental	   issues	   are	   firmly	  
anchored	   within	   the	   Group	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   way	   that	   ecological	  
aspects	   feature	   in	   all	   our	   employees’	   thinking	   and	   actions	   –	   another	  
target	   field	   in	  our	   environmental	   strategy.	  We	  pool	   and	  make	  use	  of	   all	  
our	   employees’	   skills	   and	   expertise	   in	   the	   area	   of	   environmental	  
protection	  across	  brands	  and	  regions.	  (Volkswagen,	  2014)	  
Crisis	  Definition	  and	  Classifications	  
	   Coombs	  and	  Holladay	  (1996)	  explain	  that	  crisis	  situations	  are	  those	  that	  can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  an	  organization	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  damage	  the	  organization’s	  
reputation.	  This	  reputational	  damage	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  damaging	  trust	  or	  not	  meeting	  
the	  expectations	  of	  stakeholders.	  Subsequent	  damage	  can	  have	  financial	  impacts	  or	  even	  
threaten	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  organization.	  
	   Companies	  have	  varying	  levels	  of	  crisis	  preparedness.	  Mitroff	  and	  Alpaslan	  (2003)	  
monitored	  the	  crisis	  readiness	  of	  Fortune	  500	  companies	  over	  a	  period	  of	  20	  years.	  	  They	  
made	  distinctions	  between	  companies	  that	  are	  crisis	  prepared	  (those	  companies	  that	  
develop	  plans	  to	  handle	  a	  variety	  of	  multiple	  crises)	  and	  those	  that	  are	  crisis	  prone	  (those	  
companies	  that	  treat	  crisis	  with	  a	  more	  cavalier	  attitude	  and	  invest	  in	  readiness	  only	  when	  
cost	  effective).	  	  Over	  the	  20	  years	  in	  their	  study,	  they	  found	  that	  only	  between	  5	  and	  25	  
percent	  of	  Fortune	  500s	  studied	  were	  crisis	  prepared.	  Interestingly,	  while	  the	  authors	  did	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not	  focus	  on	  ethical	  behavior	  in	  their	  study,	  they	  found	  that	  “crisis-­‐prepared	  companies	  
believe	  no	  harm	  should	  come	  to	  even	  one	  person	  when	  a	  crisis	  erupts”	  (p.	  110).	  	  	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  attention	  should	  also	  be	  given	  to	  the	  specific	  
typology	  assigned	  to	  organizational	  crises.	  	  Mitroff	  and	  Alpaslan	  (2003)	  studied	  corporate	  
crises	  in	  detail	  and	  found	  three	  general	  forms	  of	  misfortune.	  They	  explain	  that	  there	  are	  
“natural	  accidents”,	  which	  would	  include	  fires,	  hurricanes,	  earthquakes,	  economic	  crisis;	  
“normal	  accidents”,	  which	  involve	  applied	  technologies	  that	  are	  so	  complex	  that	  they	  can	  
be	  assumed	  to	  normally	  breakdown	  or	  malfunction;	  and	  “abnormal”	  crises	  –	  intentional	  
incidents	  and	  criminal	  actions,	  “which	  are	  the	  result	  of	  deliberate	  evil	  actions	  such	  as	  
bombing,	  kidnappings	  and	  cyber	  attacks”	  	  (p.	  10).	  	  	  
Snyder	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  define	  organizational	  crisis	  as	  “an	  extraordinary	  condition	  that	  
is	  disruptive	  and	  damaging	  to	  the	  existing	  operational	  state	  of	  an	  organization.	  	  An	  
organizational	  crisis,	  if	  ignored	  or	  mismanaged,	  will	  threaten	  competitiveness	  and	  
sustainability	  of	  the	  affected	  entity”	  (p.	  372).	  Snyder	  and	  his	  colleagues	  saw	  the	  value	  of	  
Mitroff’s	  three	  general	  forms	  of	  misfortune	  analysis	  and	  suggested	  a	  more	  detailed	  
typology	  to	  help	  draw	  the	  link	  to	  ethical	  philosophy:	  
Building	   on	   their	   (Mitroff	   et	   al.)	   work,	   we	   advance	   a	   new	   typology	   of	  
organizational	   crises	   to	   consider	   in	   an	   ethical	   context.	   	   Our	   crises	  
classification	   groups	   all	   events	   affecting	   organizations	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
relationship	  of	   the	  crisis	  to	  the	  organization.	   	  There	  are	  two	  dimensions	  
to	  our	  crises	  typology.	  	  The	  first	  dimension	  is	  based	  on	  the	  organizational	  
distance	   to	   the	  crisis’	  original	  center	  of	  gravity	   (internal/external).	   	  The	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second	   dimension	   refers	   to	   a	   frequency	   factor	   (normal/abnormal).	   (p.	  
373)	  
	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research	  into	  the	  VW	  Dieslegate	  case,	  I	  am	  specifically	  
interested	  in	  what	  Snyder	  et	  al.	  call	  “internal-­‐abnormal”	  crises.	  	  They	  describe	  these	  as	  rare	  
and	  unpredictable	  events	  originating	  from	  within	  the	  organization.	  	  They	  cite	  examples	  
such	  as	  criminal	  crises	  including	  all	  types	  of	  corporate	  scandal	  and	  misappropriation	  as	  
well	  as	  information	  theft	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  tampering.	  Internal	  crises	  are	  especially	  
problematic	  for	  an	  organization	  because	  of	  the	  reputational	  fallout.	  Hearit	  (2001)	  explains	  
that	  “these	  misdeeds	  bring	  unwanted	  public	  scrutiny,	  and	  if	  organizations’	  responses	  are	  
judged	  to	  be	  uncompelling,	  then	  social	  sanctions	  insue	  on	  the	  part	  of	  disgruntled	  
stakeholders	  and	  special	  interest	  groups”	  (p.	  511).	  
One	  final	  crisis	  typology	  to	  mention	  is	  that	  discussed	  by	  Coombs	  (2007)	  in	  relation	  
to	  his	  Situational	  Crisis	  Communications	  Theory	  (SCCT).	  Coombs	  classifies	  crises	  in	  
clusters:	  victim	  cluster	  (where	  the	  organization	  is	  clearly	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  event	  such	  as	  with	  
product	  tampering);	  accidental	  cluster	  (where	  the	  organization’s	  actions	  leading	  to	  the	  
crisis	  were	  unintentional	  such	  as	  with	  an	  equipment	  or	  technology	  failure);	  and	  
preventable	  cluster	  (such	  as	  with	  organizational	  misdeed	  or	  misconduct).	  
Table	  1	  below	  summarizes	  the	  crisis	  definitions	  and	  typologies.	  
Table	  1.	  	  Crisis	  typology	  summary	  
This	  table	  summarizes	  often-­‐cited	  crises	  types	  with	  definitions	  and	  originating	  source.	  
Type	   Definition	   Source	  
Natural	  accidents	   Naturally	  occurring	  events	  such	  as	  
earthquakes,	  hurricanes,	  economic	  
downturns,	  etc.	  
Mitroff	  et	  al..,	  
2003	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Normal	  accidents	   Normal	  breakdown	  or	  malfunction	  
of	  applied	  technologies.	  
	  
Mitroff	  et	  al.,	  
2003	  
Abnormal	  crises	   Intentional	  incidents	  and	  criminal	  
actions.	  
	  
Mitroff	  et	  al.,	  
2003	  
Internal	  or	  external	   The	  organization’s	  relation	  to	  the	  
crisis’	  original	  center	  of	  gravity	  (and	  
often	  combined	  with	  the	  earlier	  





Victim	  crisis	  cluster	   Where	  the	  organization	  is	  the	  victim	  
of	  the	  crisis	  event	  (e.g.	  product	  
tampering	  by	  an	  external	  party).	  
	  
Coombs,	  2007	  
Accidental	  crisis	  cluster	   Organization’s	  actions	  were	  
unintentional	  but	  led	  to	  the	  crisis	  









Along	  with	  classifying	  crises	  types,	  crisis	  researchers	  have	  also	  worked	  to	  describe	  
the	  lifecyle	  of	  a	  crisis	  in	  order	  to	  help	  inform	  crisis	  response	  planning.	  Fearn-­‐Banks	  (2001)	  
took	  a	  fairly	  typical	  path	  by	  identifying	  five	  stages:	  detection,	  where	  the	  organization	  is	  
scanning	  the	  environment	  for	  potential	  signs	  of	  crisis;	  preparation/prevention,	  where	  the	  
organization	  makes	  plans	  and	  takes	  proactive	  steps	  to	  avoid	  the	  crisis;	  containment,	  which	  
is	  characterized	  by	  efforts	  to	  limit	  the	  duration	  or	  keep	  it	  from	  becoming	  more	  serious;	  
recovery,	  or	  the	  efforts	  to	  return	  to	  normalcy;	  and	  learning,	  which	  evaluates	  what	  is	  lost	  
and	  how	  the	  learnings	  can	  help	  prevent	  future	  crises	  (p.	  480).	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Crisis	  and	  Trust	  	  	  
If	  we	  adhere	  to	  the	  proposition	  from	  Coombs	  and	  others	  that	  a	  crisis	  can	  damage	  an	  
organization’s	  trustworthiness,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  trust	  in	  organization-­‐
stakeholder	  relationships.	  In	  a	  crisis	  scenario,	  the	  importance	  of	  trust	  is	  magnified	  such	  
that	  Diermeier	  (2011)	  calls	  trust	  “the	  magic	  word	  in	  managing	  reputational	  crises”	  (p.	  21).	  
Hon	  and	  Grunig	  (1999)	  identify	  trust	  as	  one	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  successful	  
relationships	  and	  define	  it	  as	  “one	  party’s	  level	  of	  confidence	  in	  and	  willingness	  to	  open	  
oneself	  to	  the	  other	  party”	  (p.	  19).	  They	  identify	  three	  underlying	  dimensions	  of	  trust:	  
integrity,	  dependability,	  and	  competence.	  
In	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  hallmark	  of	  successful	  relationships,	  trust	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  
an	  enabler	  of	  communications.	  Flynn	  (2016)	  posits	  that	  trust	  makes	  for	  easier	  
organizational	  communications	  because	  it	  breaks	  down	  barriers	  and	  clears	  a	  quicker	  
cognitive	  path	  for	  message	  delivery.	  Like	  Grunig	  and	  Hon	  (1999),	  he	  also	  identifies	  
necessary	  elements	  for	  trust:	  authenticity,	  credibility	  and	  an	  ability	  to	  meet	  the	  
expectations	  of	  stakeholders.	  
Importantly,	  stakeholders’	  expectations	  of	  organizations	  have	  changed	  with	  the	  
availability	  of	  the	  internet	  and	  new	  tools	  to	  empower	  them.	  Scholars	  have	  found	  that	  
stakeholders	  are	  increasingly	  more	  active	  and	  more	  demanding	  of	  corporate	  transparency,	  
which	  in	  turn	  makes	  organizations	  feel	  more	  vulnerable	  (Christensen,	  2002).	  Christensen	  
describes	  an	  environment	  where	  stakeholders	  thirst	  for	  more	  organizational	  disclosure	  
putting	  pressure	  on	  organizations	  to	  “publicize	  strategic	  choices,	  corporate	  plans	  and	  
business	  practices	  –	  all	  in	  order	  to	  cultivate	  accountability	  and	  trust”	  (2009,	  p.	  209).	  
	  
	   	   	  
27	  
As	  trust	  becomes	  more	  important	  in	  the	  age	  of	  the	  empowered	  stakeholder,	  
organizations	  should	  have	  a	  firm	  understanding	  of	  consequences	  for	  violating	  trust.	  
Diermeier	  explains	  this	  in	  the	  context	  of	  moral	  outrage	  from	  stakeholders	  regarding	  an	  
organization’s	  actions.	  He	  cautions	  that	  moral	  outrage	  tends	  to	  come	  from	  intuitive	  
judgments	  which	  are	  very	  emotionally-­‐driven.	  This	  outrage	  often	  leads	  to	  a	  desire	  for	  
punishment	  as	  a	  way	  to	  seek	  retribution.	  Finally,	  in	  a	  nod	  toward	  the	  importance	  of	  prior	  
reputation,	  he	  explains	  that	  moral	  outrage	  is	  especially	  pronounced	  when	  stakeholders	  feel	  
that	  trust	  has	  been	  violated	  (p.	  127).	  
Crisis	  Response	  Theories	  
Benoit’s	  (1997)	  image	  repair	  theory	  (IRT)	  is	  useful	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  typology	  of	  
responses	  used	  by	  organizations	  to	  manage	  crises.	  Benoit	  says	  the	  theory’s	  value	  is	  on	  its	  
focus	  on	  message	  options	  that	  are	  available	  and	  argues	  that	  “the	  theory	  of	  image	  
restoration	  discourse	  is	  a	  viable	  approach	  for	  use	  in	  developing	  and	  understanding	  
messages	  that	  respond	  to	  corporate	  image	  crises”	  (p.	  177).	  Specifically,	  the	  strategic	  
response	  options	  available	  under	  IRT	  are	  denial	  (simple	  denial	  or	  blame-­‐shifting);	  evasion	  
of	  responsibility	  (provocation,	  defeasibility,	  accidental	  or	  good	  intentions	  gone	  bad);	  
reducing	  offensiveness	  of	  the	  act	  (bolstering,	  minimization	  of	  event,	  differentiation	  of	  
event,	  transcendence	  in	  the	  forms	  of	  means	  justifying	  ends,	  accuser	  attack,	  compensation,	  
or	  corrective	  action);	  and	  mortification	  (apologizing	  for	  the	  act).	  
	   Of	  particular	  interest	  to	  this	  researcher	  is	  compensation,	  which	  is	  classified	  by	  
Benoit	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  reduce	  the	  offensiveness	  of	  the	  act	  through	  restitution	  and	  is	  
characterized	  by	  an	  organization	  providing	  something	  of	  value	  back	  to	  the	  harmed	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stakeholder(s).	  Benoit	  posits	  that	  when	  an	  organization	  compensates	  its	  stakeholders	  (and	  
if	  the	  compensation	  is	  acceptable	  to	  the	  victim),	  the	  firm’s	  image	  should	  be	  improved.	  
Other	  researchers	  have	  also	  attempted	  to	  classify	  crisis	  responses.	  Coombs	  and	  
Holladay	  (1998)	  describe	  the	  continuum	  developed	  by	  Marcus	  and	  Goodman	  (1991)	  
wherein	  they	  divided	  crisis	  responses	  into	  either	  accommodative	  or	  defensive	  strategies.	  In	  
Coombs’	  Situational	  Crisis	  Communications	  Theory	  (SCCT),	  he	  looks	  at	  the	  perceptual	  
nature	  of	  crises	  and	  calls	  his	  process	  “stakeholder	  reaction	  management”	  (2007,	  p.	  167).	  
Coombs	  suggests	  that	  when	  response	  strategies	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  accommodative	  and	  show	  
significant	  concern	  for	  victims,	  that	  stakeholders	  perceive	  the	  organization	  as	  taking	  
greater	  responsibility	  for	  the	  situation.	  Some	  of	  Coombs’	  earliest	  works	  looked	  at	  crisis	  
effects	  on	  organizations	  and	  their	  images.	  In	  analyzing	  frameworks	  for	  crisis	  situations	  
(1996),	  Coombs	  concluded	  via	  experiment	  that	  image	  damage	  varies	  with	  who	  
stakeholders	  perceive	  an	  organization’s	  responsibility	  for	  a	  crisis.	  
	   Stakeholder	  perception	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  stakeholder	  attribution	  of	  
responsibility,	  are	  foundational	  to	  SCCT.	  Coombs	  cites	  attribution	  theory	  as	  being	  
extremely	  relevant	  when	  viewing	  crisis	  stakeholder	  reaction.	  He	  posits	  that	  “stakeholders	  
evaluate	  organizational	  responsibility	  for	  a	  crisis	  when	  they	  determine	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  
crisis.	  The	  more	  publics	  attribute	  crisis	  responsibility	  to	  an	  organization,	  the	  stronger	  the	  
likelihood	  is	  of	  publics	  developing	  and	  acting	  upon	  negative	  images	  of	  the	  organization”	  
(1996,	  p.	  282).	  
	   As	  for	  naming	  various	  response	  strategies	  within	  SCCT,	  Coombs’	  classifications	  look	  
much	  like	  Benoit’s	  and	  are	  divided	  between	  primary	  strategies	  which	  are	  primarily	  denials	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(denial,	  attack	  accuser,	  scapegoat,	  excuse,	  justification,	  compensation	  and	  apology)	  and	  
secondary	  strategies,	  which	  are	  primarily	  bolstering	  (reminder,	  ingratiation	  and	  
victimage).	  
	   As	  for	  compensation,	  Coombs	  describes	  it	  as	  a	  “rebuild	  strategy”	  where	  the	  idea	  is	  to	  
counteract	  the	  negatives	  from	  the	  crisis	  through	  good	  works.	  He	  posits	  that	  rebuild	  
strategies	  are	  best	  for	  crises	  with	  severe	  reputational	  threats	  including	  intentional	  acts.	  He	  
further	  asserts	  that	  rebuild	  strategies	  are	  “safest…because	  they	  address	  victims	  so	  well”	  
(2007,	  p.	  172)	  
Rebuild	   strategies	   are	   the	   main	   avenue	   for	   generating	   new	   reputational	  
assets.	  Rebuild	  strategies	  attempt	  to	  improve	  the	  organization’s	  reputation	  
by	   offering	   material	   and/or	   symbolic	   forms	   of	   aid	   to	   victims.	   The	   crisis	  
managers	   say	   and	   do	   things	   to	   benefit	   stakeholders	   and	   thereby	   take	  
positive	  action	  to	  offset	  the	  crisis.	  Offering	  compensation	  or	  a	  full	  apology	  
both	  are	  positive	  reputational	  actions.	  (2007,	  p.	  172)	  
Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000)	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  ambiguous	  vs.	  
unambiguous	  crisis	  response.	  These	  terms	  hinge	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  crisis	  response	  
is	  clear	  and	  comprehensive.	  They	  explain	  that	  responses	  exist	  in	  a	  continuum	  between	  
stonewalling,	  denial-­‐type	  responses	  at	  one	  extreme	  and	  clear	  and	  unambiguous	  responses	  
at	  the	  other.	  	  Unambiguous	  responses	  consist	  of	  “assumption	  of	  responsibility,	  an	  apology	  
to	  consumers	  or	  other	  affected	  constituencies	  and	  some	  form	  of	  remedy.”	  They	  explain	  that	  
the	  opposite	  of	  an	  unambiguous	  response	  is	  stonewalling,	  or	  “denial	  of	  responsibility	  and	  
absence	  of	  remedial	  measures	  or	  no	  communication	  at	  all”	  (p.	  216).	  In	  the	  middle	  lies	  what	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they	  call	  ambiguous	  responses	  –	  responses	  that	  have	  elements	  that	  suggest	  support	  
through	  partial	  acceptance	  of	  responsibility	  and	  remediation.	  Importantly,	  these	  
ambiguous	  responses	  lack	  clarity	  in	  terms	  of	  remediation	  or	  responsibility	  and	  are	  often	  
not	  deemed	  final	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  stakeholders.	  
Coombs’	  SCCT	  and	  the	  Importance	  of	  Prior	  Reputation	  
In	  many	  ways,	  Coombs	  advances	  the	  work	  of	  Benoit	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  identifies	  
the	  factors	  that	  are	  important	  in	  building	  reputation.	  For	  Coombs,	  crisis	  is	  essentially	  a	  
“reputational	  threat”	  (2007,	  p.	  164),	  and	  reputations	  are	  based,	  in	  large	  part,	  on	  how	  well	  
stakeholders	  perceive	  that	  organizations	  have	  met	  their	  expectations.	  When	  a	  crisis	  hits,	  
the	  organization	  loses	  some	  of	  the	  reputational	  capital	  it	  has	  accumulated	  over	  time	  but,	  if	  
it	  has	  sufficient	  reputational	  capital	  built	  up,	  the	  path	  to	  crisis	  recovery	  can	  be	  quicker:	  
A	   favorable	   prior	   (pre-­‐crisis)	   reputation	   is	   a	   buffer	   against	   the	  
reputational	   capital	   lost	   during	   a	   crisis.	   An	   organization	   with	   a	   more	  
favorable	   prior	   reputation	   will	   still	   have	   a	   strong	   post-­‐crisis	   reputation	  
because	   it	   has	   more	   reputational	   capital	   to	   spend	   than	   an	   organization	  
with	   an	   unfavorable	   or	   neutral	   prior	   reputation.	   As	   a	   result,	   a	   favorable	  
prior	   reputation	   mans	   an	   organization	   suffers	   less	   and	   rebounds	   more	  
quickly.	  (2007,	  p.	  164)	  
In	  SCCT,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  where	  an	  organization	  stands	  with	  
its	  stakeholders	  in	  terms	  of	  pre-­‐crisis	  reputation.	  Coombs	  describes	  poor	  prior	  reputation	  
as	  an	  organizational	  flaw	  that	  shows	  the	  organization	  has	  little	  consideration	  for	  
stakeholders	  in	  many	  situations,	  not	  just	  crises	  (2007,	  p.	  167).	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Attribution	  of	  responsibility	  is,	  again,	  a	  key	  mechanism	  within	  SCCT.	  According	  to	  
Coombs,	  “unfavorable	  prior	  relational	  reputation	  intensifies	  attributions	  of	  crisis	  
responsibility	  thereby	  indirectly	  affecting	  the	  reputational	  threat”	  (p.	  167).	  Since	  prior	  
reputation	  is	  a	  crisis	  intensifying	  factor,	  Coombs	  recommends	  that	  crisis	  managers	  assess	  
prior	  relationship	  reputation	  with	  stakeholders	  as	  part	  of	  crisis	  planning.	  
In	  terms	  of	  ultimate	  impact	  on	  an	  organization,	  Coombs	  cautions	  that	  how	  an	  
organization	  handles	  itself	  in	  a	  crisis	  affects	  its	  post-­‐crisis	  reputation.	  Stakeholder	  backlash	  
in	  the	  event	  of	  poor	  post-­‐crisis	  reputation	  can	  manifest	  in	  behavioral	  intentions	  including	  
intent	  to	  purchase	  and	  support	  for	  the	  organization.	  	  
Many	  communications	  scholars	  explain	  the	  importance	  of	  stakeholder	  expectations	  
of	  organizations.	  Flynn	  (2016)	  posits	  that	  receivers	  “use	  prior	  knowledge	  to	  generate	  
expectations	  of	  a	  communicator’s	  position	  or	  intention”	  (p.	  8).	  Scholarly	  research	  in	  
business	  and	  marketing	  also	  discusses	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  organization’s	  prior	  reputation	  
relative	  to	  stakeholder	  reaction	  post-­‐crisis.	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000)	  examined	  how	  the	  
prior	  expectations	  about	  a	  company	  (either	  more	  positive	  or	  negative)	  affects	  the	  
company’s	  brand	  equity	  after	  a	  crisis.	  They	  found	  that	  when	  firms	  have	  a	  good	  previous	  
reputation	  they	  tend	  to	  get	  a	  more	  positive	  stakeholder	  reaction	  –	  especially	  when	  the	  
company	  provides	  what	  they	  call	  a	  clear	  and	  complete,	  “unambiguous”	  response.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  conceptualize	  prior	  
reputational	  expectations.	  	  They	  explain	  that	  these	  expectations	  are	  based	  on	  past	  behavior	  
and	  that	  consumers	  tend	  to	  interpret	  information	  in	  the	  context	  of	  prior	  reputational	  
expectations.	  They	  posit	  that,	  in	  a	  crisis,	  “objectively	  identical	  firm	  responses	  may	  have	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substantially	  different	  impacts	  on	  customer-­‐based	  brand	  equity	  depending	  on	  consumers’	  
prior	  expectations	  about	  the	  firm”	  (p.	  215).	  
Through	  experimental	  research	  looking	  at	  how	  subjects	  interpreted	  a	  firm’s	  
response	  in	  a	  crisis,	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000)	  concluded	  that	  prior	  positive	  reputational	  
expectations	  about	  a	  firm	  may	  provide	  a	  “form	  of	  insurance	  against	  the	  potentially	  
devastating	  impact	  of	  crises”	  on	  a	  company’s	  brand	  equity	  (p.	  224).	  In	  summarizing	  their	  
findings,	  they	  explained:	  
From	  a	  managerial	  perspective,	  the	  result	  that	  consumers’	  interpretation	  of	  
the	   evidence	   of	   firm	   response	   is	   moderated	   by	   their	   prior	   expectations	  
about	   the	   firm	   indicates	   that	   an	   identical	   response	   can	  have	  dramatically	  
different	   effects	   on	   brand	   equity,	   depending	   on	   consumers’	   prior	  
expectations	   about	   the	   firm.	   In	   other	   words,	   in	   developing	   an	  
understanding	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   corporate	   actions	   on	   brand	   equity,	   firm	  
actions	  alone	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  sufficient	  to	  predict	  the	  effects	  of	  product-­‐
harm	   crises	   on	   brand	   equity;	   consumer’s	   prior	   expectations	   are	   a	   key	  
moderator.	  (p.	  224)	  
	   In	  this	  project,	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  also	  identified	  the	  type	  of	  crisis	  response	  as	  a	  
variable.	  Responses	  were	  either	  ambiguous	  or	  unambiguous.	  They	  found	  that	  strong	  prior	  
expectation	  combined	  with	  an	  unambiguous	  crisis	  response	  actually	  increased	  brand	  
equity	  compared	  to	  brand	  equity	  measured	  in	  a	  no-­‐crisis	  environment.	  Even	  more	  
importantly	  for	  my	  project,	  when	  the	  prior	  expectation	  was	  strong	  but	  the	  crisis	  response	  
was	  ambiguous	  and	  incomplete,	  they	  found	  that	  brand	  equity	  resembled	  the	  unambiguous	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response	  condition.	  The	  worst	  result	  was	  found	  for	  companies	  who	  combined	  weak	  prior	  
expectation	  with	  a	  stonewalling	  response.	  
	   Together	  with	  Klein,	  Dawar	  (2004)	  corroborated	  the	  2000	  findings	  with	  a	  study	  that	  
looked	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  firm’s	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  (CSR)	  on	  brand	  evaluations	  in	  
a	  crisis	  situation.	  That	  experimental	  study	  also	  found	  that	  a	  negative	  prior	  reputational	  
image	  was	  a	  “powerful	  liability”	  (p.	  215)	  to	  a	  firm	  facing	  crisis.	  	  
Diermeier	  (2011)	  is	  another	  scholar	  who	  studies	  corporate	  behavior	  in	  times	  of	  
crisis.	  He	  posits	  that	  there	  are	  four	  dimensions	  to	  consider	  when	  responding	  to	  crisis	  –	  
each	  of	  these	  residing	  in	  his	  “trust	  radar”	  tool	  (p.	  21).	  	  He	  describes	  the	  trust	  radar	  as	  a	  tool	  
for	  preserving	  and	  protecting	  relationships	  and	  reputations	  during	  an	  evolving	  crisis.	  
Shaped	  in	  a	  diamond	  pattern,	  the	  radar	  has	  four	  elements	  with	  empathy	  at	  the	  top	  
(conveying	  messages	  with	  warmth	  and	  authenticity);	  transparency	  at	  the	  right	  (relevant	  
information	  openly	  shared);	  expertise	  at	  the	  bottom	  (conveying	  deep	  experience	  and	  
knowledge);	  and	  commitment	  at	  the	  left	  (the	  sense	  that	  the	  organization	  is	  working	  on	  
correcting	  the	  situation).	  	  The	  utility	  of	  this	  tool	  is	  that	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  help	  organizations	  
keep	  all	  four	  elements	  in	  alignment,	  so	  that	  not	  too	  much	  effort	  is	  spent	  in	  one	  quadrant	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  another.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  some	  crisis	  case	  studies	  have	  seen	  
organizations	  spend	  too	  much	  time	  and	  effort	  in	  the	  “expertise”	  quadrant	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
another	  dimension	  such	  as	  empathy	  or	  commitment.	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  be	  too	  
heavily	  weighted	  in	  another	  category.	  For	  example,	  an	  organization	  could	  be	  so	  focused	  on	  
commitment	  to	  solving	  the	  crisis	  that	  it	  neglects	  the	  empathy	  quadrant	  and	  fails	  to	  send	  the	  
appropriate	  messages	  of	  sympathy	  to	  victims	  or	  others.	  The	  trust	  radar	  tool	  was	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instructive	  for	  me	  because	  it	  so	  clearly	  illustrated	  the	  complex	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  nature	  of	  
appropriate	  crisis	  communications.	  
Crisis	  Response	  Research	  and	  the	  Lack	  of	  Quantitative	  Methods	  
	   Benoit’s	  IRT	  strategies	  are	  frequently	  used	  in	  crisis	  case	  studies.	  While	  IRT	  clearly	  
provides	  a	  way	  to	  classify	  and	  explain	  crises	  response,	  scholars	  point	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  strategies	  in	  practice	  and	  there	  have	  been	  few	  
studies	  that	  have	  employed	  quantitative	  research	  on	  IRT	  (Benoit,	  2016).	  Peijuan	  et	  al.,	  
(2009)	  quote	  Benoit	  as	  saying	  that	  qualitative	  rhetorical	  analysis	  has	  been	  “the	  prevalent	  
and	  primary	  method	  of	  analysis	  in	  image	  repair	  strategies”	  (p.	  214).	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  
validate	  this	  finding,	  I	  reviewed	  some	  of	  the	  most	  cited	  studies	  on	  image	  repair	  theory	  and	  
found	  that	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  and	  qualitative	  rhetorical	  analysis	  were	  by	  far	  the	  
most	  prevalent	  methods	  used	  (see	  Table	  2	  below).	  
	  
Table	  2.	  	  Examples	  of	  prominent	  image	  repair	  theory	  studies	  
Following	  are	  examples	  of	  case	  study	  research	  projects	  that	  utilized	  Benoit’s	  image	  repair	  theory.	  
Each	  project	  is	  listed	  along	  with	  the	  author	  and	  the	  methodology	  used	  (qualitative,	  quantitative,	  
content	  analysis,	  etc.).	  These	  are	  all	  case	  studies	  involving	  crisis	  situations	  faced	  by	  organizations,	  
governments,	  etc.	  All	  of	  these	  studies	  were	  cited	  in	  other	  research	  more	  than	  50	  times	  as	  
referenced	  in	  Google	  Scholar.	  
	  
Study	   Author,year	   Methodology	   Citation	  
President	  Bush’s	  major	  
post-­‐Katrina	  speeches:	  
Enhancing	  image	  repair	  
discourse	  theory	  applied	  
to	  the	  public	  sector	  
Liu,	  2007	   Qualitative	  content	  
analysis	  identifying	  
themes	  in	  texts	  
Liu,	  B.	  F.	  (2007).	  
President	  Bush's	  major	  
post-­‐Katrina	  speeches:	  
Enhancing	  image	  
repair	  discourse	  theory	  
applied	  to	  the	  public	  
sector.	  Public	  Relations	  
Review,	  33(1),	  40-­‐48.	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A	  critical	  analysis	  of	  






Benoit,	  W.	  L.,	  &	  
Czerwinski,	  A.	  (1997).	  
A	  critical	  analysis	  of	  
USAir's	  image	  repair	  
discourse.	  Business	  
Communication	  
Quarterly,	  60(3),	  38-­‐57.	  
	  
BP	  initial	  image	  repair	  
strategies	  after	  the	  
Deepwater	  Horizon	  spill.	  
	  




Harlow,	  W.	  F.,	  Brantley,	  
B.	  C.,	  &	  Harlow,	  R.	  M.	  
(2011).	  BP	  initial	  
image	  repair	  strategies	  
after	  the	  Deepwater	  
Horizon	  spill.	  Public	  
Relations	  
Review,	  37(1),	  80-­‐83.	  
	  
Image	  repair	  in	  President	  
Bush’s	  April	  2004	  news	  
conference	  
Benoit,	  2004	   Qualitative	  critical	  
analysis	  
Benoit,	  W.	  L.	  (2006).	  
Image	  repair	  in	  







Managing	  a	  nation’s	  
image	  during	  crisis:	  A	  
study	  of	  the	  Chinese	  
government’s	  image	  
repair	  efforts	  in	  the	  “Made	  
in	  China”	  controversy	  




Peijuan,	  C.,	  Ting,	  L.	  P.,	  &	  
Pang,	  A.	  (2009).	  
Managing	  a	  nation's	  
image	  during	  crisis:	  A	  
study	  of	  the	  Chinese	  
government's	  image	  
repair	  efforts	  in	  the	  






Queen	  Elizabeth’s	  image	  
repair	  discourse:	  
Insensitive	  royal	  or	  
compassionate	  queen?	  
Benoit,	  1999	   Qualitative	  critical	  
analysis	  
Benoit,	  W.	  L.,	  &	  
Brinson,	  S.	  L.	  (1999).	  
Queen	  Elizabeth's	  
image	  repair	  discourse:	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Gary	  Condit’s	  image	  
repair	  strategies:	  
Determined	  denial	  and	  
differentiation	  




Len-­‐Rıós,	  M.	  E.,	  &	  
Benoit,	  W.	  L.	  (2004).	  
Gary	  Condit’s	  image	  
repair	  strategies:	  
Determined	  denial	  and	  
differentiation.	  Public	  
Relations	  
Review,	  30(1),	  95-­‐106.	  
	  
The	  image	  repair	  





Brazeal,	  2008	   Qualitative	  rhetorical	  
analysis	  
Brazeal,	  L.	  M.	  (2008).	  
The	  image	  repair	  
strategies	  of	  Terrell	  
Owens.	  Public	  Relations	  
Review,	  34(2),	  145-­‐
150.	  
Image	  repair	  strategies,	  
local	  news	  portrayals	  and	  
crisis	  stage:	  A	  case	  study	  
of	  Duke	  University’s	  
Lacrosse	  team	  crisis	  




Len-­‐Ríos,	  M.	  E.	  (2010).	  
Image	  repair	  
strategies,	  local	  news	  
portrayals	  and	  crisis	  









In	  the	  2016	  book	  edited	  by	  Blaney,	  Putting	  Image	  Repair	  to	  the	  Test,	  seven	  authors	  
use	  quantitative	  analysis	  to	  evaluate	  specific	  strategies	  and	  offer	  commentary	  on	  their	  
effectiveness.	  	  Gribas	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  explain	  that	  “testing	  various	  principles	  of	  effectiveness	  is	  
vital,	  particularly	  if	  one	  is	  to	  advise	  practitioner	  choices	  regarding	  image	  repair”	  (p.	  41).	  
While	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  IRT	  strategies	  affect	  audience	  perceptions	  and	  
attitudes	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  trust	  quantitatively,	  Spence	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  note	  that	  there	  have	  
been	  no	  extensive	  empirical	  tests	  assessing	  attitudinal	  changes	  among	  individuals	  
receiving	  the	  response.	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   Coombs	  (2017)	  echoes	  this	  need	  for	  empirical	  testing	  of	  IRT	  strategies,	  saying	  that	  
research	  to	  date	  has	  been	  via	  case	  study	  form	  and	  therefore	  can	  yield	  only	  “speculative	  
conclusions”	  (p.	  171).	  
Findings	  from	  quantitative	  research	  
	   The	  book	  previously	  referenced	  and	  edited	  by	  Blaney,	  Putting	  Image	  Repair	  to	  the	  
Test:	  Quantitative	  Applications	  of	  Image	  Restoration	  Theory	  (2016),	  gives	  us	  the	  most	  
comprehensive	  modern	  view	  of	  research	  implementing	  quantitative	  methods	  to	  study	  
Benoit’s	  IRT.	  Blaney’s	  book	  includes	  IRT	  case	  studies,	  all	  of	  which	  provide	  elements	  of	  
quantitative	  review.	  
	   In	  his	  introduction,	  while	  acknowledging	  IRT	  as	  a	  seminal	  work	  and	  giving	  credit	  to	  
the	  importance	  of	  case	  study	  application	  of	  the	  theory,	  Blaney	  states	  that	  “scholars	  have	  
pointed	  to	  the	  empirical	  limitations	  of	  the	  rhetorical/critical	  approaches	  largely	  deployed	  
to	  this	  point”	  (p.	  4).	  This	  is	  why	  he	  included	  only	  studies	  that	  made	  generalizable	  claims.	  
	   In	  writing	  the	  book’s	  first	  chapter,	  Benoit	  himself	  acknowledges	  the	  dearth	  of	  
research	  with	  any	  quantitative	  methodology	  and	  points	  out	  problems	  with	  the	  few	  studies	  
that	  had	  been	  conducted	  to	  date,	  calling	  them	  “piecemeal”	  and	  yielding	  only	  a	  “fragmentary	  
understanding”	  of	  various	  responses	  studied	  (p.	  8).	  Therefore,	  this	  book	  makes	  an	  
important	  contribution	  as	  the	  various	  chapter	  authors	  approached	  IRT	  strategies	  by	  using	  
either	  mixed	  or	  entirely	  quantitative	  methods.	  	  Table	  3	  below	  summarizes	  the	  studies	  








Table	  3.	  	  A	  summary	  of	  IRT	  studies	  published	  in	  2016	  Putting	  Image	  Repair	  to	  the	  Test	  
Following	  is	  a	  list	  of	  case	  study	  research	  projects	  included	  in	  the	  book	  edited	  by	  Blaney	  
with	  a	  summary	  of	  each	  study’s	  methodology	  and	  research	  goals	  as	  well	  as	  summarized	  
findings.	  
	  
Study	  Title	   Author,year	   Methodology/goals	   Summary	  of	  findings	  
	  
Examining	  the	  impact	  of	  






analysis	  identifying	  themes	  
in	  texts.	  Goal	  was	  to	  test	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  
corrective	  action	  and	  
mortification	  strategies.	  




reputation	  based	  on	  
the	  use	  of	  corrective	  
action	  or	  apology.	  
	  
Exploring	  the	  alignment	  
of	  image	  repair	  tactics	  to	  
audience	  type	  
Gribas,	  et	  al.,	  
2016	  
Exploratory	  survey	  of	  
students	  to	  find	  which	  IRT	  
response	  strategies	  are	  
perceived	  to	  be	  more	  or	  
less	  appropriate	  and	  
successful	  for	  various	  
audience	  types.	  
Accommodative	  
strategies	  such	  as	  
corrective	  action,	  
mortification	  and	  
compensation	  are	  most	  
successful	  regardless	  
of	  audience	  type.	  
	  
Crisis	  communications	  
effectiveness:	  The	  role	  of	  




Exploratory	  survey	  looking	  
at	  accommodative	  and	  
defensive	  strategies	  for	  
effectiveness	  based	  on	  
prior	  reputational	  history	  
with	  the	  affected	  audience.	  
	  
Participants	  perceived	  
responses	  as	  either	  
compassionate	  or	  
lacking	  compassion	  
based	  on	  prior	  
relationship	  history	  
and	  either	  defensive	  or	  
accommodative	  nature	  

















perceptions	  of	  sincerity	  
based	  on	  various	  response	  
strategies	  employed	  in	  a	  






Participants	  exposed	  to	  




more	  positive	  feelings	  
toward	  the	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organization	  than	  with	  
any	  other	  strategies.	  	  
	  
“I’m	  sorry”	  is	  hard	  to	  say	  
for	  Lance	  Armstrong.	  







Mixed	  method	  content	  
analysis	  and	  experiment.	  
Goal	  was	  to	  examine	  the	  
IRT	  strategies	  employed	  by	  
Armstrong	  and	  test	  
assumptions	  the	  media	  
(print	  or	  video)	  would	  
impact	  public	  reaction	  to	  
the	  chosen	  IRT	  strategies.	  
	  
Content	  analysis	  found	  
that	  simple	  denial	  was	  




more	  negative	  after	  
both	  reading	  and	  
watching	  statements	  
from	  Armstrong.	  
Responding	  to	  criminal	  
accusations:	  An	  
experimental	  
examination	  of	  Aqib	  






Experimental	  test	  of	  
response	  strategies	  to	  
analyze	  athlete	  image	  
repair	  strategies	  
(mortification	  and	  attack	  
the	  accuser	  strategy	  
effectiveness	  as	  a	  means	  to	  




attack	  the	  accuser	  
strategies	  were	  both	  
effective	  at	  mitigating	  
negative	  word	  of	  
mouth.	  
Measuring	  the	  impact	  of	  
IRT	  via	  social	  media.	  
What	  are	  organizations	  






Content	  analysis	  of	  social	  
media	  messages	  from	  
Paula	  Dean	  and	  Barilla	  US	  
as	  they	  engaged	  in	  image	  
repair	  during	  crisis.	  Goal	  
was	  to	  determine	  message	  
efficacy.	  
Mortification	  and	  
attack	  the	  accuser	  
were	  used	  in	  both	  
cases	  and	  neither	  
garnered	  more	  positive	  
than	  negative	  reactions	  
from	  stakeholders	  on	  




Scholarly	  Consensus	  on	  Response	  Strategy	  Effectiveness	  
Many	  case	  studies	  have	  described	  how	  poor	  crisis	  management	  and	  
communications	  have	  negatively	  affected	  organizational	  reputation	  and	  relationships.	  
We’ve	  seen	  examples	  of	  misguided	  response	  strategies,	  errant	  anticipation	  of	  stakeholder	  
reaction	  to	  messages,	  inadequate	  attempts	  at	  compensation,	  and	  hollow	  apologies	  –
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missteps	  that	  can	  have	  long-­‐lasting	  consequences	  as	  stakeholders	  often	  view	  organizations	  
more	  negatively	  as	  a	  result.	  
	   However,	  we	  also	  know	  from	  numerous	  case	  studies	  that	  if	  an	  organization	  chooses	  
the	  right	  strategy	  and	  conceives	  the	  proper	  response,	  its	  reputation	  can	  actually	  improve	  
and	  it	  can	  build	  important	  advocates	  among	  stakeholders	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  
handled	  itself.	  	  
But	  proper	  crisis	  response	  is	  challenging	  as	  crises	  often	  evolve	  and	  morph	  over	  
time.	  With	  the	  explosion	  of	  media	  outlets,	  an	  organization	  can	  lose	  at	  least	  some	  of	  its	  
control	  of	  the	  message	  along	  the	  way.	  Scholars	  talk	  about	  the	  media	  as	  an	  intensifier	  that	  
can	  grab	  control	  away	  from	  the	  organization.	  	  Kim	  (2016)	  maintains	  this	  control	  shift	  
occurs	  as	  the	  media	  position	  the	  story	  in	  their	  coverage	  decisions.	  Media	  often	  bring	  in	  new	  
elements	  and	  shine	  light	  on	  the	  human	  impacts	  of	  crisis	  situations,	  which	  can	  be	  a	  force	  
magnifier.	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  both	  Benoit	  and	  Coombs	  have	  expressed	  opinions	  on	  which	  
response	  strategies	  are	  most	  effective.	  In	  his	  theory,	  Coombs	  links	  the	  anticipated	  
stakeholder	  reaction	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  crisis	  communications	  strategy.	  In	  SCCT,	  the	  response	  
posture	  adopted	  by	  the	  organization	  should	  relate	  directly	  to	  the	  type	  of	  crisis	  and	  the	  level	  
of	  responsibility	  that	  stakeholders	  attribute	  to	  the	  organization.	  
	   SCCT	  guidelines	  are	  designed	  to	  help	  choose	  the	  best	  response.	  For	  example,	  the	  
theory	  suggests	  that	  the	  organization	  should	  adopt	  a	  rebuild	  response	  such	  as	  
compensation	  or	  apology	  when	  there	  is	  strong	  attribution	  of	  crisis	  responsibility	  
(preventable	  crises).	  Diminish	  strategies	  such	  as	  excuse	  or	  justification	  should	  be	  used	  for	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crises	  with	  minimal	  attribution	  (accidents).	  Victimage	  can	  also	  be	  used	  for	  crises	  with	  
minimal	  attribution	  (e.g.	  workplace	  violence	  or	  product	  tampering).	  
Hagan	  (2007)	  is	  aligned	  with	  many	  other	  researchers	  in	  her	  observation	  that	  
mortification	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  sincere	  apology)	  followed	  by	  corrective	  action	  is	  best	  so	  that	  
organizations	  both	  say	  and	  do	  the	  right	  things.	  These	  concepts	  are	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  PR	  
history.	  In	  the	  original	  “Page	  Principles”	  established	  by	  the	  Arthur	  W.	  Page	  Society,	  two	  of	  
the	  core	  principles	  are	  “tell	  the	  truth”	  and	  “prove	  it	  with	  action”	  (Koten,	  2004).	  
PR	  as	  a	  function,	  with	  its	  role	  in	  crafting	  organizational	  communications,	  is	  a	  major	  
player	  in	  response	  strategy.	  In	  her	  research	  on	  reputation	  management	  in	  the	  automotive	  
industry	  crises,	  Hagan	  (2007)	  explains	  organizational	  responsibility:	  
For	  example,	  when	  a	  product	   fails,	   customers	  expect	   the	  manufacturer	   to	  
fix	  it	  and	  make	  it	  right.	  Executives	  typically	  weigh	  their	  decisions	  based	  on	  
“hard”	   factors	   such	   as	   economic,	   legal,	   technical,	   logistical,	   and	   timing	  
concerns.	   Therefore,	   too,	   they	   need	   to	   base	   decisions	   on	   “soft	   factors”	   or	  
human	   factors	   involving	   emotion	   as	   well.	   When	   a	   product	   has	   defects,	  
especially	   something	   safety	   related,	   a	   company	   must	   act	   quickly	   and	  
responsibly.	   It	   is	   public	   relations’	   role	   to	   communicate	   those	   actions	   to	  
publics	  and	  maintain	  relationships	  with	  them.	  (p.	  429)	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  several	  recent	  studies	  included	  in	  the	  Blaney	  book	  examined	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  response	  type	  (these	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  3).	  	  Many	  of	  these	  
examined	  mortification,	  compensation	  and	  corrective	  action	  relative	  to	  effectiveness	  
perception	  by	  stakeholders.	  The	  strategies	  that	  were	  more	  accommodative,	  such	  as	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mortification,	  corrective	  action	  and	  compensation,	  were	  generally,	  but	  not	  uniformly,	  seen	  
to	  be	  more	  effective	  and	  impactful.	  According	  to	  Coombs,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Caldiero	  (2016),	  	  
“accommodation	  reflects	  compassion	  and	  concern	  for	  victims,	  whereas	  defensive	  [sic]	  lacks	  
compassion	  by	  denying	  victims’	  needs”	  (p.	  68)	  	  	  
	   In	  their	  experiment	  to	  test	  audiences’	  perceptions	  of	  sincerity	  based	  on	  various	  
response	  strategies	  employed	  in	  a	  fictional	  company	  crisis	  scenario,	  Cos	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  found	  
that	  mortification	  and	  corrective	  action	  were	  significantly	  more	  effective	  than	  other	  
strategies	  tested	  including	  scapegoating,	  transcendence,	  bolstering	  and	  minimization.	  
	   In	  a	  similar	  project,	  Gribas	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  conducted	  an	  exploratory	  survey	  of	  students	  
to	  find	  which	  IRT	  response	  strategies	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  appropriate	  and	  
successful	  for	  various	  audience	  types.	  The	  audience	  types	  included	  antagonistic,	  concerned,	  
bemused	  and	  animated.	  Interestingly,	  these	  researchers	  found	  that,	  regardless	  of	  audience	  
type,	  “certain	  tactics	  such	  as	  corrective	  action,	  compensation	  and	  mortification	  seem	  to	  be	  
very	  good	  actions	  across	  audiences”	  (p.	  59).	  
	   Finally,	  Caldiero	  (2016)	  looked	  at	  the	  role	  of	  prior	  reputation	  and	  compassionate	  
response	  in	  the	  context	  of	  IRT	  strategies.	  Like	  Coombs,	  Caldiero	  posited	  that	  relationship	  
history	  is	  central	  to	  effective	  crisis	  communications.	  	  His	  exploratory	  survey	  examined	  
accommodative	  and	  defensive	  strategies	  for	  effectiveness	  based	  on	  prior	  reputational	  
history	  with	  affected	  audiences.	  He	  did	  find	  that	  audiences	  tended	  to	  assign	  compassionate	  
or	  uncompassionate	  perception	  of	  response	  but	  saw	  similar	  results	  in	  both	  the	  
accommodative	  and	  defensive	  response	  types.	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Channels	  for	  Effective	  Crisis	  Response	  and	  the	  Element	  of	  Execution	  
The	  credibility	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  source	  of	  messages	  in	  and	  after	  a	  crisis	  
constitute	  an	  important	  area	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  stakeholders	  will	  perceive	  outcome.	  Message	  
channels	  and	  sources	  have	  proliferated	  in	  the	  digital	  era,	  so	  researchers	  have	  renewed	  
interest	  in	  which	  sources	  might	  have	  the	  most	  influence.	  In	  their	  study	  of	  sources	  of	  
information	  and	  how	  people	  are	  likely	  to	  react	  to	  crisis	  communications,	  Liu,	  Jin	  and	  Austin	  
(2013)	  found	  that,	  in	  general,	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  comment	  positively	  about	  an	  
organization	  in	  crisis	  when	  they	  receive	  the	  crisis	  details	  from	  the	  organization	  directly	  
instead	  of	  through	  a	  third	  party.	  They	  also	  found	  that	  organizations	  could	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
encouraging	  stakeholders	  to	  communicate	  positive	  messages	  to	  others	  in	  online	  public	  
channels.	  
Diermeier	  (2011)	  explains	  that	  people	  examine	  how	  the	  company	  is	  handling	  itself	  
in	  a	  much	  more	  focused	  manner	  when	  it	  is	  in	  crisis	  recovery	  and	  “when	  people	  are	  paying	  
attention,	  they	  remember,	  sometimes	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time”	  (p.	  91).	  Therefore,	  any	  
comprehensive	  review	  of	  crisis	  response	  should	  mention	  the	  importance	  of	  executing	  once	  
the	  responses	  (especially	  accommodative	  responses)	  are	  communicated.	  	  Crises	  are	  often	  
described	  as	  “make	  or	  break”	  moments	  for	  organizations.	  Diermeier	  describes	  them	  as	  
times	  when	  “companies	  are	  on	  stage”	  and	  explains	  that	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  response	  (from	  
communication	  through	  execution)	  must	  be	  managed	  effectively	  and	  with	  minimal	  
mistakes.	  The	  risk,	  for	  instance,	  of	  a	  flawed	  corrective	  action,	  compensation	  or	  other	  
accommodative	  strategy	  becomes	  further	  reputational	  damage.	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In	  conclusion,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  studying	  crisis	  response	  as	  a	  component	  of	  
organizational-­‐stakeholder	  communications	  because	  I	  believe	  it	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  
quality	  of	  reputation	  and,	  ultimately,	  relationships.	  I	  share	  Grunig’s	  (2006)	  view	  that	  PR	  
and	  those	  who	  practice	  it	  should	  strive	  for	  it	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  bridging	  activity	  helping	  to	  
preserve	  and	  build	  relationships,	  rather	  than	  simply	  a	  buffering	  activity	  that	  often	  results	  
in	  isolation	  and	  focuses	  on	  self-­‐interest.	  
As	  we	  examine	  the	  VW	  Dieselgate	  crisis	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  this	  literature	  review,	  I	  
would	  like	  to	  explore	  three	  specific	  research	  questions.	  
	   RQ1:	  	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  did	  Volkswagen’s	  response	  to	  Dieselgate	  affect	  customers’	  
opinions	  about	  the	  company?	  	  
	   RQ2:	  Did	  consumers	  views	  about	  VW	  show	  improvement	  after	  more	  substantial	  
compensation	  was	  offered?	  
	   RQ3:	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  is	  brand	  equity	  impacted	  for	  a	  company	  with	  a	  previously	  highly	  
favorable	  reputation	  based	  on	  whether	  it	  provided	  a	  complete	  and	  unambiguous	  
response/remedy	  or	  an	  ambiguous	  response/remedy	  following	  a	  crisis?	  
	  
Footnotes:	  
[1]	  	  In	  published	  works,	  Benoit’s	  theory	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  both	  “image	  restoration	  
theory”	  as	  well	  as	  “image	  repair	  theory”.	  More	  recently,	  Benoit	  has	  used	  “repair”	  more	  










	   In	  my	  research	  into	  Volkswagen’s	  Dieselgate	  crisis,	  I	  employed	  a	  mixed-­‐method	  
approach	  using	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  strategies.	  By	  using	  these	  techniques,	  I	  hope	  to	  
increase	  the	  body	  of	  knowledge	  about	  organizational	  behavior	  in	  crises	  and	  crisis	  response	  
specifically.	  Table	  4	  below	  summarizes	  the	  methods	  used	  for	  all	  research	  questions.	  
Table	  4.	  	  Research	  questions	  methods	  
Research	  Question	   Method	  
RQ1:	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  did	  Volkswagen’s	  
response	  to	  Dieselgate	  affect	  customers’	  
opinions	  about	  the	  company?	  
	  
In-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  VW	  owners	  
RQ2:	  Did	  consumers’	  views	  about	  VW	  
show	  improvement	  after	  more	  
substantial	  compensation	  was	  offered?	  
	  
Qualitatitive	  content	  analysis	  of	  tweets	  and	  
online	  discussion	  board	  postings	  in	  both	  
compensation	  offer	  periods	  (Goodwill	  
Package	  and	  final	  offer).	  The	  researcher	  and	  
two	  outside	  coders	  analyzed	  the	  texts.	  
	  
RQ3:	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  is	  brand	  equity	  
impacted	  for	  a	  company	  with	  
previously	  high	  reputational	  
expectations	  based	  on	  whether	  it	  
provided	  a	  complete	  and	  unambiguous	  
response/remedy	  or	  an	  ambiguous	  
response/remedy	  following	  a	  crisis?	  
	  
Quantitative	  content	  analysis	  of	  tweets	  and	  
online	  discussion	  board	  postings	  with	  a	  
dependent	  variable	  of	  expressed	  brand	  
sentiment	  and	  independent	  variables	  
comprised	  of	  the	  two	  separate	  compensation	  
events.	  Two	  outside	  coders	  analyzed	  the	  
texts	  and	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability	  was	  




	   I	  believe	  robust	  qualitative	  methods	  serve	  my	  research	  objectives	  well.	  	  Baxter	  and	  
Babbie	  (2004)	  describe	  qualitative	  research	  as	  being	  characterized	  by	  its	  demands	  for	  the	  
flexibility	  and	  insightful	  interpretation	  by	  the	  researcher.	  The	  focus	  of	  qualitative	  research	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is	  on	  interpreting	  meaning.	  Unlike	  quantitative	  research,	  Mason	  (2010)	  explains	  that,	  in	  
general,	  frequencies	  aren’t	  as	  important	  in	  qualitative	  research,	  as	  one	  occurrence	  of	  the	  
data	  is	  potentially	  as	  useful	  as	  many	  in	  understanding	  the	  process	  behind	  a	  topic.	  This	  is	  
because	  “qualitative	  research	  is	  concerned	  with	  meaning	  and	  not	  making	  generalized	  
hypothesis	  statements”	  (p.	  1).	  
	   There	  are	  a	  few	  primary	  qualitative	  methods	  often	  employed.	  	  These	  include	  
participant	  observation	  (either	  observing	  participants	  from	  afar	  or	  participating	  with	  them	  
in	  the	  field);	  qualitative	  interviews	  (a	  conversation	  with	  a	  purpose	  to	  help	  the	  researcher	  
explore	  a	  line	  of	  inquiry	  with	  a	  qualified	  source);	  and	  focus	  groups	  (small	  groups	  of	  people	  
in	  a	  discussion	  about	  a	  topic	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  researcher).	  These	  methods	  have	  different	  
utility	  and	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  Scholars	  suggest	  that	  the	  	  research	  direction	  and	  
research	  question	  should	  determine	  which	  methods	  are	  best	  for	  the	  situation.	  
	   Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  describe	  what	  they	  call	  the	  “triad”	  of	  qualitative	  research:	  
participant	  observation,	  qualitative	  interviewing	  and	  social	  text	  content	  analysis.	  
Importantly,	  many	  scholars	  cite	  trustworthiness	  as	  an	  important	  test	  for	  qualitative	  
research.	  Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  also	  cite	  Shenton	  to	  describe	  trustworthiness	  elements	  
for	  good	  qualitative	  research	  to	  be	  credibility	  (how	  congruent	  are	  the	  findings	  with	  
reality);	  transferability	  (can	  the	  results	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  wider	  group	  or	  population);	  
dependability	  (are	  the	  observations	  dependable	  and	  is	  the	  researcher’s	  process	  trackable);	  
and	  confirmability	  (is	  the	  data	  objective).	  
	   These	  authors	  also	  say	  that	  qualitative	  researchers	  are	  obligated	  to	  provide	  “thick	  
descriptions”	  of	  their	  observations	  in	  a	  quest	  to	  interpret	  phenomenon	  or	  derive	  meaning.	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Geertz	  (2003)	  describes	  thick	  description	  as	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  and	  an	  elaborate	  venture	  
in	  so	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  something	  we	  observe	  at	  the	  surface	  level	  and	  
what	  might	  be	  the	  true	  meaning.	  Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  call	  thick	  description	  an	  
obligation	  of	  the	  researcher	  to	  provide	  extremely	  detailed	  descriptions	  of	  what	  he/she	  
observed.	  
	   For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project	  and	  to	  address	  RQ1,	  I	  chose	  in-­‐depth	  interviews,	  
which	  are	  generally	  defined	  as	  conversations	  with	  a	  purpose	  so	  that	  the	  researcher	  can	  
explore	  a	  line	  of	  inquiry	  with	  a	  qualified	  source	  or	  sources.	  I	  also	  conducted	  a	  qualitative	  
content	  analysis	  to	  address	  RQ2.	  
In-­‐depth	  Interviews	  with	  VW	  TDI	  Owners	  
In-­‐depth,	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  interviews	  are	  a	  frequently	  used	  qualitative	  method.	  These	  
must	  also	  meet	  the	  trustworthiness	  test.	  Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  suggest	  that	  interviews	  
be	  either	  unstructured	  or	  semi-­‐structured	  so	  that	  the	  researcher	  is	  following	  a	  general	  line	  
of	  inquiry.	  Scholars	  suggest	  interviewing	  can	  be	  a	  good	  choice	  to	  learn	  about	  something	  
that	  can’t	  be	  observed	  by	  you	  as	  the	  researcher;	  to	  understand	  an	  individual’s	  feelings	  or	  
thought	  processes;	  or	  to	  use	  as	  triangulation	  to	  see	  if	  findings	  “ring	  true”	  from	  another	  
method	  or	  process.	  	  I	  sought	  to	  meet	  all	  of	  those	  objectives	  by	  conducting	  interviews	  with	  
VW	  automobile	  owners	  who	  were	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  Dieselgate	  crisis.	  Further,	  these	  
authors	  explain	  that,	  to	  ensure	  trustworthiness,	  the	  researcher	  should	  take	  steps	  including	  
ensuring	  his/her	  process	  is	  trackable,	  having	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  participants	  to	  reach	  
saturation	  and	  achieving	  credibility	  by	  doing	  a	  second	  round	  of	  interviews.	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   I	  obtained	  IRB	  approval	  to	  conduct	  a	  series	  of	  interviews	  with	  human	  subjects	  who	  
were,	  in	  this	  case,	  VW	  owners	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  Dieselgate	  crisis	  (see	  Appendix	  for	  a	  
copy	  of	  the	  IRB	  approval	  documentation).	  I	  developed	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  questionnaire	  
allowing	  for	  open-­‐ended	  answers	  as	  frequently	  as	  possible.	  The	  questions	  explored	  owner	  
opinions	  about	  Volkswagen	  as	  a	  company	  and	  about	  its	  response	  to	  Dieselgate	  at	  relevant	  
time	  periods	  including	  both	  compensation	  offer	  events	  –	  after	  VW	  offered	  its	  goodwill	  gift	  
card	  package	  and	  after	  the	  ultimate	  final	  offer	  was	  announced.	  A	  copy	  of	  the	  questionnaire	  
instrument	  is	  included	  in	  the	  Appendix	  and	  the	  major	  categories	  of	  interview	  questions	  are	  
detailed	  in	  Table	  5	  below.	  Each	  interview	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  and	  used	  the	  
same	  questionnaire	  instrument	  (a	  copy	  of	  which	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  Appendix).	  
	  
Table	  5.	  In-­‐depth	  interview	  question	  summary	  
Content	  category	   Questioning	  strategy	  
Subject	  information	   Gather	  demographic	  information	  as	  well	  as	  establish	  
location	  and	  obtain	  information	  about	  vehicle	  type,	  
length	  of	  ownership,	  etc.	  
	  
Purchase	  intent	  and	  satisfaction	   Determine	  initial	  motivations	  for	  purchasing	  the	  VW	  
TDI	  model,	  learning	  satisfaction	  levels	  with	  the	  car	  
since	  its	  purchase	  and	  establishing	  the	  subject’s	  
willingness	  to	  recommend	  the	  car	  to	  others	  in	  
his/her	  peer	  group.	  
	  
Situation	  awareness	   Establish	  the	  subject’s	  general	  awareness	  about	  
Dieselgate,	  how	  closely	  they	  followed/continue	  to	  
follow	  news	  about	  the	  crisis	  and	  their	  awareness	  
about	  the	  Goodwill	  Package	  and	  final	  compensation	  
offers.	  
	  
Opinions	  about	  Dieselgate,	  
compensation	  and	  future	  
intention	  to	  purchase	  
Establish	  the	  subject’s	  initial	  reactions	  upon	  hearing	  
about	  the	  crisis;	  what	  they	  remembered	  about	  VW’s	  
communications	  at	  the	  time;	  their	  reaction	  to	  the	  
Goodwill	  Package	  and	  final	  settlement	  and	  whether	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they	  accepted	  either/both	  offers;	  whether	  they	  felt	  
the	  compensation	  efforts	  were	  satisfactory;	  whether	  
their	  opinion	  of	  VW	  as	  a	  company	  has	  changed;	  and	  
whether	  they	  would	  consider	  purchasing	  another	  
VW	  vehicle	  or	  recommend	  purchase	  to	  others.	  
	  	  
	  
	   Interviews	  were	  conducted	  over	  the	  phone	  or	  in-­‐person	  over	  a	  four-­‐week	  period.	  
Interviews	  lasted	  20-­‐30	  minutes	  each.	  Names	  of	  interview	  subjects	  were	  kept	  confidential	  
so	  that	  respondents	  could	  answer	  with	  anonymity	  assured.	  Interview	  subjects	  agreed	  to	  be	  
recorded	  and	  transcribed	  and,	  in	  accordance	  with	  IRB	  requirements,	  I	  will	  personally	  
maintain	  all	  interview	  raw	  materials	  for	  five	  years	  before	  destruction.	  In	  accordance	  with	  
recommendations	  from	  Edwards	  and	  Holland	  (2013),	  interview	  subjects	  were	  briefed	  
about	  the	  purpose	  and	  process	  for	  the	  interview	  and	  how	  long	  the	  interview	  was	  likely	  to	  
take.	  Edwards	  and	  Holland	  explain	  the	  importance	  of	  providing	  this	  briefing	  to	  subject	  so	  
as	  to	  	  “draw	  the	  participant	  onto	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  research”	  (p.	  8)	  
	   A	  total	  of	  six	  owners	  participated	  in	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  All	  of	  these	  were	  from	  
the	  same	  major	  metropolitan	  area	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  one	  owner	  who	  lived	  in	  New	  York	  
state).	  	  Convenience	  sampling	  and	  later	  snowball	  sampling	  were	  used	  to	  recruit	  interview	  
subjects.	  Convenience	  sampling	  relies	  on	  participants	  who	  are	  identified	  by	  the	  researcher.	  
Snowball	  sampling	  occurred	  when	  initial	  participants	  suggested	  additional	  available	  
participants	  who	  then	  agreed	  to	  be	  interviewed.	  Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  suggest	  that	  
snowball	  sampling	  is	  appropriate	  when	  members	  of	  a	  specific	  population	  are	  difficult	  to	  
identify.	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   Table	  6	  below	  provides	  basic	  demographic	  information	  about	  each	  interview	  
subject	  including	  their	  VW	  TDI	  model	  owned.	  
	  
Table	  6.	  In-­‐depth	  interview	  subjects	  
Subject	  Number	   Age,	  Sex	   Location	   TDI	  Model/Year	  
	  
1.	  	  	  C.B.	   29,	  M	   Kansas	  City,	  MO	   2010	  VW	  Passat	  
	  
2.	  	  	  J.S.	   42,	  M	   Kansas	  City,	  MO	   2010	  VW	  Jetta	  
Sport	  Wagon	  
	  
3.	  	  A.P.	   39,	  M	   Kansas	  City,	  MO	   2010	  VW	  Jetta	  
Sport	  Wagon	  
	  
4.	  	  R.M.	   67,	  M	   Rochester,	  NY	   Audi	  A7	  
	  
5.	  	  S.	  E-­‐S.	   71,	  F	   Gladstone,	  MO	   2013	  VW	  Passat	  
	  
6.	  	  B.G.	   43,	  M	   Kansas	  City,	  MO	   2012	  VW	  Passat	  
	  
	  
	   While	  more	  time	  was	  allotted	  for	  interviewing,	  saturation	  was	  observed	  from	  the	  
total	  sample	  by	  the	  sixth	  interview.	  The	  saturation	  concept	  as	  described	  by	  Glaser	  and	  
Strauss	  and	  cited	  by	  Francis	  et	  al	  (2010)	  was	  used	  to	  guide	  this	  sampling	  decision.	  
The	   concept	   of	   data	   saturation	  was	   introduced	   to	   the	   field	   of	   qualitative	  
research	   by	   Glaser	   and	   Strauss	   (1967)	   and	   referred	   to	   the	   point	   in	   data	  
collection	  when	  no	  new	  additional	  data	  are	  found	  that	  develop	  aspects	  of	  a	  
conceptual	   category…if	   sampling	   is	   adequate	   (and	   if	   the	   interviews	   have	  
been	   effective	   at	   eliciting	   participants’	   experiences	   or	   views	   from	  within	  
these	   conceptual	   categories),	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   content	   domain	   of	   the	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construct	   has	   been	   adequately	   populated	   (or	   saturated).	   (Francis	   et	   al.,	  
2010,	  p.	  3)	  
	   Edwards	  and	  Holland	  (2013)	  further	  elaborate	  on	  saturation	  as	  a	  valid	  concept	  to	  
determine	  sample	  size.	  They	  describe	  it	  as	  an	  ideal	  method	  when	  an	  interpretive	  approach	  
is	  utilized	  and	  agree	  that	  saturation	  is	  reached	  when	  the	  researcher	  fails	  to	  hear	  new	  
themes	  or	  information.	  Thus,	  “rather	  that	  the	  number	  in	  a	  sample	  being	  representative…in	  
qualitative	  research	  it	  is	  the	  range	  of	  meanings	  that	  should	  determine	  numbers	  of	  
interviewees	  in	  a	  study”	  (p.	  65).	  	  
	   These	  authors	  note	  that	  certain	  researchers	  have	  attempted	  to	  land	  on	  a	  specific	  
number,	  often	  determined	  by	  whether	  the	  goal	  is	  phenomenological	  or	  grounded.	  	  Lester	  
(1999)	  describes	  phenomenological	  research	  as	  “the	  study	  of	  experience	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  the	  individual”	  (p.	  	  1).	  Edwards	  and	  Holland	  quote	  Morse’s	  recommendation	  
of	  six	  interviews	  as	  a	  minimum	  for	  phenomenological	  studies	  (p.	  66).	  Creswell,	  as	  cited	  by	  
Mason	  (2010)	  suggests	  a	  minimum	  of	  five.	  Mason	  also	  cited	  the	  finding	  from	  Guest	  et	  al.	  
that,	  in	  samples	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  homogeneity,	  “a	  sample	  of	  six	  interviews	  may	  [be]	  
sufficient	  to	  enable	  the	  development	  of	  meaningful	  themes	  and	  useful	  interpretations”	  (p.	  
4).	  
	   Importantly,	  the	  interview	  subjects	  in	  this	  project	  were	  deemed	  to	  be	  particularly	  
relevant	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  obvious	  subject	  matter	  expertise	  since	  they	  were	  directly	  
affected	  by	  the	  Dieselgate	  crisis.	  This	  personal	  involvement	  provided	  them	  with	  a	  high	  level	  
of	  credibility.	  In	  his	  review	  of	  saturation	  in	  qualitative	  interviews,	  Mason	  (2010)	  discussed	  
the	  importance	  of	  participant	  credibility	  and	  expertise	  as	  well	  as	  the	  use	  of	  more	  than	  one	  
	  
	   	   	  
52	  
method.	  He	  cited	  Jette,	  Grover	  and	  Keck	  who	  posited	  that	  subject	  expertise	  was	  very	  
valuable	  to	  achieve	  saturation.	  
Qualitative	  Content	  Analysis	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews,	  a	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  of	  online	  
comments	  generated	  by	  affected	  VW	  owners	  was	  conducted.	  	  Qualitative	  content	  analysis	  
involves	  analyzing	  texts	  for	  their	  meaning	  and	  significance	  (Altheide	  &	  Schneider,	  2013).	  It	  
also	  considers	  how	  these	  texts	  represent	  individuals’	  and	  cultural	  assumptions,	  beliefs,	  
expectations	  and	  meanings	  in	  regards	  to	  a	  specific	  topic	  or	  phenomenon	  (Altheide	  &	  
Schneider,	  2013).	  This	  content	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  “representations	  of	  social	  meanings	  and	  
institutional	  relations”	  (p.	  5).	  Unlike	  textual	  analysis,	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  involves	  a	  
systematic	  procedure	  for	  collection	  and	  analysis	  and	  considers	  the	  context	  of	  the	  content.	  	  
Qualitative	  content	  analysis	  was	  chosen	  because	  of	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  providing	  a	  
focus	  on	  meaning	  making.	  While	  quantitative	  content	  analysis	  captures	  data	  to	  be	  
statistically	  analyzed,	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  processes	  and	  meaning.	  In	  
addition,	  there	  is	  a	  paucity	  of	  previous	  research	  to	  guide	  quantitative	  coding.	  Qualitative	  
content	  analysis	  was	  a	  suitable	  method	  for	  this	  study	  as	  it	  sought	  to	  understand	  how	  VW	  
owners	  and	  consumers	  reacted	  to	  the	  Dieselgate	  scandal.	  Past	  research	  illustrates	  the	  
success	  of	  utilizing	  the	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  method	  for	  consumer	  research	  
(Kassarjian,	  1977;	  Kolbe	  &	  Burnett,	  1991;	  Smith,	  Fischer,	  &	  Chen,	  2011).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  units	  of	  analysis	  were	  consumer	  tweets	  and	  postings	  to	  online	  discussion	  
boards	  designed	  for	  VW	  owners.	  For	  Twitter,	  hashtags	  relating	  to	  Dieselgate	  were	  accessed	  
and	  included	  #dieselgate,	  #BuyBackMyTDI	  and	  #GoodwillPackage.	  Owner	  discussion	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boards	  included	  www.tdiclub.com	  and	  www.volkswagenownersclub.com.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that,	  while	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  people	  posting	  to	  these	  online	  venues	  were	  actually	  VW	  
owners	  because	  of	  the	  content	  being	  discussed	  on	  the	  platforms,	  by	  their	  nature	  the	  
platforms	  provide	  anonymity	  through	  anonymous	  user	  names	  and	  by	  not	  requiring	  the	  
user	  to	  disclose	  specific	  information	  about	  him/herself.	  Therefore,	  VW	  ownership	  by	  
commenters	  could	  not	  be	  verified.	  
The	  Twitter	  texts	  analyzed	  included	  the	  tweet	  text,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  hashtags,	  images,	  
or	  emojis	  used	  within	  the	  tweet	  text.	  Tweets	  and	  discussion	  board	  postings	  were	  collected	  
from	  two	  specific	  timeframes	  –	  two	  weeks	  immediately	  after	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  
Goodwill	  Package	  offer	  in	  November	  2015	  and	  two	  weeks	  after	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  
final	  settlement	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  October	  2016.	  	  These	  dates	  were	  chosen	  in	  an	  effort	  
to	  capture	  user	  expressions	  and	  sentiment	  when	  the	  news	  about	  both	  compensation	  events	  
was	  still	  relatively	  recent	  and	  reactions	  were	  unclouded	  by	  further	  developments	  in	  the	  
Dieselgate	  crisis.	  
The	  tweets	  were	  accessed	  using	  Twitter’s	  Advanced	  Search	  feature.	  Tweet	  capture	  
tools	  and	  software	  were	  not	  used	  to	  collect	  tweets	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  funding.	  Retweets	  were	  
not	  analyzed	  as	  I	  was	  interested	  in	  original,	  initial	  reactions	  to	  the	  Dieselgate	  compensation	  
offers	  directly	  from	  individuals.	  Tweets	  with	  advertisements	  or	  from	  commercial	  entities	  
were	  also	  not	  included	  in	  the	  population	  as	  they	  did	  not	  represent	  consumer	  
communication.	  Tweets	  or	  postings	  that	  did	  not	  address	  the	  VW	  compensation	  offers	  were	  
also	  not	  included.	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For	  this	  research	  question,	  the	  tweets	  and	  discussion	  boards	  postings	  analyzed	  
were	  selected	  through	  systematic	  random	  sampling	  from	  a	  population	  total	  of	  674	  
tweets/postings.	  For	  this	  analysis,	  the	  population	  was	  then	  randomized	  to	  get	  to	  a	  total	  of	  
241	  total	  tweets/postings	  using	  the	  randomization	  table	  provided	  by	  Wrench,	  et	  al.	  (2008,	  
p.	  293)	  to	  determine	  sample	  size	  from	  a	  total	  population	  with	  a	  confidence	  interval	  of	  95	  
percent.	  Tweet	  search	  results	  from	  Twitter’s	  Advanced	  Search	  were	  saved	  as	  PDF	  
documents.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   A	  matrix	  was	  used	  to	  organize	  the	  data	  (see	  Appendix).	  The	  matrix	  was	  constructed	  
based	  on	  Barnett’s	  (2008)	  matrix.	  This	  study’s	  matrix	  included	  inventory	  and	  content	  
variables.	  The	  matrix	  served	  as	  a	  research	  protocol	  to	  ask	  specific	  questions	  about	  each	  
tweet	  or	  posting	  analyzed	  (Altheide	  &	  Schneider,	  2013).	  I	  served	  as	  a	  coder	  and	  also	  used	  
two	  outside	  coders	  for	  this	  analysis.	  I	  established	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability	  by	  analyzing	  a	  
subsample	  and	  found	  similar	  themes.	  The	  data	  were	  analyzed	  using	  thematic	  analysis	  and	  
open	  and	  axial	  coding.	  Thematic	  analysis	  involved	  reading	  and	  sorting	  the	  data	  collected	  
into	  themes	  and	  categories.	  These	  themes	  were	  assigned	  codes	  or	  labels	  that	  represented	  
the	  phenomenon	  occurring	  in	  the	  text	  (Altheide	  &	  Schneider,	  2013).	  Axial	  coding	  was	  also	  
conducted	  to	  find	  relationships	  by	  combining	  related	  themes	  and	  categories	  based	  on	  their	  
similarities	  (Corbin	  &	  Strauss,	  1990;	  Marshall	  &	  Rossman,	  2011).	  These	  combined	  
categories	  become	  the	  dominant	  themes	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
Quantitative	  Method	  	  
	   Using	  the	  total	  population	  of	  online	  tweets	  and	  postings	  discussed	  above	  from	  
affected	  VW	  owners,	  I	  applied	  a	  quantitative	  content	  analysis	  to	  address	  RQ3.	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   Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  define	  quantitative	  content	  analysis	  as	  the	  process	  of	  
coding	  communications	  texts	  according	  to	  some	  conceptual	  framework	  developed	  as	  a	  
coding	  schema.	  It	  is	  important	  for	  the	  researcher	  to	  identify	  whether	  his/her	  content	  to	  be	  
studied	  is	  manifest	  or	  latent	  content.	  Generally,	  these	  authors	  describe	  manifest	  content	  as	  
that	  which	  is	  easily	  identifiable	  on	  the	  surface	  and	  doesn’t	  require	  much	  interpretation.	  In	  
latent	  content,	  the	  coders	  rely	  on	  their	  interpretation	  of	  the	  overall	  texts	  to	  find	  its	  
underlying	  meaning.	  They	  describe	  latent	  content	  analysis	  as	  “better	  designed	  for	  tapping	  
the	  underlying	  meaning	  of	  texts”	  (p.	  243).	  
	   My	  identified	  dependent	  variable	  was	  an	  assessment	  of	  brand	  attitude	  sentiment.	  
My	  independent	  variables	  included	  both	  of	  the	  compensation	  events	  (the	  goodwill	  package	  
gift	  card	  offer	  in	  2015	  and	  the	  ultimate	  compensation	  offer	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  2016).	  	  
Owner	  comments	  were	  coded	  from	  both	  time	  frames.	  	  Tweets	  and	  message	  board	  
comments	  were	  coded	  for	  positive,	  negative	  or	  neutral	  overall	  sentiment	  in	  keeping	  with	  
Krippendorf’s	  model.	  Krippendorf	  (1980,	  as	  cited	  in	  Baxter	  &	  Babbie,	  2004)	  saw	  coding	  
units	  as	  categories	  that	  are	  mutually	  exclusive.	  Positive,	  negative	  and	  neutral	  codes	  were	  
assigned	  so	  as	  to	  help	  determine	  brand	  attitude	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  brand	  equity.	  	  
	   In	  developing	  the	  coding	  schema	  and	  identifying	  themes,	  I	  relied	  on	  the	  operational	  
definition	  of	  brand	  equity	  used	  by	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000)	  in	  their	  study	  of	  prior	  
reputation,	  crisis	  response	  and	  brand	  equity.	  Central	  to	  their	  definition	  of	  brand	  equity	  
were	  stakeholder	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  brand,	  expressed	  desirability	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  brand	  
(p.	  216).	  Online	  tweets/postings	  were	  coded	  based	  on	  a	  determination	  of	  each	  
commenter’s	  positive/neutral/negative	  expressed	  brand	  sentiment.	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   With	  regard	  to	  the	  steps	  in	  the	  method,	  I	  relied	  on	  Neuendorf’s	  (2002)	  eight	  steps	  to	  
conduct	  a	  content	  analysis	  as	  cited	  by	  Wrench	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  	  The	  steps	  and	  how	  my	  project	  
elements	  correspond	  to	  them	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  7	  below.	  
	  




1]	  Theory	  and	  rationale	  
Research	  questions	  must	  stem	  from	  work	  of	  
other	  researchers	  
	  
RQ	  based	  on	  prior	  work	  on	  crisis	  
response	  from	  Benoit,	  Coombs,	  Dawar	  
and	  Pillutla	  
2]	  Conceptualization	  
The	  determination	  of	  the	  research	  and	  what	  
variables	  you	  are	  studying	  
	  
Based	  on	  prior	  work	  from	  Dawar	  and	  
Pillutla,	  variables	  include	  brand	  equity	  
(DV)	  and	  the	  two	  settlement	  offers	  made	  
by	  VW	  (IVs)	  
	  
3]	  Operationalization	  
The	  determination	  of	  units	  of	  analysis	  and	  
level	  of	  measurement	  
	  
Units	  of	  analysis	  are	  tweets/online	  
postings	  and	  measurement	  level	  is	  
nominal	  
	  
4]	  Coding	  schemes	  
The	  development	  of	  a	  consistent	  method	  of	  
coding	  and	  coder	  training	  providing	  materials	  
including	  a	  codebook	  and	  coding	  forms,	  etc.	  
	  
	  
Conducted	  coder	  training	  that	  included	  
providing	  and	  introducing	  a	  detailed	  code	  
book	  for	  each	  coder	  
5]	  Sampling	  
The	  determination	  of	  the	  population	  and	  
sample	  to	  be	  analyzed	  
	  
Tweets	  from	  relevant	  hashtags	  and	  online	  
VW	  TDI	  owner	  discussion	  board	  postings	  
6]	  Training	  	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  coding	  book,	  sample	  
coding,	  establishing	  an	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability	  
coefficient	  
	  
Training	  and	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability	  
session	  conducted	  before	  coding	  began	  
7]	  Coding	   Coding	  conducted	  for	  entire	  population	  of	  
tweets/online	  postings	  
	  
8]	  Final	  reliability	   Final	  reliability	  was	  determined	  by	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comparing	  results	  after	  the	  entire	  




Coding	  Process	  and	  Intercoder	  Reliability	  	  
	   This	  project	  used	  the	  recommendation	  of	  Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  that,	  for	  
quantitative	  content	  analysis,	  two	  coders	  be	  used	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  inter-­‐coder	  
reliability.	  	  Two	  outside	  coders	  (undergraduate	  students)	  were	  trained	  and	  both	  
participated	  by	  coding	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  674	  tweets/online	  postings	  (which	  were	  
the	  units	  of	  analysis	  for	  this	  method).	  
	   It	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability	  so	  as	  to	  help	  ensure	  overall	  
reliability	  of	  results	  reporting.	  The	  authors	  suggest	  that	  determining	  reliability	  is	  often	  
achieved	  by	  having	  coders	  code	  a	  sample	  of	  the	  texts	  and	  determining	  a	  Cohen’s	  kappa	  
reliability	  coefficient	  (which	  should	  be	  at	  least	  .70).	  Another	  reliability	  check	  can	  be	  
conducted	  after	  the	  entire	  population	  has	  been	  coded.	  
	   Wrench	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  describe	  Cohen’s	  kappa	  as	  being	  a	  useful	  technique	  if	  you	  have	  
only	  two	  coders.	  This	  method	  allows	  for	  a	  determination	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  coders	  are	  
perceiving	  data	  similarly.	  	  
	   The	  initial	  reliability	  check	  included	  both	  coders	  working	  from	  the	  same	  coding	  
sheet	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  expressed	  sentiment	  of	  a	  tweet/online	  posting	  was	  positive,	  
negative	  or	  neutral.	  Following	  the	  steps	  outlined	  by	  Wrench	  et	  al.,	  both	  coders	  were	  given	  
the	  same	  trial	  sample	  of	  specific	  tweets/postings	  to	  analyze.	  Examples	  of	  sample	  tweets	  are	  
shown	  in	  Table	  8	  below.	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Table	  8.	  Examples	  of	  tweets/postings	  used	  in	  intercoder	  reliability	  assessment	  
Tweet/posting	  text	   Coder	  1	   Coder	  2	  
@VW	  how	  about	  you	  replace	  
my	  dirty	  diesel	  engine	  with	  a	  
6	  cylinder	  hybrid	  engine	  and	  
we	  call	  it	  even?	  #dieselgate	  
#vw	  #wolkswagenscandal	  
	  
Negative	   Negative	  
Thank	  you	  @VW	  for	  sending	  
a	  screenshot	  of	  the	  claims	  
website…Just	  let	  me	  know	  





Neutral	   Neutral	  
I	  DO	  love	  my	  Jetta	  S.	  
Especially	  if	  I	  get	  the	  $1000.	  




Positive	   Positive	  
$500	  doesn’t	  come	  close	  to	  
compensating	  @VW	  #TDI	  
owners	  for	  fraud,	  loss	  in	  
resale	  value,	  post-­‐recall	  loss	  
in	  efficiency	  #dieselgate	  
	  
Negative	   Negative	  
	  
Calling	  in	  has	  been	  a	  
nightmare.	  Despite	  the	  hold	  
recording	  emphasizing	  
having	  your	  claim	  number,	  
when	  you	  get	  to	  a	  real	  
person,	  they	  ask	  for	  name,	  
address,	  phone,	  VIN	  –	  all	  of	  
which	  should	  be	  in	  my	  claim	  
record.	  Then	  I	  got	  hung	  up	  
on	  three	  times	  during	  a	  
“transfer”	  
	  
Negative	   Negative	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Sumitted	  #dieselgate	  claim	  
@volkswagen	  >10	  days	  ago.	  
Still	  under	  review.	  Call	  
center	  hold	  time	  is	  >1	  hr.	  
This	  is	  not	  “expeditious”	  
	  
Negative	   Negative	  
	  
	  
Results	  from	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability	  testing	  were	  charted	  on	  a	  3	  x	  3	  matrix	  in	  order	  to	  
get	  the	  row	  and	  column	  totals	  needed	  to	  compute	  an	  expected	  frequency	  value	  and	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  complete	  the	  Cohen’s	  kappa	  formula.	  To	  determine	  if	  the	  two	  coders	  were	  assessing	  
sentiment	  accurately,	  a	  Cohen’s	  kappa	  was	  calculated	  at	  K=1.0,	  which	  is	  considered	  
satisfactory.	  
	   Wrench	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  recommend	  that	  the	  same	  Cohen’s	  kappa	  analysis	  be	  used	  after	  
all	  coding	  is	  completed	  using	  the	  same	  process.	  At	  that	  point,	  once	  a	  sum	  of	  expected	  
frequencies	  was	  calculated,	  I	  utilized	  the	  Cohen’s	  kappa	  formula	  to	  reach	  a	  kappa	  value	  
(“K”).	  To	  determine	  if	  the	  two	  coders	  were	  assessing	  sentiment	  accurately	  after	  all	  coding	  
was	  completed,	  a	  Cohen’s	  kappa	  was	  calculated	  at	  K=.83,	  which	  is	  considered	  satisfactory.	  
	   After	  determining	  final	  reliability	  (and	  as	  detailed	  in	  the	  results	  section),	  data	  were	  
analyzed	  using	  descriptive	  statistics.	  Wrench	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  explain	  that	  statistical	  
interpretation	  of	  data	  is	  important	  because	  statistics	  lend	  credibility	  to	  an	  analysis.	  They	  
explain	  that	  “statistics	  allow	  us	  to	  summarize	  or	  describe	  data…statistics	  assist	  us	  in	  
understanding	  and	  interpreting	  the	  world	  around	  us”	  (p.	  145).	  Using	  descriptive	  statistics	  
allows	  a	  researcher	  to	  organize	  and	  summarize	  information	  so	  that	  a	  description	  of	  what	  
exists	  in	  the	  data	  can	  be	  provided.	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   For	  this	  project,	  important	  descriptive	  statistics	  include	  the	  mean	  (M),	  or	  average,	  
which	  Wrench	  et	  al.	  define	  as	  the	  value	  that	  represents	  an	  entire	  group	  of	  scores	  and	  the	  
standard	  deviation	  (SD),	  which	  they	  define	  as,	  on	  average,	  how	  far	  each	  individual	  score	  
differs	  from	  the	  average	  score	  (2008,	  p.	  160).	  Larger	  standard	  deviation	  scores	  indicate	  
that	  the	  scores	  are	  more	  different	  from	  each	  other	  than	  are	  smaller	  standard	  deviation	  
scores.	  To	  conduct	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  analysis,	  coding	  results	  for	  both	  of	  the	  
independent	  variable	  offer	  event	  groups	  were	  loaded	  into	  the	  SPSS	  statistical	  software	  
program	  and	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  results	  section.	  
	   While	  this	  project	  does	  not	  include	  an	  experimental	  method	  where	  effects	  can	  be	  
measured	  against	  a	  hypothesis,	  RQ3	  compares	  two	  independent	  variables	  (the	  two	  offer	  
events)	  to	  see	  how	  commenter	  perception	  of	  brand	  sentiment	  might	  be	  affected	  based	  on	  
the	  substance	  of	  each	  offer.	  To	  analyze	  this	  research	  question,	  it	  was	  also	  helpful	  to	  identify	  
the	  variations	  in	  the	  averages	  (mean)	  scores	  of	  brand	  sentiment	  amongst	  the	  online	  
commenters	  who	  were	  analyzed	  using	  our	  coding	  schema	  (positive-­‐neutral-­‐negative)	  in	  
both	  offer	  periods.	  Then,	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  means	  was	  significant,	  an	  
independent	  samples	  t-­‐test	  was	  conducted.	  
	   Wrench	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  explain	  that	  an	  independent	  samples	  t-­‐test	  is	  frequently	  used	  
when	  a	  researcher	  has	  two	  independent	  grouping	  variables	  that	  are	  nominal	  in	  nature	  and	  
the	  researcher	  seeks	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  two	  groups’	  means	  differ	  against	  the	  dependent,	  or	  
measurement,	  variable.	  	  For	  this	  project,	  the	  two	  offer	  events	  were	  the	  independent	  
grouping	  variables	  and	  the	  coded	  brand	  attitude	  sentiment	  was	  the	  dependent	  variable.	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Coding	  results	  were	  loaded	  into	  the	  SPSS	  statistical	  software	  program	  and	  results	  are	  
reported	  in	  the	  results	  section.	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Results	  
	   RQ1:	  	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  did	  Volkswagen’s	  response	  to	  Dieselgate	  affect	  customers’	  
opinions	  about	  the	  company?	  
	   As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Methods	  section,	  I	  was	  fortunate	  to	  be	  able	  to	  conduct	  in-­‐depth	  
interviews	  with	  six	  different	  VW	  owners	  during	  spring	  2017.	  I	  found	  these	  owners	  all	  very	  
willing	  to	  engage,	  and	  all	  yielded	  interesting	  insights	  and	  opinions.	  I	  found	  myself	  drawn	  to	  
this	  aspect	  of	  research	  more	  than	  any	  other	  because	  the	  richness	  of	  the	  dialogue	  with	  
people	  who	  had	  been	  personally	  impacted	  by	  Dieselgate	  was	  exactly	  what	  I	  was	  hoping	  for	  
when	  I	  embarked	  on	  this	  project.	  
	   Further,	  by	  doing	  the	  interviews	  first,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  glean	  valuable	  perspective	  that	  
helped	  me	  in	  the	  later	  stages	  of	  the	  project	  in	  the	  content	  analysis	  research.	  By	  identifying	  
sentiments	  and	  themes	  voiced	  by	  the	  interview	  subjects,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  design	  more	  efficient	  
content	  analyses	  and	  identify	  relevant	  themes.	  
	   It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  my	  interview	  subjects	  represented	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  
experiences	  and	  backgrounds.	  For	  example,	  owners	  included	  an	  auto	  mechanic	  who	  was	  
personally	  responsible	  for	  recommending	  the	  sale	  of	  11	  other	  VWs	  to	  friends	  and	  family;	  a	  
PR	  agency	  owner	  from	  New	  York	  who	  teaches	  crisis	  communications;	  and	  a	  mechanical	  
engineer	  who	  had	  purchased	  his	  VW	  because	  he	  thought	  he	  was	  making	  an	  
environmentally-­‐friendly	  decision.	  All	  of	  the	  subjects	  reported	  following	  news	  about	  
Dieselgate	  closely,	  and	  all	  owned	  VW	  diesel	  models.	  Feedback	  from	  these	  subjects	  was	  
grouped	  according	  to	  dominant	  themes	  that	  were	  voiced	  multiple	  times.	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Theme	  1:	  Buyer’s	  Remorse	  Following	  Betrayal	  	  	  
	   As	  customers	  became	  aware	  of	  Dieselgate,	  many	  used	  the	  words	  “shock”	  and	  
“surprise”	  as	  the	  news	  was	  breaking	  about	  their	  automobiles.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  same	  owner	  
comments	  observed	  in	  media	  reports	  were	  echoed	  by	  these	  subjects	  as	  they	  described	  a	  
feeling	  of	  betrayal,	  some	  even	  recalling	  the	  VW	  advertising	  campaign	  and	  its	  ironic	  “clean	  
diesel”	  claim.	  
One	  owner	  characterized	  his	  initial	  feelings	  as	  “shock	  and	  anger.	  I	  felt	  betrayed	  that	  
I	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  burning	  clean	  fuel,	  and	  then	  it	  turns	  out	  I’m	  not.	  I’m	  certainly	  
concerned	  that	  I’m	  driving	  a	  car	  around	  that’s	  polluting	  the	  environment	  especially	  since	  
that’s	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  I	  bought	  the	  car	  in	  the	  first	  place.”	  
An	  auto	  mechanic	  who	  described	  himself	  as	  extremely	  brand	  loyal	  to	  VW	  and	  
reported	  once	  having	  five	  VW’s	  parked	  in	  his	  driveway	  was	  especially	  troubled	  by	  the	  
company’s	  admissions.	  He	  reported	  that,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  his	  jobs	  for	  customers,	  he	  had	  
personally	  recommended	  TDI	  models	  to	  many	  others.	  
“I’m	  an	  extremely	  brand	  loyal	  person	  and	  they	  killed	  that.	  Like	  I	  said,	  I	  have	  
almost	   a	   dozen	   people	   I	   know	   who	   have	   purchased	   similar	   cars	   on	   my	  
recommendation,	  and	  here	  it	  was,	  sold	  on	  a	  false	  pretense.	  It’s	  one	  thing	  to	  
misrepresent	  something,	  but	  it’s	  another	  to	  do	  outright	  fraud.”	  
Another	  owner	  reported,	  as	  a	  buying	  motivation,	  the	  desire	  to	  join	  others	  looking	  
for	  better	  fuel	  economy	  with	  environmental	  benefits.	  He	  remembered	  being	  motivated	  by	  
seeing	  signs	  in	  the	  parking	  lot	  at	  his	  workplace	  reserving	  parking	  spaces	  for	  lower	  
emission	  cars.	  At	  first,	  he	  thought	  Dieslegate	  would	  be	  like	  other	  recalls	  until	  he	  learned	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about	  the	  implanted	  cheat	  software	  and	  then	  “I	  became	  kind	  of	  offended	  and	  I	  thought	  I	  
was	  sold	  a	  vehicle	  that	  no	  one	  would	  ever	  be	  interested	  in	  and	  that	  I	  would	  be	  stuck	  with	  
for	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  life	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  that,	  if	  I	  was	  able	  to	  sell	  it,	  the	  resale	  value	  would	  drop.”	  
Interestingly,	  all	  of	  the	  subjects	  interviewed	  reported	  being	  either	  satisfied	  or	  
extremely	  satisfied	  with	  all	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  car	  including	  performance,	  interior,	  ride	  
quality	  and	  fuel	  economy,	  etc.	  Were	  it	  not	  for	  Dieselgate,	  they	  would	  have	  anticipated	  being	  
happy	  with	  their	  cars	  for	  years	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  some	  reported	  they	  would	  have	  bought	  
another	  TDI	  for	  the	  same	  benefits.	  
Some	  subjects	  characterized	  this	  previous	  general	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  TDI	  models	  
as	  making	  the	  betrayal	  harder	  to	  process.	  When	  asked	  his	  first	  reaction,	  one	  owner	  said,	  
“probably	  disappointment	  because	  I	  love	  my	  car.	  My	  first	  car	  was	  a	  Volkswagen,	  and	  it’s	  a	  
brand	  that’s	  always	  had	  a	  special	  place	  in	  my	  heart.	  I	  still	  love	  the	  car,	  you	  know,	  so	  I	  was	  
disappointed.”	  
Theme	  2:	  Trust	  Erosion	  
As	  the	  size	  and	  scope	  of	  Dieselgate	  became	  more	  clear,	  and	  their	  own	  sense	  of	  
concern	  about	  their	  financial	  situation	  worsened,	  these	  subjects	  universally	  reported	  an	  
erosion	  in	  their	  trust	  of	  VW	  and	  in	  their	  general	  regard	  for	  the	  VW	  brand.	  Many	  pointed	  to	  
the	  intentionality	  of	  VW’s	  actions	  as	  being	  crucial	  to	  how	  they	  perceived	  the	  company.	  As	  
the	  news	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  deceit	  became	  clearer,	  one	  owner	  described	  how	  his	  opinions	  
about	  VW	  changed	  dramatically.	  
“My	  opinion	  of	  the	  company	  has	  changed.	  I’m	  not	  sure	  they	  are	  an	  ethical	  
company.	   I	   hadn’t	   thought	   that	   they	   weren’t,	   but	   now	   I	   have	   serious	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concerns	   that	   their	   leadership	   is	   unethical	   because	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	  
there	  were	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  executives	  who	  were	  privy	  to	  this	  and	  
maybe	   even	   gave	   their	   blessing	   to	   this	   software	   that	   was	   deliberately	  
intended	  to	  get	  around	  the	  law	  -­‐-­‐	  so	  that	  really	  concerns	  me	  a	  lot.”	  
One	  owner	  admitted	  that,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  one	  of	  only	  two	  interviewed	  who	  
might	  consider	  buying	  another	  VW	  in	  the	  future,	  his	  trust	  in	  the	  company	  had	  definitely	  
diminished,	  and	  he	  described	  VW	  as	  a	  “tarnished	  brand.”	  There	  was	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  
subjects	  who	  reported	  that,	  even	  though	  their	  trust	  in	  VW	  had	  eroded,	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  
that	  all	  car	  companies	  are	  focused	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  profit.	  Therefore,	  actions	  such	  as	  
Dieselgate	  were	  not	  overly	  surprising	  to	  them	  in	  the	  grand	  scheme.	  The	  difference,	  as	  one	  
owner	  described	  it,	  was	  that	  even	  though	  VW’s	  was	  an	  intentional	  act,	  “they	  were	  caught,	  
and	  I	  think	  they’ve	  had	  to	  pay	  for	  it	  as	  they	  should	  have.”	  Another	  indicated	  that	  her	  trust	  in	  
car	  companies	  was	  already	  low,	  so	  Dieselgate	  simply	  reinforced	  those	  notions.	  
Theme	  3:	  Questioning	  VW’s	  Motives	  in	  Crisis	  Response	  	  	  
As	  the	  crisis	  evolved	  and	  VW	  responded	  with	  written	  statements	  and	  actions	  such	  
as	  the	  GWP,	  subjects	  began	  to	  analyze	  the	  company’s	  motives.	  	  Many	  offered	  their	  own	  
critiques	  of	  why	  VW	  might	  have	  responded	  as	  it	  did.	  This	  armchair	  quarterbacking	  
occurred	  from	  the	  beginning	  as	  owners	  tried	  to	  read	  between	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  company’s	  
actions	  partially	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  forecast	  what	  type	  of	  ultimate	  retribution	  they	  might	  
receive.	  
Even	  though	  the	  company	  did	  admit	  responsibility	  relatively	  quickly,	  three	  of	  the	  
subjects	  seemed	  to	  perceive	  VW	  as	  still	  trying	  to	  hide	  its	  actions	  or,	  as	  one	  called	  it,	  “sweep	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it	  under	  the	  curtain.”	  One	  remembered	  specifically	  watching	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  new	  VW	  
CEO	  who	  replaced	  Winterkorn,	  Matthias	  Mueller,	  and	  remembering	  that	  he	  referred	  to	  
Dieselgate	  as	  “not	  really	  a	  fraud	  but	  more	  of	  a	  misunderstanding”	  and	  then	  watching	  as	  the	  
company	  backtracked	  from	  that	  statement.	  As	  a	  long-­‐time	  VW	  customer,	  he	  described	  
himself	  as	  a	  student	  of	  the	  company’s	  culture	  and	  explained	  his	  feeling	  that	  Dieselgate	  and	  
the	  response	  to	  it	  might	  not	  be	  so	  surprising	  given	  how	  the	  company	  had	  been	  led	  from	  the	  
beginning.	  He	  pointed	  toward	  long-­‐time	  former	  Chairman	  Ferdinand	  Piech,	  who	  preceded	  
Winterkorn	  and	  resigned	  in	  April	  2015.	  
“You	  do	  have	  to	  wonder	  how	  much	  the	  corporation	  was	  allowing	  this	  to	  be	  
an	   issue	   instead	  of	   fixing	   it.	  Under	  Ferdinand	  Piech	   they	  really	  did	  start	  a	  
corporate	  culture	  that	  was	  quite	  unhealthy	  and	  led	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  thing.	  He	  
got	  results	  in	  kind	  of	  all	  of	  the	  wrong	  ways,	  I	  think.”	  
Subjects	  had	  different	  interpretations	  of	  VW’s	  initial	  reactions	  and	  response	  to	  
customers.	  As	  mentioned,	  some	  felt	  it	  were	  trying	  to	  diminish	  or	  deny,	  while	  others	  felt	  
that	  VW	  appropriately	  admitted	  details	  early.	  One	  explained	  that,	  although	  admission	  of	  
responsibility	  was	  important,	  remorse	  was	  lacking,	  as	  was	  a	  sufficient	  level	  of	  
communication.	  
“They	  put	   serious	  doubts	   in	  my	  mind.	   I	   don’t	   know	   that	   they	  have	  done	  
enough	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   didn’t	   really	   show	   any	   remorse,	   which	  
makes	  you	  think	  less	  of	  them	  as	  a	  company.	  Also,	  the	  communication	  was	  
really	   poor	   -­‐-­‐	   infrequent	   and	   poor.	   I	   think	   through	   this	  whole	   process	   I	  
might	  have	  received	  two	  letters.	  And	  then	  I	  would	  call	  my	  local	  dealership	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and	  they	  kept	  saying	  they	  were	   in	  the	  dark	  as	  well,	  and	  that	  they	  were	  a	  
victim	  as	  well	  as	  they	  were	  stockpiling	  all	  of	  these	  diesel	  cars	  they	  had	  and	  
they	   couldn’t	   sell	   them.	   So	   the	  management	   there	   sympathized	  with	  me	  
but	  couldn’t	  get	  me	  information.”	  
Theme	  4:	  	  GWP	  as	  a	  Good	  Gesture	  but	  Unfulfilling	  Overall	  	  	  
	   All	  but	  one	  of	  the	  customers	  interviewed	  said	  they	  had	  accepted	  VW’s	  2015	  
Goodwill	   Package.	  They	   seemed	   to	   view	   it	   as	   a	   significant	   gesture	   and	   indicated	  
varying	  levels	  of	  appreciation.	  They	  described	  it	  using	  words	  including	  “gift”	  and	  
“free	  money.”	  	  An	  important	  consideration	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  ability	  to	  retain	  legal	  
rights	   for	   future	  remedy	   if	   the	  customer	  desired	   to	  pursue	   it.	  Once	   the	  company	  
made	  clear	  that	  the	  offer	  was	  without	  strings	  attached,	  these	  customers	  said	  they	  
signed	  on	  quickly.	  
Although	  there	  was	  appreciation	  for	  the	  gift	  card	  offer,	  these	  subjects	  indicated	  that	  
it	  was	  by	  no	  means	  totally	  satisfying	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  potential	  ultimate	  financial	  costs.	  It	  
was	  seen	  as	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  complete	  restitution.	  
“No,	   I	  didn’t	   feel	   it	  was	   satisfactory	  at	   the	   time.	   I	   felt	  heartened	   that	   they	  
were	   knowing	   that	   it	  was	   going	   to	   be	   a	   long	   process	   and	   that	   they	  were	  
doing	   something	   immediately	   to	   say	   ‘hey,	   we’re	   working	   on	   this.’	   You	  
know,	  a	  $500	  gift	  card	  and	  then	  $500	  to	  use	  on	  your	  service,	  that’s	  nice,	  but	  
this	  is	  a	  $25,000	  car.”	  
Other	  owners	  described	  it	  as	  “not	  enough,	  certainly,	  but	  a	  gesture	  that	  made	  sense,”	  
“the	  right	  thing	  to	  do”	  and	  “I	  took	  it,	  but	  it	  didn’t	  satisfy	  me.”	  	  Only	  two	  owners	  remembered	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being	  confused	  about	  whether	  they	  would	  retain	  legal	  rights	  for	  future	  action	  by	  accepting	  
the	  GWP.	  	  One	  said	  he	  debated	  about	  accepting	  it	  until	  his	  car	  dealer	  assured	  him	  there	  was	  
no	  downside.	  The	  owner	  who	  turned	  down	  the	  offer	  had	  the	  definite	  opinion	  that	  she	  might	  
be	  leaving	  future	  money	  on	  the	  table	  saying	  “because,	  once	  you	  accepted	  that	  I	  was	  afraid	  
that	  I	  wouldn’t	  get	  the	  full	  buyout.”	  	  
Theme	  5:	  Final	  Settlement	  Was	  Fair	  and	  Complete	  But	  Poorly	  Executed	  	  	  
All	  but	  one	  of	  the	  customers	  interviewed	  accepted	  the	  final	  buyout	  offer.	  That	  
subject’s	  car	  was	  an	  Audi	  with	  a	  3.0	  liter	  engine	  and,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview,	  a	  final	  
offer	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  finalized	  for	  cars	  with	  those	  diesel	  engines.	  None	  chose	  the	  option	  to	  
wait	  for	  the	  final	  fix	  and	  keep	  their	  existing	  car.	  
The	  subjects	  described	  the	  buyout	  as	  being	  financially	  fair	  (and	  some	  leaned	  toward	  
generous)	  from	  a	  financial	  perspective.	  They	  seemed	  happy	  with	  the	  analysis	  used	  to	  
calculate	  their	  car’s	  buyback	  value	  and	  restitution	  payments.	  Some	  complained	  about	  the	  
time	  lag	  between	  the	  GWP	  and	  the	  final	  offer	  but	  acknowledged	  their	  understanding	  that	  
this	  was	  a	  legal	  process	  that	  inherently	  took	  time	  to	  complete.	  
The	  buyback/fix	  choice	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  simple	  one.	  One	  subject	  said	  the	  company	  
made	  it	  “financially	  silly”	  not	  to	  accept	  the	  buyback	  money	  based	  on	  the	  generosity	  of	  the	  
buyback	  value	  calculation.	  The	  Audi	  owner	  said,	  if	  given	  the	  opportunity,	  he	  would	  choose	  
the	  buyback	  and	  not	  the	  fix,	  not	  for	  financial	  reasons	  but	  rather	  “I	  feel	  I	  was	  lied	  to.	  My	  next	  
car	  won’t	  be	  an	  Audi.	  I	  don’t	  think	  I’ll	  ever	  buy	  an	  Audi	  again.”	  
While	  owners	  felt	  they	  received	  a	  satisfactory	  financial	  settlement	  and	  saw	  the	  offer	  
as	  a	  suitable	  conclusion	  to	  their	  Dieselgate	  experience,	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  sense	  that	  the	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company	  had	  failed	  to	  execute	  well	  on	  delivery	  of	  final	  restitution.	  Subjects	  voiced	  concerns	  
about	  lack	  of	  communication,	  excessive	  time	  lags	  in	  communication	  and	  general	  poor	  
customer	  service	  in	  trying	  to	  see	  their	  process	  to	  completion.	  
One	  owner	  described	  his	  difficulties	  negotiating	  the	  website	  set	  up	  for	  the	  final	  offer,	  
calling	  it	  “pretty	  terrible”	  customer	  service.	  He	  described	  that	  the	  ten-­‐day	  period	  quoted	  for	  
processing	  his	  paperwork	  took	  30	  days,	  and	  it	  wasn’t	  until	  he	  contacted	  a	  headquarters	  
representative	  that	  he	  finally	  received	  the	  service	  he	  needed.	  Another	  owner	  said	  that	  the	  
customer	  service	  executional	  issues	  changed	  his	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  regarding	  the	  offer.	  
“I	   think	   I	  was	  OK	  with	   it	  and	  thought	   they	  handled	   it	  well	  up	  until	  a	   few	  
weeks	   ago	   when	   I	   started	   hearing	   stories	   about	   customer	   service	   not	  
being	   very	   friendly	   and	   accommodating	   when	   it	   came	   to	   the	   buyback	  
program.	  As	  of	  yesterday,	  or	  two	  days	  ago,	  we	  had	  another	  gentleman	  here	  
that	   had	   a	   diesel	   as	  well	   -­‐-­‐	   he	   tried	   selling	   it	   back	   and	   it’s	   become	   a	   big	  
pain.”	  
One	  owner	  did	  urge	  tolerance	  in	  regard	  to	  VWs	  customer	  service	  issues.	  “There	  
were	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  complaining	  that	  ‘this	  is	  taking	  too	  long,’	  but	  I	  thought	  ‘you	  know,	  there	  
is	  no	  template	  for	  this.’”	  
Theme	  6:	  Damaged	  Brand	  Loyalty	  and	  Purchase	  Intention	  	  
Some	  owners	  echoed	  the	  previously	  stated	  sentiment	  from	  the	  Audi	  owner	  that	  
their	  loyalty	  to	  VW	  manufactured	  cars	  had	  been	  severely	  damaged	  and	  that	  their	  intent	  to	  
purchase	  (always	  a	  very	  important	  customer	  benchmark	  for	  car	  manufacturers)	  had	  been	  
lessened	  if	  not	  completely	  eliminated.	  Responses	  here	  were	  a	  bit	  polarized,	  however,	  as	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other	  owners	  reported	  that,	  given	  the	  right	  circumstances,	  they	  might	  purchase	  another	  
VW.	  
Owners	  who	  reported	  buying	  their	  car	  with	  a	  clear	  sense	  that	  they	  were	  making	  an	  
environmentally-­‐motivated	  decision	  were	  the	  ones	  who	  also	  reported	  that	  they	  were	  
uninterested	  in	  buying	  another	  VW	  and	  were	  quite	  vocal	  about	  their	  loss	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  
company.	  This	  was	  an	  interesting	  contrast	  because	  most	  all	  of	  these	  owners	  had	  described	  
themselves	  as	  extremely	  brand	  loyal.	  We	  know	  from	  the	  brand	  value	  and	  reputation	  data	  
previously	  reported	  that	  VW	  enjoyed	  excellent	  prior	  reputation	  globally,	  yet	  these	  
interviewed	  owners	  cited	  Dieselgate	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  their	  now	  much	  more	  negative	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  company	  and	  brand.	  
The	  owners	  who	  reported	  that	  they	  would	  possibly	  consider	  another	  VW	  purchase	  
were	  also	  those	  who	  cited	  other	  motivational	  factors	  (performance,	  size,	  etc.)	  for	  their	  
initial	  purchase	  and	  also	  tended	  to	  be	  those	  who	  reported	  having	  low	  levels	  of	  trust	  in	  car	  
companies	  even	  before	  Dieselgate.	  Loss	  of	  trust	  didn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  “make	  or	  break”	  event	  
for	  these	  owners.	  
“I	   think,	   you	   know,	   the	   shine	   has	  worn	   off	   a	   little	   bit.	   In	   full	   disclosure	   I	  
have	   looked	   at	   buying	   another	   Volkswagen.	   I	   ultimately	  went	   a	   different	  
way,	  but	  it	  was	  in	  my	  top	  three	  choices.	  I’m	  hopeful	  for	  them	  that	  they	  can	  
regain	  my	  trust	  in	  the	  position	  that	  they	  sort	  of	  held	  or	  had	  held.	  But,	  yeah,	  
I	  think	  they’ve	  fallen	  a	  little.”	  
While	  those	  were	  the	  major	  themes	  covered	  in	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews,	  there	  was	  
one	  other	  sub-­‐theme	  that	  was	  observed.	  Three	  of	  the	  owners	  interviewed	  seemed	  either	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confused	  by	  or	  actually	  questioned	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  evidence	  on	  environmental	  harm.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  opinions	  reported	  was	  that	  other	  vehicles	  seemed	  to	  also	  be	  highly-­‐polluting	  
and	  these	  owners	  were	  unsure	  why	  VW	  was	  singled	  out.	  One	  owner	  made	  this	  comparison	  
by	  commenting	  that	  “who	  are	  they	  to	  go	  and	  criticize	  a	  car	  that	  gets	  40	  miles	  to	  the	  gallon	  
when	  trucks	  are	  running	  the	  road	  and	  blowing	  coal	  smoke.”	  Another	  expressed	  that	  “I’m	  
not	  big	  on	  environment.	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  get	  up	  behind	  one	  of	  these	  trucks	  that	  blows	  black	  
smoke	  I’m	  thinking	  ‘they’re	  calling	  my	  car	  back?’	  There’s	  something	  wrong	  with	  this	  
picture.”	  
	   RQ2:	  Did	  consumers’	  views	  about	  VW	  show	  improvement	  after	  more	  
substantial	  compensation	  was	  offered?	  
	   This	  research	  question	  was	  addressed	  through	  a	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  of	  
online	  tweets	  and	  discussion	  board	  postings.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  examine	  comments	  after	  both	  
compensation	  events	  to	  discern	  meaning	  and	  sentiment	  from	  those	  affected	  by	  Dieslegate	  
and	  to	  compare	  their	  expressed	  sentiments	  to	  see	  if	  they	  improved	  after	  the	  final	  
compensation	  offer	  was	  announced.	  
Reaction	  After	  the	  Goodwill	  Package	  Offer	  
	   As	  might	  be	  expected	  based	  on	  the	  media	  reports	  reviewed	  as	  well	  as	  the	  qualitative	  
content	  analysis	  completed	  by	  Molleda	  (2016),	  several	  online	  commenters	  expressed	  
extremely	  negative	  feelings	  in	  the	  days	  following	  the	  GWP	  offer.	  Many	  characterized	  it	  as	  
insufficient	  relative	  to	  the	  overall	  potential	  loss	  in	  value	  for	  individual	  owners	  and	  
demanded	  more	  in	  terms	  of	  substantial	  response	  from	  VW.	  Commenters	  expressed	  feelings	  
including	  “how	  about	  buying	  back	  your	  garbage	  cars	  that	  poison	  us	  all,”	  “what	  VW	  did	  not	  
	  
	   	   	  
72	  
only	  violated	  federal	  law	  it	  also	  violated	  business	  ethics,”	  and	  “I	  don’t	  think	  $1,000	  in	  gift	  
cards	  is	  doing	  it	  for	  me.”	  
	   Often,	  commenters	  would	  address	  the	  company	  specifically	  and	  include	  VW’s	  
Twitter	  handle	  to	  send	  their	  message	  directly	  to	  the	  source	  of	  their	  anger.	  Comments	  such	  
as	  “no	  deal	  on	  the	  gift	  cards,	  I’ll	  see	  you	  in	  court,”	  	  “you’ve	  ruined	  my	  car	  and	  my	  
experience,”	  “stop	  insulting	  your	  customers…offer	  full	  refunds	  and	  outline	  a	  plan	  to	  
remediate	  NOx,”	  and	  “@VW	  how	  about	  you	  replace	  my	  dirty	  diesel	  engine	  with	  a	  6	  cylinder	  
hybrid	  engine	  and	  we	  call	  it	  even?”	  were	  commonly	  observed	  in	  the	  days	  following	  the	  
offer.	  
	   Although	  dissatisfaction	  was	  present	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  online	  comments	  
observed,	  a	  few	  commenters	  expressed	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  offer,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  sentiment	  
that	  it	  represented	  a	  good	  faith	  gesture	  on	  the	  part	  of	  VW	  to	  those	  affected.	  These	  subjects	  
indicated	  that	  they	  liked	  their	  vehicle	  and	  viewed	  the	  offer	  as	  “free	  money”	  to	  use	  to	  make	  
improvements	  to	  their	  vehicles	  in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  parts,	  new	  tires	  and	  other	  equipment.	  
	   Specific	  comments	  that	  fell	  into	  this	  offer	  satisfaction	  theme	  included	  “That	  works	  
for	  me,	  I	  love	  my	  car	  and	  was	  called	  by	  my	  dealer	  about	  the	  GWP,”	  “I	  seriously	  thought	  we	  
were	  going	  to	  get	  a	  recall	  and	  that’s	  it…I	  think	  this	  is	  a	  good	  job	  from	  VW,”	  	  “it’s	  better	  than	  
a	  class	  action	  lawsuit	  and	  maybe	  a	  settlement	  check	  for	  $2.50,”	  “Volkswagen	  is	  really	  doing	  
their	  best	  in	  regaining	  their	  customers’	  trust,”	  and	  “love	  my	  car	  but	  stinkin’	  mad	  if	  a	  fix	  is	  
mandated	  and	  it	  affects	  my	  mileage.”	  
	   As	  might	  be	  expected	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  Dieselgate,	  some	  commenters	  expressed	  
concern	  about	  their	  legal	  rights	  and	  any	  possible	  future	  compensation	  they	  might	  forfeit	  as	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a	  condition	  of	  accepting	  the	  GWP.	  Even	  though	  the	  company	  had	  clearly	  stated	  in	  the	  
written	  terms	  of	  the	  program	  that	  owners	  would	  retain	  all	  legal	  rights,	  some	  were	  clearly	  
concerned	  and	  took	  their	  speculation	  about	  legal	  status	  to	  the	  online	  communities.	  
	   Specific	  comments	  included	  in	  this	  legal	  uncertainty	  theme	  included	  “they	  will	  make	  
you	  sign	  away	  legal	  rights	  for	  the	  money,”	  “I’m	  concerned	  we’ll	  be	  giving	  away	  our	  rights,”	  
“I	  wonder	  if	  by	  accepting	  this	  offer	  you	  are	  excluding	  yourself	  from	  further	  legal	  action	  or	  
monetary	  compensation…hmm,	  we	  will	  really	  need	  to	  read	  the	  fine	  print	  on	  this	  one,”	  and	  
“are	  you	  giving	  away	  your	  right	  to	  sue?”	  A	  few	  voices	  in	  the	  online	  community	  tried	  to	  calm	  
the	  uncertainty	  by	  quoting	  the	  VW	  terms	  for	  accepting	  the	  gift	  cards	  including	  one	  
commenter	  who	  asked	  “how	  many	  times	  do	  we	  have	  to	  repeat,	  there	  are	  no	  strings	  
attached	  to	  the	  GWP	  money.”	  
	   Many	  of	  the	  negative	  voices	  in	  the	  online	  community	  used	  sarcasm	  liberally	  to	  help	  
make	  their	  point	  about	  their	  displeasure	  with	  the	  GWP	  offer.	  Commenters	  would	  put	  a	  
sarcastic	  spin	  on	  most	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  offer	  including	  comments	  such	  as	  “So	  happy	  with	  
the	  gift	  card	  offer,	  my	  car	  is	  worth	  $10,000	  less,	  but	  $500	  for	  Taco	  Bell	  sounds	  fair,”	  “the	  
Germans	  are	  pros	  at	  reparations,”	  “$1,000…it’s	  a	  start,”	  “I	  wonder	  if	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  
gas	  masks	  too,”	  and	  “Happy	  holidays?”	  
	   Finally,	  one	  theme	  that	  emerged	  specifically	  from	  this	  review	  was	  a	  propensity	  for	  
commenters	  to	  speculate	  as	  to	  VW’s	  strategic	  motives	  for	  offering	  the	  GWP.	  	  Commenters	  
would	  speculate	  as	  to	  possible	  ulterior	  motives	  or	  accuse	  VW	  of	  creating	  a	  smokescreen	  to	  
divert	  attention.	  Others	  guessed	  that	  VW	  was	  making	  this	  offer	  soon	  after	  Dieselgate	  so	  as	  
to	  head-­‐off	  potential	  class	  action	  litigation	  that	  might	  be	  in	  the	  works.	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   One	  commenter	  accused	  VW	  of	  “slow	  rolling”	  the	  compensation	  back	  to	  owners	  in	  
hopes	  that	  they	  would	  “panic	  dump”	  their	  cars	  to	  be	  rid	  of	  the	  problem.	  Another	  suggested	  
that	  the	  GWP	  was	  a	  strategy	  derived	  from	  “the	  PR	  firm.”	  The	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  the	  gift	  cards	  
was	  restricted	  to	  purchases	  at	  a	  dealership	  caused	  one	  commenter	  to	  speculate	  that	  VW’s	  
ulterior	  motive	  was	  to	  spur	  foot	  traffic	  to	  dealer	  locations.	  
Reaction	  After	  the	  Ultimate	  Compensation	  Offer	  	  	  
	   In	  reviewing	  online	  postings	  after	  the	  final	  offer	  was	  announced	  about	  a	  year	  
following	  the	  GWP,	  many	  of	  the	  same	  themes	  were	  observed	  but	  with	  different	  frequency	  
and	  intensity.	  
	   Many	  commenters	  were	  still	  clearly	  unhappy	  with	  the	  company.	  Comments	  
included	  “I	  believe	  the	  cheat	  device	  has	  killed	  and	  damaged	  the	  health	  of	  thousands	  
through	  air	  pollution,”	  “they	  say	  they	  can	  fix	  my	  tainted	  diesel,	  see	  you	  in	  court,”	  “paid	  $41K	  
for	  my	  diesel	  Jetta,	  getting	  $10K	  back.	  Doesn’t	  look	  like	  justice	  to	  me,”	  “this	  isn’t	  making	  
good.	  It’s	  a	  pittance	  for	  the	  headache	  and	  fraud	  from	  them,”	  and	  “Audi,	  please	  be	  honest	  
and	  refund	  me	  $$	  I	  wasted	  on	  my	  Audi	  Q5.	  #dieselgate	  is	  a	  disaster.”	  
	   While	  many	  comments	  expressed	  general	  displeasure,	  one	  major	  theme	  observed	  
with	  the	  negative	  comments	  in	  this	  time	  period	  related	  to	  specific	  perceived	  customer	  
service	  issues	  for	  owners	  trying	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  offer.	  Commenters	  frequently	  
complained	  about	  long	  hold	  times	  on	  the	  company’s	  offer	  hotline,	  slow	  delivery	  of	  
paperwork	  needed	  to	  process	  their	  buyback	  and	  other	  poor	  execution	  by	  VW	  when	  
attempting	  to	  accommodate	  owners.	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   Specific	  comments	  noted	  within	  this	  customer	  service	  related	  theme	  included	  
“when	  the	  recording	  says	  ‘your	  call	  is	  important	  to	  us’	  but	  you’re	  on	  hold	  for	  56	  minutes…,”	  
“VW	  being	  radio	  silent	  on	  this	  is	  horsecrap…I	  was	  considering	  another	  VW	  but	  this	  lack	  of	  
communication	  is	  slowly	  eroding	  that	  away,”	  “No	  surprise	  that	  VW	  failed	  me	  again,	  was	  
promised	  offer	  letter	  within	  10	  business	  days,	  today’s	  the	  day	  and	  nothing,”	  and	  “I	  have	  
submitted	  everything,	  it	  says	  10	  days	  so	  what’s	  the	  holdup?”	  
	   Still,	  other	  commenters	  seemed	  glad	  to	  be	  receiving	  restitution	  and	  indicated	  
satisfaction	  with	  this	  final	  offer.	  Comments	  noted	  in	  this	  offer	  satisfaction	  theme	  included	  
“glad	  to	  be	  near	  the	  finished	  line,”	  “good	  news,”	  “good…now	  let’s	  get	  this	  out	  of	  my	  
driveway,”	  “relief	  at	  last	  for	  U.S	  owners!”	  and	  “get	  my	  final	  offer	  in	  two	  weeks,	  woohoo!”	  In	  
total,	  however,	  there	  were	  fewer	  positive	  sentiment	  comments	  observed	  after	  the	  final	  
offer	  than	  after	  the	  GWP	  offer.	  
	   While	  the	  tone	  of	  comments	  after	  the	  GWP	  offer	  was	  often	  sarcastic,	  sarcasm	  was	  
not	  used	  as	  frequently	  in	  postings	  reviewed	  during	  the	  final	  settlement	  period.	  Also,	  it	  
should	  be	  noted	  that	  many	  of	  the	  postings	  reviewed	  in	  both	  time	  period	  samples	  were	  not	  
expressing	  an	  opinion	  or	  sentiment,	  but	  were	  simply	  sharing	  news	  about	  the	  offers,	  often	  
sharing	  a	  link	  to	  a	  news	  article.	  This	  might	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  timeframe	  of	  the	  collection	  
which	  was	  immediately	  after	  the	  offer	  announcements.	  
	   RQ3:	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  is	  brand	  equity	  impacted	  for	  a	  company	  with	  a	  previously	  
highly	  favorable	  reputation	  based	  on	  whether	  it	  provided	  a	  complete	  and	  
unambiguous	  response/remedy	  or	  an	  ambiguous	  response/remedy	  following	  a	  
crisis?	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   As	  described	  in	  the	  Methods	  section,	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  all	  of	  the	  online	  
postings	  (tweets	  and	  discussion	  board	  comments)	  were	  accessed	  and	  divided	  between	  
postings	  after	  the	  GWP	  offer	  event	  in	  2015	  (offer	  event	  1)	  and	  those	  that	  occurred	  after	  the	  
final	  offer	  event	  in	  2016	  (offer	  event	  2).	  As	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000)	  described,	  companies	  
with	  previously	  high	  brand	  reputations	  saw	  their	  brand	  equity	  increase	  if	  they	  offered	  
what	  the	  authors	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  “unambiguous”	  or	  complete	  crisis	  response.	  But	  when	  
the	  prior	  expectation	  was	  high	  and	  the	  crisis	  response	  was	  ambiguous	  and	  incomplete,	  they	  
found	  that	  brand	  equity	  resembled	  the	  unambiguous	  response	  condition.	  This	  would	  
indicate	  that	  companies	  such	  as	  VW	  who	  enjoyed	  a	  strong	  prior	  reputation	  can	  be	  
protected	  from	  damage	  to	  their	  brand	  equity	  even	  when	  their	  crisis	  response	  is	  deemed	  to	  
be	  incomplete.	  Therefore,	  to	  address	  this	  research	  question,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  capture	  
expressed	  brand	  sentiment	  in	  online	  postings	  after	  both	  offer	  event	  time	  period.	  
	   As	  described	  in	  the	  methods	  section,	  after	  establishing	  inter-­‐coder	  reliability,	  the	  
coding	  team	  coded	  all	  postings	  with	  a	  ranking	  of	  positive	  (1),	  neutral	  (2),	  or	  negative	  (3).	  
Descriptive	  statistics	  results	  from	  both	  offer	  events	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  9	  below.	  
Table	  9.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  quantitative	  content	  analysis	  of	  online	  postings	  




467	   207	  
Positive	  
	  
15.2%	   8.7%	  
Neutral	  
	  
55.5%	   30.4%	  
Negative	  
	  
29.3%	   60.9%	  
M	  =	  
	  
2.14	   2.52	  
SD	  =	   .653	   .652	  
	  




	   Importantly,	  these	  results	  show	  that,	  compared	  with	  the	  sentiment	  measured	  after	  
the	  first	  offer	  event,	  the	  percentage	  of	  positive	  comments	  about	  VW	  brand	  sentiment	  after	  
the	  final	  offer	  was	  lower.	  Also,	  negative	  brand	  sentiment	  comments	  after	  the	  final	  offer	  
were	  more	  than	  double,	  on	  a	  percentage	  basis,	  the	  amount	  measured	  after	  the	  first	  offer	  
event.	  The	  difference	  in	  means	  between	  both	  offer	  events	  is	  shown	  graphically	  in	  Table	  10.	  
	   To	  look	  further	  at	  this	  difference,	  an	  independent	  samples	  t-­‐test	  was	  conducted.	  
Offer	  1	  (M	  =	  2.14,	  SD	  =	  .65)	  generated	  more	  positive	  brand	  sentiment	  than	  did	  Offer	  2	  (M	  =	  
2.52,	  SD	  =	  .65),	  and	  the	  difference	  is	  statistically	  significant	  (t	  =	  -­‐6.98,	  p	  =	  <.05).	  This	  finding	  
rejects	  the	  observation	  that,	  in	  companies	  with	  strong	  prior	  reputation,	  an	  ambiguous	  
crisis	  response	  offer	  will	  generate	  as	  much	  positive	  brand	  sentiment	  as	  an	  unambiguous	  
crisis	  response	  offer.	  
Table	  10.	  	  Table	  showing	  difference	  in	  means	  between	  offer	  events	  1	  and	  2.
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   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  more	  postings	  were	  captured	  in	  offer	  event	  1	  than	  in	  offer	  
event	  2.	  Because	  this	  was	  secondary	  research	  utilizing	  publicly	  available	  postings,	  I	  can	  
only	  speculate	  as	  to	  why	  the	  comment	  volume	  was	  lower	  after	  the	  final	  offer.	  One	  possible	  
reason	  may	  be	  that	  specific	  details	  about	  car	  buyback	  values	  and	  restitution	  payments	  
came	  after	  the	  announcement	  and,	  because	  commenters	  were	  unsure	  of	  the	  specific	  
financial	  remuneration	  they	  could	  expect,	  they	  were	  more	  reluctant	  or	  simply	  didn’t	  have	  
the	  personal	  motivation	  to	  comment.	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Discussion	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  where	  Dieselgate	  fits	  according	  to	  the	  research	  on	  
types	  of	  crises	  discussed	  earlier.	  Dieselgate	  could	  be	  characterized	  as	  an	  internal-­‐abnormal	  
crisis	  using	  the	  Snyder	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  typology	  since	  it	  was	  an	  unpredictable	  event	  
originating	  from	  within	  the	  organization.	  Under	  Coombs’	  (2007)	  typology,	  it	  could	  be	  seen	  
as	  residing	  in	  the	  “preventable	  cluster”	  since	  it	  involved	  admitted	  organizational	  misdeed	  
or	  misconduct.	  
I	  was	  intentional	  about	  the	  choice	  to	  begin	  my	  research	  with	  lengthy,	  in-­‐depth	  
conversations	  with	  VW	  owners	  because	  I	  wanted	  to	  gain	  personal	  insights	  and	  
perspectives	  directly	  from	  people	  who	  had	  been	  most	  profoundly	  affected	  by	  Dieselgate.	  
This	  method,	  which	  I	  used	  to	  address	  RQ1,	  allowed	  me	  to	  explore	  their	  feelings	  about	  the	  
crisis	  and	  to	  get	  a	  sense	  for	  how	  their	  opinions	  and	  perceptions	  changed	  as	  the	  crisis	  wore	  
on.	  It	  also	  allowed	  me	  to	  better	  define	  the	  online	  content	  analysis	  and,	  later,	  compare	  and	  
contrast	  the	  interview	  subjects’	  comments	  against	  what	  was	  being	  observed	  in	  the	  online	  
content	  analysis.	   	  
Not	  only	  did	  I	  want	  to	  assess	  owner	  perceptions;	  I	  wanted	  to	  see	  if,	  before	  
Dieselgate,	  they	  carried	  the	  same	  high	  opinion	  of	  the	  company	  that	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  
national	  brand	  rankings	  observed	  in	  media.	  In	  evaluating	  crisis	  response,	  Coombs	  (2007)	  
emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  gaining	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  stakeholders	  perceive	  an	  
organization	  before	  trouble	  hits	  so	  that	  we	  can	  know	  if	  the	  organization	  has	  amassed	  prior	  
reputational	  capital	  to	  help	  it	  weather	  the	  storm.	  This	  aspect	  of	  positive	  prior	  reputation	  
was	  also	  important	  to	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  RQ3.	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   It	  was	  evident	  that	  these	  owners	  had	  been	  mostly	  loyal	  customers	  and	  some	  talked	  
passionately	  about	  their	  regard	  for	  the	  company	  using	  specific	  words	  such	  as	  	  “brand	  
loyal,”	  “love”	  and	  “a	  special	  place	  in	  my	  heart.”	  They	  described	  purchasing	  their	  cars	  for	  the	  
motivational	  factors	  that	  had	  become	  synonymous	  with	  VW:	  performance,	  comfort,	  
durability,	  fuel	  economy	  and	  environmental	  friendliness.	  
	   Of	  course,	  when	  the	  Dieselgate	  story	  broke,	  emotions	  changed	  to	  shock	  and	  a	  
pervasive	  sense	  of	  betrayal.	  Owners	  explained	  that	  their	  prior	  positive	  feelings	  for	  the	  
company	  had	  made	  the	  betrayal	  seem	  even	  more	  pronounced.	  Their	  stance	  went	  from	  
being	  willing	  recommenders	  of	  VW	  to	  one	  in	  which	  most	  expressed	  no	  future	  intentions	  of	  
buying	  another	  VW	  car.	  Even	  owners	  who	  didn’t	  describe	  themselves	  as	  being	  particularly	  
environmentally	  conscious	  and	  were	  more	  concerned	  with	  other	  TDI	  features	  such	  as	  
performance	  and	  gas	  mileage	  expressed	  a	  feeling	  of	  general	  betrayal.	  
	   With	  the	  betrayal	  came	  the	  subsequent	  erosion	  of	  trust	  that	  is	  often	  described	  in	  
reputational	  crises	  such	  as	  Dieselgate.	  As	  the	  company	  admitted	  its	  action	  and	  news	  began	  
to	  further	  implicate	  executives	  at	  higher	  and	  higher	  levels,	  owners	  got	  a	  clearer	  sense	  of	  
how	  intentional	  Dieselgate	  had	  been.	  They	  described	  their	  trust	  in	  the	  company	  eroding	  
even	  further.	  Car	  owners	  are	  no	  strangers	  to	  periodic	  recalls	  for	  mechanical	  and	  safety	  
issues,	  but	  these	  owners	  viewed	  those	  as	  more	  errors	  of	  omission	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  
intentional	  act	  where	  the	  company	  had	  purposely	  conspired	  to	  commit	  the	  act.	  
	   As	  described	  by	  Coombs	  (1996),	  victims	  of	  a	  crisis	  attribute	  responsibility	  at	  varying	  
levels	  and	  the	  more	  direct	  attribution	  they	  place	  on	  the	  firm,	  the	  more	  its	  image	  will	  be	  
perceived	  negatively.	  The	  owners	  interviewed	  saw	  Dieselgate	  as	  internally	  driven	  with	  a	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high	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  attributed	  to	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  company.	  As	  the	  crisis	  wore	  
on,	  this	  took	  the	  form	  of	  speculation	  by	  stakeholders	  as	  to	  the	  company’s	  strategic	  
motivations	  for	  crisis	  response	  actions.	  Some	  felt	  the	  company	  was	  trying	  to	  lessen	  the	  
crisis	  by	  being	  evasive	  or	  attempting	  to	  hide	  details	  through	  poor	  or	  unclear	  
communications.	  Some	  subjects	  in	  both	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  and	  online	  comments	  
suggested	  that	  the	  company	  was	  orchestrating	  its	  actions	  with	  its	  own	  interests	  primarily	  
in	  mind	  –	  whether	  it	  be	  offering	  the	  GWP	  to	  head	  off	  future	  lawsuits	  or	  even	  to	  drive	  more	  
business	  by	  spurring	  traffic	  into	  dealerships.	  Responses	  in	  the	  interviews	  and	  the	  content	  
analysis	  of	  online	  comments	  reflected	  several	  instances	  of	  second-­‐guessing	  of	  company	  
actions	  and	  communications.	  
	   Along	  those	  lines,	  some	  subjects	  in	  both	  interviews	  and	  online	  speculated	  that	  VW	  
was	  employing	  a	  diminish-­‐style	  response,	  particularly	  in	  the	  early	  period	  around	  the	  time	  
of	  the	  GWP	  offer,	  in	  which	  VW	  was	  seen	  as	  being	  less	  than	  transparent	  about	  its	  own	  
responsibility	  or	  the	  impact	  of	  Dieselgate	  on	  society	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  
	   In	  both	  interviews	  and	  online	  comments,	  there	  was	  a	  definite	  sense	  from	  a	  few	  
owners	  that	  they	  had	  been	  sensitized	  to	  the	  many	  automobile	  crises	  over	  the	  years,	  which	  
had	  led	  them	  to	  a	  general	  level	  of	  distrust	  of	  all	  car	  companies.	  This	  group	  seemed	  less	  
shocked	  at	  VW’s	  involvement	  and,	  in	  their	  minds,	  the	  difference	  with	  Dieselgate	  was	  that	  
VW	  leadership	  had	  been	  caught	  in	  an	  overtly	  deceptive	  act.	  
One	  finding	  from	  the	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  was	  that,	  while	  they	  were	  a	  minority,	  some	  
owners	  questioned	  whether	  the	  environmental	  impact	  of	  Dieselgate	  was	  as	  bad	  as	  was	  
being	  reported,	  or	  at	  least	  relative	  to	  other	  environmental	  pollutants.	  They	  seemed	  to	  have	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a	  hard	  time	  rationalizing	  how	  their	  cars	  could	  be	  “as	  bad”	  as	  larger	  vehicles	  such	  as	  over-­‐	  
the-­‐road	  trucks	  and	  looked	  at	  their	  own	  contribution	  as	  a	  polluter	  to	  be	  small	  in	  
comparison	  with	  the	  big	  picture.	  
	   When	  looking	  at	  the	  company’s	  first	  significant	  attempt	  to	  compensate	  customers,	  in	  
the	  interviews	  and	  online	  there	  was	  general	  agreement	  that	  the	  Goodwill	  Package	  was	  
worthy	  of	  acceptance	  but	  that	  it	  fell	  significantly	  short	  of	  being	  a	  complete	  response.	  	  As	  
described	  in	  the	  review	  of	  literature,	  media	  coverage	  of	  criticism	  of	  the	  GWP	  by	  owners	  and	  
government	  leaders	  was	  also	  significant	  at	  this	  point	  and	  could	  have	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  
owner	  opinion,	  thereby	  achieving	  the	  force	  magnifier	  effect	  that	  media	  coverage	  can	  bring	  
in	  a	  crisis	  as	  described	  by	  Kim	  (2016).	  The	  fact	  that	  many	  owners	  were	  suspicious	  that	  the	  
GWP	  was	  designed	  to	  limit	  their	  ability	  to	  seek	  further	  legal	  remedy	  again	  pointed	  to	  a	  poor	  
level	  of	  general	  trust.	  	  
	   Owners	  described	  accepting	  the	  package	  because	  there	  was	  no	  downside	  to	  doing	  
so,	  but	  didn’t	  seem	  to	  assign	  credit	  to	  the	  action	  beyond	  calling	  it	  merely	  a	  gesture	  and	  
unsatisfactory	  compensation.	  Several	  of	  the	  online	  commenters	  used	  sarcasm	  to	  
underscore	  their	  feeling	  that	  the	  GWP	  fell	  short	  of	  what	  they	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  satisfactory	  
response.	  Even	  those	  who	  seemed	  to	  view	  the	  GWP	  the	  most	  favorably	  offered	  feeble	  
endorsements	  at	  best,	  using	  phrases	  such	  as	  “a	  good	  start.”	  
	   RQ2	  attempted	  to	  evaluate	  perceptions	  about	  VW	  after	  the	  final	  compensation	  offer	  
was	  announced	  in	  fall	  of	  2016.	  This	  question	  sought	  to	  explore	  whether	  views	  showed	  
improvement	  after	  this,	  much	  more	  substantial	  monetary	  compensation,	  was	  rendered.	  By	  
taking	  a	  close	  look	  at	  sentiments	  expressed	  directly	  by	  owners	  in	  the	  interviews	  and	  by	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commenters	  online,	  I	  hoped	  to	  discover	  if	  they	  felt	  more	  satisfaction	  after	  a	  more	  final	  and	  
substantial	  crisis	  compensation	  response.	  In	  first	  conceptualizing	  compensation,	  Benoit	  
(1997)	  posited	  that,	  if	  compensation	  is	  deemed	  acceptable	  to	  victims,	  the	  image	  of	  a	  firm	  
should	  improve.	  	  
	   Interviews	  and	  online	  comments	  showed	  a	  range	  of	  reactions	  after	  the	  final	  offer.	  
There	  was	  a	  definite	  sense	  of	  relief	  that	  the	  long	  wait	  for	  restitution	  was	  ending	  and	  that	  
the	  uncertainty	  owners	  had	  felt	  regarding	  the	  final	  dispensation	  of	  their	  automobile	  was	  
beginning	  to	  ease.	  As	  might	  be	  expected	  in	  a	  crisis	  of	  this	  size	  and	  scope,	  the	  degree	  of	  
satisfaction	  was	  wide	  ranging.	  While	  many	  expressed	  that,	  from	  a	  financial	  perspective,	  the	  
offer	  was	  fair,	  others	  felt	  that	  their	  buyout	  offer	  was	  insufficient	  and	  left	  them	  feeling	  as	  if	  
they	  had	  wasted	  the	  money	  spent	  purchasing	  their	  cars	  in	  the	  final	  analysis.	  	  Others	  
expressed	  that	  the	  offer	  didn’t	  account	  for	  their	  own	  pain	  and	  suffering.	  Still	  other	  
commenters	  reflected	  back	  on	  the	  societal	  costs	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  couldn’t	  
rationalize	  how	  this	  offer	  began	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  nearly	  a	  half-­‐million	  polluting	  
cars	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
	   The	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  of	  comments	  after	  the	  final	  offer	  also	  looked	  at	  
future	  purchase	  intent	  as	  a	  possible	  sign	  that	  owners	  were	  more	  favorable	  toward	  VW	  but	  
very	  few	  comments	  were	  observed	  indicating	  that	  people	  were	  likely	  to	  turn	  back	  to	  VW	  
for	  future	  car	  purchases.	  As	  mentioned,	  most	  of	  the	  interview	  subjects	  specifically	  stated	  
their	  unwillingness	  to	  consider	  VW	  even	  after	  they	  received	  the	  final	  offer.	  
	   One	  observation	  that	  had	  definite	  relevance	  for	  the	  research	  questions	  was	  the	  clear	  
sense	  from	  most	  owners	  and	  online	  commenters	  that	  VW	  executed	  the	  final	  offer	  package	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poorly.	  They	  made	  numerous	  comments	  about	  many	  different	  problems	  related	  to	  
customer	  service	  execution	  including	  poor	  general	  communications,	  excessive	  wait	  times	  
when	  calling	  phone	  lines	  established	  to	  handle	  individual	  owner	  buyback	  details,	  lengthy	  
waits	  for	  documents	  to	  be	  transferred	  and	  website	  functionality	  issues.	  Owners	  reported	  
feeling	  fatigued	  by	  the	  process	  and	  disappointed	  by	  the	  poor	  execution.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  interviewed	  owners	  expressed	  this	  secondary	  victimization	  by	  saying	  
that	  the	  company	  had	  “failed	  me	  again.”	  The	  many	  others	  who	  were	  unhappy	  with	  the	  post-­‐
final	  offer	  customer	  service	  show	  the	  disconnect	  between	  planning	  and	  execution.	  Crisis	  
scholars	  have	  cautioned	  that	  rebuilding	  trust	  after	  a	  crisis	  is	  difficult.	  Grunig	  and	  Hon	  
(1999)	  identify	  confidence	  as	  a	  basic	  building	  block	  of	  trust.	  Flynn	  (2016)	  notes	  that	  an	  
organization’s	  credibility	  is	  a	  foundational	  element	  of	  trust.	  By	  failing	  to	  execute	  with	  
excellence,	  VW	  seemed	  to	  compound	  its	  problems	  by	  not	  fostering	  the	  levels	  of	  confidence	  
and	  credibility	  needed	  to	  rebuild	  trust.	  Hearit	  (2001)	  describes	  that	  corrective	  action	  
responses	  are	  essentially	  a	  promise	  to	  the	  stakeholder	  that	  the	  situation	  will	  be	  resolved.	  If	  
the	  firm’s	  response	  is	  deemed	  insufficient,	  disgruntled	  stakeholders	  react	  even	  more	  
unfavorably.	  
In	  RQ3,	  the	  purpose	  was	  simply	  to	  understand	  if	  VW’s	  positive	  prior	  reputation	  
would	  help	  it	  weather	  the	  storm	  of	  Dieselgate.	  Since	  we	  know	  the	  company’s	  prior	  
reputation	  was	  strong,	  would,	  as	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000)	  observed	  in	  their	  study,	  VW’s	  
brand	  equity	  be	  protected	  in	  either	  an	  ambiguous	  (GWP)	  or	  unambiguous	  (final	  offer)	  
scenario.	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Taken	  independently,	  the	  interviews	  and	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  would	  indicate	  
that	  owners	  were	  glad	  that	  their	  Dieselgate	  experience	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end	  and	  that	  they	  
would	  be	  receiving	  more	  substantial	  compensation.	  However,	  the	  company’s	  poor	  job	  of	  
executing	  and	  delivering	  the	  final	  offer	  created	  a	  headwind	  obstacle	  that	  hindered	  the	  
company’s	  efforts	  to	  rebuild	  trust.	  	  
Executional	  problems	  in	  the	  crisis	  response	  phase	  are	  no	  small	  matter	  when	  viewed	  
through	  what	  we	  know	  about	  stakeholder	  reaction	  to	  a	  crisis	  response.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  
the	  literature	  review,	  scholars	  consistently	  view	  mortification	  combined	  with	  
accommodative	  strategies	  as	  being	  the	  most	  effective	  in	  reputational,	  internal	  crises.	  
Authors	  including	  Coombs,	  Hagan	  and	  Cos	  et	  al.	  all	  found	  this	  combination	  to	  be	  the	  best.	  
Coombs	  (2007)	  elaborated	  by	  stating	  that	  mortification	  combined	  with	  compensation	  is	  
the	  most	  effective	  strategy	  in	  the	  preventable	  cluster.	  Therefore,	  it	  would	  be	  important	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  accommodative	  strategy	  employed	  is	  well	  managed	  with	  minimal	  flaws	  or	  
executional	  problems.	  	  
Of	  course,	  executing	  with	  excellence	  goes	  beyond	  simply	  crisis	  communications	  and	  
applies	  to	  best	  practice	  in	  organizational	  communications	  as	  a	  whole.	  Concepts	  as	  
foundational	  as	  the	  Page	  Principles	  talk	  about	  the	  need	  for	  delivering	  on	  promises	  and	  
“proving	  it	  with	  action”	  (Koten,	  2004).	  Another	  global	  group	  of	  PR	  thought	  leaders,	  the	  
Global	  Alliance	  for	  PR	  and	  Communication	  Management	  promotes	  competent	  performance	  
stating	  that	  “Ethical	  performance,	  not	  principles,	  is	  ultimately	  what	  counts.”	  (Global	  
Alliance	  for	  Public	  Relations	  and	  Communication	  Management,	  2016)	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In	  the	  quantitative	  content	  analysis,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  judge	  the	  levels	  of	  brand	  
sentiment	  overall	  and	  at	  the	  two	  critical	  offer	  periods.	  Relative	  to	  RQ3,	  findings	  from	  the	  
content	  analysis	  were	  that	  negative	  brand	  sentiment	  actually	  increased	  after	  the	  final	  offer	  
event	  and	  was	  more	  than	  double,	  on	  a	  percentage	  basis,	  than	  the	  negative	  sentiment	  
expressed	  earlier	  in	  the	  crisis	  and	  after	  the	  GWP	  offer.	  These	  findings	  would	  reject	  the	  
Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000)	  observation	  that,	  with	  strong	  prior	  reputation	  companies,	  
positive	  brand	  sentiment	  in	  both	  unambiguous	  and	  ambiguous	  response	  scenarios	  should	  
resemble	  each	  other.	  Since	  negative	  brand	  sentiment	  increased,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  VW’s	  
strong	  prior	  reputation	  didn’t	  provide	  a	  protective	  effect	  even	  when	  the	  offer	  was	  deemed	  
more	  complete.	  	  
Coombs	  (2007)	  posited	  that	  prior	  reputation	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  and	  that,	  
without	  a	  strong	  prior	  reputation,	  crisis	  attribution	  can	  be	  intensified	  and	  recovery	  can	  be	  
more	  difficult.	  Again,	  in	  these	  results	  we	  don’t	  see	  VW’s	  strong	  prior	  reputation	  helping	  
contribute	  to	  its	  recovery	  since	  stakeholders	  assigned	  less,	  not	  more,	  positive	  brand	  
sentiment	  to	  it	  after	  the	  final	  Dieselgate	  compensation	  offer.	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Conclusions	  
	   There	  is	  broad	  consensus	  amongst	  communications	  and	  PR	  scholars	  that	  studying	  
crises	  is	  of	  lasting	  value	  to	  the	  academy	  and	  the	  profession.	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  stakes	  are	  
never	  higher	  for	  an	  organization	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  future	  reputation	  and,	  sometimes,	  its	  very	  
survival,	  than	  when	  it	  is	  facing	  crisis.	  In	  addition	  to	  learning,	  organizations	  actually	  grow	  
and	  improve	  as	  they	  study	  how	  mistakes	  were	  made	  in	  handling	  crises	  (Hagan,	  2007).	  
Hagan	  explains	  that	  crisis	  planning	  is	  a	  process	  of	  ongoing	  learning	  and	  that	  “learning	  
comes	  from	  assessing	  whether	  the	  organization	  handled	  the	  crisis	  appropriately	  or	  
mishandled	  aspects	  of	  it.	  This	  helps	  organizations	  prepare	  for	  the	  next	  crisis”	  (p.	  436).	  
This	  process	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  research	  on	  how	  organizations	  handle	  large	  
crises	  was	  my	  major	  motivation	  for	  this	  project.	  As	  I	  learned	  more	  about	  crisis	  
communications	  and	  the	  important	  factors	  cited	  for	  success	  including,	  most	  notably,	  prior	  
reputation,	  I	  came	  to	  see	  the	  Dieselgate	  case	  as	  ideal	  for	  my	  research	  needs	  and	  as	  a	  way	  to	  
contribute	  to	  existing	  research	  in	  the	  field.	  	  
The	  Importance	  of	  VW	  and	  Dieselgate	  in	  Crisis	  Communications	  Research	  
	   Not	  only	  was	  VW	  a	  high-­‐profile	  company	  and	  under	  heavy	  scrutiny	  when	  I	  began	  my	  
research,	  I	  noted	  other	  factors	  that	  made	  Dieselgate	  a	  good	  case	  to	  study.	  Because	  VW	  was	  
a	  consumer	  company	  with	  a	  long	  history,	  people	  easily	  identified	  with	  it	  and	  knew	  it	  well.	  	  
Unlike	  some	  other	  big	  reputational	  internal	  crises	  where	  the	  companies	  affected	  were	  
primarily	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  giants,	  such	  as	  Enron	  or	  some	  of	  the	  investment	  banks	  
involved	  in	  recent	  scandals,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  people	  might	  know	  someone	  on	  
their	  street	  who	  owns	  a	  VW	  or	  perhaps	  even	  a	  VW	  TDI	  car	  affected	  by	  Dieselgate.	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Another	  factor	  that	  I	  viewed	  as	  a	  positive	  reason	  to	  apply	  my	  research	  questions	  to	  
VW	  was	  its	  obvious	  and	  long-­‐measured	  prior	  positive	  brand	  reputation.	  This	  was	  not	  a	  
little-­‐known	  company	  or	  one	  that	  had	  suffered	  from	  a	  number	  of	  past	  crises	  (like	  some	  
other	  large	  car	  companies).	  As	  described	  in	  the	  introduction	  and	  literature	  review,	  this	  was	  
a	  firm	  that	  had	  long	  been	  recognized,	  by	  multiple	  ranking	  services,	  as	  a	  premier	  brand	  in	  its	  
segment	  –	  making	  it	  quite	  suitable	  for	  my	  questions	  about	  the	  value	  of	  prior	  reputation.	  
Since	  other	  crisis	  scholars	  including	  Coombs	  and	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  had	  looked	  closely	  at	  
the	  relationship	  between	  prior	  reputation	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  crisis	  response,	  I	  saw	  VW	  
and	  Dieselgate	  as	  relevant.	  Further,	  since	  research	  showed	  that	  internal	  reputational	  crises	  
can	  be	  particularly	  problematic,	  the	  fact	  that	  Dieselgate	  was	  admittedly	  intentional	  and	  
involved	  complicity	  at	  the	  very	  highest	  senior	  levels	  made	  it	  appealing	  for	  study.	  
Key	  Differences	  From	  Other	  Automotive	  Internal	  Crises	  
One	  important	  conclusion	  I	  observed	  after	  studying	  Dieselgate	  was	  that	  it	  had	  
another	  element	  that	  increased	  the	  complexity	  and	  impacted	  stakeholder	  reaction.	  
Specifically,	  I	  was	  very	  interested	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  VW	  had	  so	  clearly	  and	  vociferously	  stated	  
its	  commitment	  to	  responsible	  environmental	  practice	  prior	  to	  Dieselgate.	  I	  also	  noted	  the	  
efforts	  the	  company	  took	  to	  make	  environmental	  friendliness	  a	  buying	  proposition	  through	  
its	  heavy	  consumer	  advertising.	  In	  that	  sense,	  I	  viewed	  Dieselgate	  differently	  than	  other	  
internal	  crises	  because	  the	  misdeed	  related	  directly	  to	  an	  overt	  customer	  buying	  
proposition	  that	  had	  been	  heavily	  promoted	  (by	  a	  company	  with	  a	  previously	  strong	  prior	  
reputation).	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One	  can	  begin	  to	  see	  this	  distinction	  when	  viewing	  Dieselgate	  against	  other	  recent	  
and	  prominent	  internal	  crises	  in	  the	  automotive	  industry.	  One	  example	  was	  GM’s	  crisis	  
with	  defective	  ignition	  switches	  that	  caused	  cars	  to	  shut	  down	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  operation	  
and	  disable	  key	  systems	  including	  airbags,	  steering	  and	  brakes	  (Isidore	  &	  Perez,	  2015).	  
CNN	  reported	  that	  the	  car	  giant	  paid	  $900	  million	  to	  settle	  charges	  related	  to	  deaths	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  defect.	  While	  there	  was	  a	  call	  to	  investigate	  and	  prosecute	  individuals	  at	  GM,	  
the	  United	  States	  Justice	  Department	  deferred	  prosecution	  as	  the	  company	  agreed	  to	  
independent	  monitoring	  and	  oversight.	  
In	  another	  prominent	  internally	  caused	  automotive	  crisis,	  Toyota	  faced	  customers	  
in	  2009	  and	  2010	  with	  the	  news	  that	  safety	  systems	  were	  faulty	  in	  some	  of	  its	  models	  
including	  gas	  pedals	  that	  could	  be	  stuck	  while	  driving,	  causing	  unintended	  acceleration.	  
Media	  reports	  told	  of	  drivers	  whose	  cars	  had	  accelerated	  to	  more	  than	  100	  miles	  per	  hour.	  
The	  company,	  at	  the	  time	  the	  world’s	  largest	  automaker,	  vowed	  to	  fully	  investigate	  and	  
initiated	  recalls	  that	  affected	  about	  four	  million	  cars	  across	  many	  different	  model	  families	  
(Vlasic	  &	  Bunkley,	  2009).	  Impact	  to	  the	  company	  was	  significant	  as	  sales	  of	  new	  Toyota	  
vehicles	  were	  down	  by	  nearly	  25	  percent	  as	  of	  November	  2009.	  
These	  two	  crises	  shared	  the	  same	  internal	  classification	  as	  Dieselgate.	  Both	  were	  
widespread	  incidents	  involving	  massive	  numbers	  of	  vehicles	  on	  multiple	  continents.	  In	  
addition,	  both	  included	  questions	  about	  the	  involvement/prior	  knowledge	  of	  senior	  
leaders.	  But	  while	  there	  were	  many	  similarities	  with	  Dieselgate,	  I	  observed	  that	  a	  key	  
difference	  was	  that	  in	  neither	  of	  these	  examples	  did	  the	  companies	  specifically	  call	  out	  the	  
defective	  feature	  in	  marketing	  efforts	  to	  consumers.	  Toyota	  didn’t	  say	  “buy	  our	  cars	  for	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their	  superior	  accelerators”	  and	  GM	  didn’t	  implore	  consumers	  to	  buy	  its	  cars	  “because	  
we’re	  your	  best	  choice	  for	  ignition	  switches.”	  While	  safety	  is	  often	  a	  selling	  point	  for	  
automobiles,	  it	  has	  become	  more	  ubiquitous	  and	  less	  advertised	  by	  car	  companies	  as	  
governments	  and	  other	  regulatory	  bodies	  have	  mandated	  that	  all	  cars	  must	  meet	  certain	  
safety	  standards.	  
Dieselgate	  as	  a	  “Double	  Hit”	  Crisis	  
Indeed,	  with	  Dieselgate,	  we	  observe	  a	  company	  that	  had	  all	  of	  the	  features	  of	  prior	  
large-­‐scale	  automotive	  internal	  crises.	  The	  difference	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  it	  compounded	  its	  
error	  by	  aggressively	  marketing	  not	  just	  compliance	  with	  environmental	  regulations,	  but	  
the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  going	  above	  and	  beyond	  what	  was	  required	  to	  keep	  the	  environment	  
safe.	  
Importantly	  for	  Dieselgate	  victims,	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  created	  a	  “double	  hit”	  in	  
terms	  of	  how	  they	  perceived	  the	  impact.	  We	  know	  this	  because	  customers	  described	  their	  
deep	  feelings	  of	  betrayal	  from	  a	  situation	  wherein	  they	  were	  not	  only	  sold	  an	  illegal	  car,	  but	  
they	  were	  purposely	  baited	  into	  buying	  it	  for	  features	  it	  could	  never	  deliver.	  VW’s	  prior	  
excellent	  reputation	  seemed	  to	  make	  this	  even	  more	  shocking.	  Instead	  of	  prior	  reputation	  
protecting	  the	  company,	  it	  seemed	  to	  make	  the	  betrayal	  even	  worse	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  many	  
stakeholders.	  This	  was	  voiced	  especially	  strongly	  by	  those	  who	  described	  themselves	  as	  
being	  VW	  brand	  loyal.	  
From	  literature,	  it	  seems	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  implications	  in	  terms	  of	  effective	  
response	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  double	  hit	  crisis	  and	  perhaps	  further	  study	  is	  needed.	  We	  know	  
from	  Coombs’	  work	  in	  reputational	  crises	  with	  high	  victim	  attribution	  that	  mortification	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and	  accommodative	  action	  are	  observed	  as	  working	  best	  (and	  both	  were	  used	  by	  VW	  in	  
Dieselgate).	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  stakeholders	  would	  need	  to	  be	  extremely	  satisfied	  with	  the	  
execution	  of	  those	  strategies	  in	  a	  double	  hit	  crisis	  case.	  
In	  terms	  of	  my	  examination	  of	  the	  two	  specific	  crisis	  response	  events	  within	  
Dieselgate,	  I	  observed	  that	  both	  used	  an	  accommodative	  strategy,	  specifically	  
compensation	  (which	  had	  been	  preceded	  by	  apology).	  Unlike	  some	  crisis	  cases	  where	  only	  
one	  compensation	  effort	  was	  made,	  VW	  compensated	  victims	  in	  the	  United	  States	  twice	  –	  
once	  on	  its	  own	  with	  the	  Goodwill	  Package	  offer	  and	  once	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  final	  offer	  
settlement	  after	  negotiations	  through	  the	  court	  system.	  I	  studied	  stakeholder	  reaction	  at	  
both	  of	  these	  offer	  timeframes.	  
The	  GWP	  as	  a	  Recognized	  Gesture	  but	  Ultimately	  Unsatisfying	  	  
I	  initially	  viewed	  the	  GWP	  as	  an	  interesting	  choice	  because	  it	  seemed	  inadequate	  on	  
its	  face.	  After	  all,	  $1,000	  in	  gift	  cards	  represented	  less	  than	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  
new	  VW	  TDI.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  compensation	  offer	  from	  VW	  to	  its	  harmed	  victims	  and	  it	  
fell	  grossly	  short	  of	  what	  their	  potential	  financial	  loss	  could	  eventually	  be.	  In	  the	  beginning,	  
stakeholder	  reaction	  seemed	  to	  echo	  those	  thoughts	  as	  victims,	  many	  times	  in	  strikingly	  
sarcastic	  tones,	  chided	  VW	  for	  what	  they	  characterized	  was	  an	  insufficient	  offer.	  
Later,	  in	  the	  days	  following	  the	  GWP,	  tones	  changed	  somewhat	  as	  owners	  began	  to	  
see	  that	  this	  was	  a	  crisis	  that	  would	  take	  a	  protracted	  period	  to	  resolve.	  Beyond	  convincing	  
needed	  by	  some	  owners	  that	  their	  acceptance	  wouldn’t	  jeopardize	  their	  future	  legal	  
remedies,	  owners	  began	  to	  express	  that	  they	  would	  take	  the	  offer,	  albeit	  begrudgingly.	  The	  
general	  sentiment	  observed	  was	  that	  it	  was	  a	  gesture	  that	  they	  would	  accept,	  while	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acknowledging	  that	  it	  was	  in	  no	  way	  was	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  them	  completely.	  This	  “not	  
enough”	  sentiment	  is	  what	  led	  me	  to	  view	  the	  GWP	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ambiguous	  
response	  type	  as	  defined	  by	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutla	  (2000).	  
In	  the	  end,	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  owners	  I	  interviewed	  accepted	  the	  GWP.	  Many	  of	  those	  
interviewed	  and	  those	  who	  posted/tweeted	  online	  described	  how	  they	  had	  used	  the	  money	  
for	  their	  benefit	  while	  waiting	  for	  a	  final	  and	  complete	  settlement.	  Unlike	  the	  final	  offer	  
execution,	  little	  frustration	  was	  voiced	  with	  how	  the	  offer	  was	  delivered.	  
As	  an	  interim	  step	  on	  the	  way	  to	  final	  compensation,	  and	  with	  what	  was	  found	  about	  
brand	  sentiment	  after	  the	  final	  offer,	  the	  GWP	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  a	  reasonable	  step	  for	  VW	  
to	  take	  at	  the	  time.	  However,	  I	  would	  emphasize	  that	  customer	  reaction	  would	  indicate	  it	  
clearly	  wasn’t	  satisfactory	  as	  a	  standalone	  response,	  and	  therefore	  would	  be	  an	  ambiguous	  
response.	  
Relief	  and	  Frustration	  with	  the	  Final	  Offer	  
Approximately	  one	  year	  later	  the	  final	  offer	  was	  presented	  to	  owners	  who	  quickly	  
accessed	  whatever	  information	  they	  could	  find	  about	  what	  would	  be	  the	  final	  resolution	  to	  
their	  VW	  issue.	  Initial	  reactions	  included	  relief	  and	  an	  easing	  of	  their	  concerns	  but,	  
unfortunately	  for	  VW,	  owners	  quickly	  encountered	  numerous	  customer	  service	  problems	  
that	  left	  them	  lacking	  important	  information	  about	  their	  personal	  situations	  or	  even	  
delayed	  the	  time	  to	  final	  payment	  that	  they	  said	  they	  had	  been	  promised.	  
The	  content	  analyses	  revealed	  that	  these	  customer	  service	  issues	  were	  significant.	  
This	  was	  a	  stakeholder	  base	  that	  had	  already	  waited	  for	  more	  than	  a	  year	  for	  financial	  
resolution	  to	  what	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  investments	  most	  households	  will	  make.	  It	  would	  be	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hard	  to	  expect	  already-­‐harmed	  stakeholders	  to	  give	  VW	  a	  pass	  for	  poor	  execution	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  this	  long	  crisis	  cycle.	  The	  spirit	  of	  accommodative	  actions	  as	  described	  by	  crisis	  
scholars	  is	  that	  such	  strategies	  would	  be	  well-­‐executed.	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  delivering	  an	  effective	  response	  is	  well	  established	  in	  PR	  literature	  
and	  is	  articulated	  often	  in	  texts	  as	  foundational	  as	  the	  Page	  Society’s	  Page	  Principles.	  If	  the	  
action	  is	  flawed,	  it	  becomes	  harder	  to	  receive	  the	  reputational	  benefit	  from	  the	  response.	  
Coombs	  explains	  that	  these	  rebuild	  strategies	  must	  “address	  victims	  well”	  (2007,	  p.	  171).	  
This	  makes	  sense	  when	  looking	  at	  other	  crises.	  Automotive	  safety	  recalls,	  for	  instance,	  are	  
expected	  to	  be	  done	  right	  the	  first	  time.	  One	  wonders	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  product	  recalls	  
were	  done	  incorrectly	  or	  if	  Johnson	  &	  Johnson	  in	  the	  Tylenol	  case,	  for	  example,	  would	  have	  
removed	  only	  some	  product	  lots	  from	  stores.	  As	  Diermeier	  (2011)	  emphasized,	  companies	  
are	  effectively	  “on	  stage”	  when	  responding	  to	  a	  crisis	  and	  stakeholders	  expect	  a	  high	  level	  
of	  execution	  in	  a	  remedy	  like	  corrective	  action.	  Organizations	  have	  little	  room	  for	  error.	  
My	  conclusion	  is	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  for	  an	  organization	  to	  wait	  to	  provide	  
compensation	  (or	  any	  accommodative	  strategy)	  until	  its	  response	  mechanism	  is	  robust	  and	  
tested	  to	  prevent	  errors	  or	  mistakes.	  Mortification	  and	  transparent	  and	  ongoing	  two-­‐way	  
communication	  must	  suffice	  until	  the	  organization’s	  response	  is	  tested	  and	  robust.	  Coupled	  
with	  prior	  comments	  about	  the	  force	  magnifier	  effect	  of	  prior	  reputation	  on	  betrayal,	  this	  is	  
the	  best	  way	  I	  can	  rationalize	  the	  findings	  of	  RQ3,	  where,	  in	  the	  content	  analyses,	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Evaluating	  Dieselgate	  with	  the	  Trust	  Radar	  	  
Disciplinary	  literature	  gives	  us	  other	  ways	  to	  view	  VW’s	  crisis	  communications	  
handling.	  Diermeier	  (2011)	  urges	  organizations	  to	  think	  about	  four	  elements	  working	  
together	  during	  communications	  in	  crisis.	  His	  trust	  radar	  diagrams	  communications	  that	  
show	  empathy,	  transparency,	  commitment	  and	  expertise	  as	  working	  in	  unison	  for	  the	  
organization	  to	  be	  most	  effective	  during	  a	  crisis	  (see	  Fig.	  1	  below).	  
	  
Fig.	  1	  Diermeier’s	  Trust	  Radar	  for	  Crisis	  Communications	  
	  
In	  reviewing	  the	  findings	  from	  this	  project,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  VW’s	  diagram	  would	  not	  
look	  nearly	  as	  symmetrical	  as	  the	  one	  shown	  above.	  While	  VW	  received	  credit	  for	  
empathizing	  with	  owners	  and	  certainly	  created	  lots	  of	  communications	  indicating	  that	  is	  
was	  committed	  to	  solving	  the	  crisis,	  many	  stakeholders	  criticized	  it	  for	  withholding	  
pertinent	  information	  or	  delaying	  communications,	  which	  would	  affect	  the	  transparency	  
quadrant	  of	  the	  diagram	  since	  Diermeier	  defines	  transparency	  as	  relevant	  information	  
openly	  shared.	  In	  the	  Dieselgate	  case,	  I	  would	  expect	  the	  expertise	  component	  of	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communications	  to	  be	  a	  smaller	  element	  of	  the	  communications	  because	  this	  crisis	  was	  
caused	  internally	  and	  was	  actually	  the	  result	  of	  misuse	  of	  expertise.	  However,	  VW’s	  
executional	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  final	  offer	  would	  also	  contribute	  to	  low	  marks	  in	  the	  
expertise	  quadrant	  as	  well.	  For	  Dieselgate,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  trust	  radar	  might	  look	  
more	  like	  what	  is	  seen	  in	  Fig.	  2	  below.	  
	  
Fig	  2.	  How	  VW’s	  Dieselgate	  United	  States	  Response	  Might	  Be	  Viewed	  
	  
Other	  Relevant	  Stakeholder	  Mindsets	  
	   As	  mentioned,	  while	  they	  were	  in	  the	  minority,	  there	  were	  a	  few	  owners	  who	  
expressed	  that	  the	  number	  of	  automotive	  crises	  over	  the	  years	  had	  affected	  their	  
perceptions.	  These	  owners	  talked	  of	  being	  fatigued	  by	  car	  crises	  that	  had	  left	  them	  jaded	  
toward	  the	  industry	  in	  general.	  They	  expressed	  a	  general	  feeling	  of	  discontent	  or	  even	  
distrust	  of	  the	  industry	  and,	  therefore,	  seemed	  less	  shocked	  by	  Dieselgate.	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   Another	  observed	  sentiment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  some	  owners	  involved	  skepticism	  about	  
how	  bad	  the	  environmental	  impact	  of	  Dieselgate	  might	  be.	  While	  they	  didn’t	  openly	  dispute	  
what	  had	  been	  reported	  or	  offer	  any	  other	  evidence,	  they	  talked	  about	  how	  they	  couldn’t	  
rationalize	  how	  their	  own	  typical	  automobile	  could	  be	  as	  highly	  polluting	  as	  much	  larger	  
vehicles	  or	  how	  their	  individual	  car	  could	  make	  a	  significant	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  
environment.	  
Strong	  Prior	  Reputation	  as	  a	  Hindrance:	  The	  Corollary	  to	  Coombs	  
	   Those	  minority	  views	  aside,	  I	  do	  believe	  Dieselgate	  is	  an	  exemplar	  of	  a	  crisis	  case	  
that	  can	  help	  us	  understand	  how	  a	  company	  who	  had	  been	  previously	  highly-­‐regarded	  
should	  handle	  crisis	  response	  after	  internal	  misdeeds.	  As	  mentioned	  above	  in	  the	  
discussion	  of	  dieselgate	  as	  a	  “double	  hit	  crisis,”	  I	  posit	  that	  the	  stakeholder	  reactions	  here	  
and	  the	  brand	  sentiment	  data	  measured	  illustrates	  an	  observed	  negative	  force	  magnifier	  
effect	  of	  prior	  reputation:	  when	  someone	  you	  respect	  lets	  you	  down,	  it	  can	  hurt	  more	  than	  
if	  someone	  you	  didn’t	  know	  did	  the	  same	  thing.	  Combined	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  false	  
virtue,	  clean	  diesel,	  we	  can	  see,	  in	  a	  case	  like	  this	  with	  a	  strong	  prior	  reputation	  company	  
caught	  in	  an	  internal,	  preventable	  cluster	  crisis,	  a	  corollary	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  reputation	  as	  a	  
brand	  protector.	  
	   As	  Diermeier	  (2011)	  pointed	  out,	  we	  have	  always	  known	  that	  when	  stakeholders	  
feel	  that	  trust	  is	  violated,	  they	  react	  with	  outrage.	  Couple	  that	  with	  the	  findings	  that	  
stakeholders	  are	  more	  empowered	  and	  demanding	  than	  ever	  before,	  and	  this	  negative	  
force	  magnifier	  effect	  of	  strong	  prior	  reputation	  is	  an	  important	  finding	  and	  a	  contribution	  
to	  prior	  research	  on	  crisis	  response	  for	  internal	  reputational	  crises.	  Finally,	  the	  customer	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service	  issues	  identified	  after	  the	  final	  offer	  event	  remind	  us	  again	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  
delivering	  on	  promises	  so	  that	  victims	  can	  more	  quickly	  move	  on	  and	  that	  the	  organization	  
can	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  rebuilding	  reputation.	  	  
Limitations	  
	   This	  project	  had	  limitations	  that	  should	  be	  mentioned.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  
introduction,	  this	  project	  looked	  only	  at	  a	  relatively	  short	  time	  in	  the	  Dieselgate	  crisis	  and	  
only	  at	  the	  outcome	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  crisis	  continues	  globally	  as	  many	  countries	  
have	  yet	  to	  reach	  agreement	  with	  VW	  on	  their	  individualized	  outcomes.	  	  
Regarding	  methodology,	  the	  qualitative	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  relied	  on	  convenience	  
and	  snowball	  sampling.	  Convenience	  sampling	  uses	  participants	  who	  are	  identified	  by	  the	  
researcher.	  While	  Baxter	  and	  Babbie	  (2004)	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  is	  justified	  “if	  the	  
researcher	  wants	  to	  study	  the	  characteristics	  of	  people	  passing	  the	  sampling	  point	  at	  
specified	  times,”	  (p.	  134)	  they	  warn	  that	  it	  can	  be	  risky	  when	  trying	  to	  generalize	  the	  
results.	  	  
For	  the	  qualitative	  content	  analysis,	  the	  research	  examined	  only	  Twitter	  posts	  using	  
certain	  hashtags	  including	  #Dieselgate,	  #BuyBAckMyTDI	  and	  #GoodwillPackage.	  This	  was	  
in	  an	  effort	  to	  explore	  stakeholder	  interaction	  regarding	  the	  Dieselgate	  crisis.	  In	  addition,	  
only	  original	  tweets,	  and	  not	  retweets,	  were	  collected	  and	  analyzed.	  Future	  research	  could	  
examine	  retweets	  as	  well	  to	  determine	  the	  viral	  spread	  and	  to	  better	  assess	  interactivity	  
with	  the	  campaign.	  Lastly,	  Twitter’s	  Advanced	  Search	  tool	  has	  its	  limitations	  and	  future	  
research	  should	  utilize	  multiple	  tools	  to	  access	  past	  tweets	  on	  Twitter.	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For	  both	  the	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  content	  analyses,	  fewer	  tweets	  and	  online	  
postings	  were	  found	  for	  the	  period	  after	  the	  final	  offer	  than	  for	  after	  the	  GWP.	  As	  
mentioned,	  this	  may	  have	  been	  because	  there	  was	  a	  time	  lag	  between	  the	  announcement	  of	  
the	  offer	  details	  and	  individualized	  communications	  to	  owners	  about	  their	  own	  
compensation	  payments.	  Also,	  as	  previously	  mentioned,	  online	  comments	  were	  drawn	  
from	  pertinent	  Twitter	  hashtags	  and	  from	  online	  discussion	  boards	  designed	  for	  owners	  –	  
all	  online	  venues	  likely	  populated	  by	  VW	  TDI	  owners.	  However,	  because	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  
verify	  identities	  on	  these	  platforms,	  TDI	  ownership	  could	  not	  be	  verified	  from	  these	  
commenters.	  
Future	  Research	  	  	  
Internal	  crises	  with	  high	  reputational	  impact	  are	  worthy	  of	  future	  study.	  Because	  
Dieselgate	  lives	  on	  in	  terms	  of	  impact	  around	  the	  globe	  in	  other	  countries,	  research	  could	  
examine	  more	  recent	  company	  response	  efforts	  in	  other	  global	  regions.	  	  Other	  potential	  
avenues	  for	  future	  research	  might	  look	  at	  crises	  with	  similarities	  in	  terms	  of	  consumer	  
features	  that	  had	  been	  highly	  promoted	  but	  were	  later	  found	  to	  be	  faulty,	  creating	  the	  
double-­‐hit	  explained	  above.	  
Further,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  observed	  corollary	  to	  Coombs’	  and	  Dawar	  and	  Pillutlas’	  
findings	  about	  the	  value	  of	  a	  strong	  prior	  reputation	  is	  also	  warranted.	  As	  today’s	  
consumers	  become	  more	  empowered	  and	  more	  demanding,	  will	  the	  sense	  of	  victimization	  
and	  betrayal	  from	  a	  previously	  trusted	  organization	  be	  worsened	  as	  was	  observed	  with	  
Dieselgate?	  Looking	  at	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  corollary	  on	  reputation	  in	  companies	  that	  
promoted	  what	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  false	  virtue	  would	  be	  especially	  relevant.	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As	  mentioned,	  the	  VW	  corporate	  culture	  is	  also	  ripe	  for	  future	  study.	  This	  project	  
found	  stakeholders	  who	  viewed	  VW’s	  corporate	  culture	  as	  having	  contributed	  to	  the	  
internal	  environment	  that	  allowed	  it	  to	  approve	  cheating	  its	  customers.	  Media	  reports	  also	  
posited	  that	  VW’s	  historically	  command-­‐and	  control	  culture	  and	  unwavering	  drive	  for	  
profits	  led	  to	  Dieselgate.	  Specific	  research	  into	  VW’s	  culture	  might	  provide	  further	  insight.	  	  
Using	  Holmstrom’s	  reflective	  paradigm	  as	  a	  theoretical	  basis,	  research	  could	  look	  at	  how	  
VW’s	  more	  reflexive	  operational	  mindset	  precipitated	  the	  crisis	  and	  perhaps	  impacted	  its	  
crisis	  response	  decisions.	  A	  review	  of	  VW’s	  stated	  corporate	  values	  and	  how	  those	  were	  
enacted	  might	  also	  be	  enlightening	  and	  would	  contribute	  to	  knowledge	  about	  flawed	  values	  
enactment.	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Oral	  Consent	  –	  Tidwell	  Interviews	  for	  Dissertation	  Project	  -­‐-­‐	  2017	  
	  
As	   (a	   student,	   professor,	   etc.)	   in	   the	   University	   of	   Kansas's	   Department	   of	   _Journalism__________,	   I	  
(we)	  am	  conducting	  a	  research	  project	  about	  Volkswagen	  and	  its	  recent	  “dieselgate”	  crisis.	  I	  would	  like	  
to	  interview	  you)	  to	  obtain	  opinions	  about	  this	  matter	  as	  a	  Volkswagen	  or	  Audi	  automobile	  owner.	  Your	  
participation	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  about	  20	  minutes.	  You	  have	  no	  obligation	  to	  participate	  and	  you	  may	  
discontinue	  your	  involvement	  at	  any	  time.	  
	  
Your	  participation	  should	  cause	  no	  more	  discomfort	   than	  you	  would	  experience	   in	  your	  everyday	   life.	  
Although	  participation	  may	  not	  benefit	  you	  directly,	  the	  information	  obtained	  from	  the	  study	  will	  help	  
us	   gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  companies	   react	   in	   a	   crisis	   and	  how	   they	  go	  about	   interacting	  
with	   customers	   during	   such	   an	   event.	   Your	   identifiable	   information	  will	   not	   be	   shared	   unless	   (a)	   it	   is	  
required	  by	  law	  or	  university	  policy,	  or	  (b)	  you	  give	  written	  permission.	  	  
	  
*It	   is	  possible,	  however,	  with	   internet	  communications,	   that	   through	   intent	  or	  accident	  someone	  other	  
than	  the	  intended	  recipient	  may	  hear	  your	  response.	  
	  
**This	  interview	  will	  be	  recorded.	  Recording	  is	  required	  to	  participate.	  You	  may	  stop	  taping	  at	  any	  time.	  
The	   recordings	   will	   be	   transcribed	   by	   me.	   Only	   I	   and/or	   the	   faculty	   supervisor)	   will	   have	   access	   to	  
recordings	  which	  will	  be	  stored	  in	  my	  project	  files	  and	  will	  be	  destroyed	  in	  five	  years.	  
	  
Participation	   in	   the	   interview	   indicates	   your	  willingness	   to	   take	  part	   in	   this	   study	   and	   that	   you	  are	   at	  
least	  18	  years	  old.	  Should	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  this	  project	  or	  your	  participation	  in	  it	  you	  may	  
ask	  me	  or	  my	   (our)	   faculty	   supervisor,	  Dr.	  Charles	  Marsh	  at	   the	  School	  of	   Journalism.	   If	   you	  have	  any	  
questions	  about	  your	  rights	  as	  a	  research	  participant,	  you	  may	  call	  the	  Human	  Subjects	  Protection	  Office	  
at	  (785)	  864-­‐7429	  or	  email	  irb@ku.edu.	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1]	  Subject	  information	  
Demographics:	  Age/sex	  
Location:	  
Volkswagen	  model	  owned:	  
Length	  of	  ownership:	  
	  
2]	  Purchase	  intent	  and	  satisfaction	  	  
Why	  did	  you	  purchase	  your	  VW	  car?	  What	  were	  the	  major	  motivational	  factors	  (performance,	  fuel	  economy,	  
environmental	  impact,	  etc.)	  
Was	  there	  a	  reason	  you	  chose	  a	  diesel	  powered	  car?	  
Generally,	  Have	  you	  been	  happy	  with	  your	  car	  in	  terms	  of	  performance,	  service	  you've	  received	  from	  the	  company,	  
etc.?	  
Have	  you	  recommended	  VW	  to	  others	  (at	  any	  time?)	  
3]	  Situation	  awareness	  
How	  closely	  have	  you	  followed	  the	  news	  about	  Volkswagen	  and	  its	  diesel	  vehicles?	  
Do	  you	  remember	  when	  you	  first	  heard	  about	  it?	  
How	  frequently	  do	  you	  follow	  news	  about	  VW	  now?	  
Are	  you	  aware	  of	  two	  elements	  of	  the	  situation:	  The	  'goodwill	  package'	  that	  was	  offered	  to	  customers	  in	  fall	  of	  
2015	  and	  the	  ultimate	  settlement	  package	  for	  customers	  that	  was	  announced	  in	  October	  of	  2016?	  
	  
4]	  Dieselgate	  compensation	  and	  future	  intention	  
When	  you	  first	  heard	  about	  Dieselgate,	  what	  was	  your	  immediate	  reaction?	  
What	  do	  you	  remember	  about	  how	  VW	  reacted	  in	  the	  beginning?	  
Did	  you	  accept	  the	  Goodwill	  Package	  gift	  card	  offer?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  
Did	  you	  feel	  like	  the	  Goodwill	  package	  was	  a	  satisfactory	  offer	  from	  VW	  at	  the	  time?	  Do	  you	  feel	  any	  differently	  
now?	  
Later,	  in	  2016,	  VW	  settled	  in	  the	  US	  and	  offered	  its	  final	  compensation	  package.	  Have	  you	  accepted	  that	  final	  
compensation?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  
Did	  you	  feel	  like	  that	  final	  settlement	  package	  was	  a	  satisfactory	  offer	  at	  the	  time?	  Do	  you	  feel	  any	  differently	  
now?	  
Now	  that	  customers	  have	  received	  final	  compensation,	  what	  is	  your	  opinion	  of	  VW	  as	  a	  company?	  Has	  it	  changed	  
since	  before	  Dieselgate?	  
Would	  you	  purchase	  another	  VW	  automobile?	  If	  so,	  under	  what	  conditions	  and	  what	  would	  be	  your	  motivating	  
factors?	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RQ	  2	  Coding	  Form-­‐Tidwell	  Dissertation	  2017-­‐Qualitative	  content	  analysis	  matrix	  
Inventory	  variables:	   	  
User	  name	   	  
Date	  of	  posting	   	  
Source	  (Twitter	  or	  discussion	  board)	   	  
	   	  
	  
Content	  variables:	   	  
	   	  
The	  user	  made	  comments	  indicating	  
satisfaction	  with	  VW	  or	  its	  offer	  (Y/N)	  
	  
	  
The	  user	  made	  comments	  indicating	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  VW	  or	  its	  offer	  (Y/N)	  
	  
	  
The	  user	  reported	  news	  about	  the	  offer	  (Y/N)	  
	  
	  
The	  user	  expressed	  concern	  over	  his/her	  legal	  
options	  regarding	  the	  offer	  (i.e.	  ability	  to	  sue	  
VW)	  or	  expressed	  a	  desire	  to	  sue	  VW	  (Y/N…	  
explain)	  
	  
The	  user	  displayed	  sarcastic	  comments	  about	  
VW	  as	  a	  company	  or	  its	  behavior	  (Y/N…	  
explain)	  
	  
The	  user	  addressed	  the	  company	  directly	  with	  





The	  user	  addressed	  the	  company	  directly	  with	  




RQ	  3	  Coding	  Form-­‐Tidwell	  Dissertation	  2017	  –	  Quantitative	  content	  analysis	  
	  
Inventory	  variables:	   	  
User	  name	   	  
Date	  of	  posting	   Oct-­‐Nov	  2016	  OR	  Nov	  2015	  
Source	  (Twitter	  or	  discussion	  board)	   T	  or	  D	  
	   	  
	  
	  
